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This study aimed at exploring how different jurisdictions interacted with each other in 
regional railway planning in China. The research questions focused on the complex 
relationships between different jurisdictions in the planning process. More specific 
attention was spent on the institutional arrangement that relevant governments have set 
up, their roles in the planning process, and the way they coordinated plans to achieve 
demands on regional infrastructure. Although the cooperation regime between central 
and local governments has been considerably improved since the reform era, it still 
embodies constraints that intensify the bargaining between various tiers of governments. 
This in turn leads to a change of state power among different geopolitical scales. 
In this study, the theoretical basis of state re-organization adopts the state rescaling 
theory, which provides an alternative way to examine the changing roles of states. 
Instead of treating the regional institution as a pre-given form, its core lies in evaluating 
the dialectical ways in which regions are produced by interaction between different 
jurisdictional governments. The Pearl River Delta intercity railway was used as a case 
study. What concerned most was the ways in which multiple actors conducted the 
planning coordination. 
Since economic reform, the centrally-dominated system of railway planning gradually 
has changed to a multi-level partnership where the central government, provincial 
governments and municipal governments join together to form a partnership to 
maximize their economic interests. Coordination among multiple jurisdictions becomes 
necessary in planning railways in regions. Particularly, the coordinating process not only 
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includes vertical negotiation among the multi-level governments, but also a horizontal 
and competitive relationship between municipal governments. 
It is found that the coordinating mechanism is not fixed, but rather, ad hoc during the 
planning process. The planning mechanisms varied case by case in planning the PRD 
intercity railway. There is no regular route in planning coordination. Once conflicts 
appear, relevant actors come together to solve the problems. On the other hand, no scale 
of government dominates the power in decision-making. All agreements are reached 
based on the bargaining between different jurisdictions in both scaling-up and scaling-
down processes. 
Briefly, the planning process of the PRD intercity railway and the politics involved are a 
reflection of the ongoing process of state rescaling. The administrative form and 
configuration in planning railways are formed in relation to the trends and counter-
trends of the state re-organization process. 
The regions in China are now witnessing a re-organization of states' regulatory scale, 
because certain functions of states are being scaled up and scaled down towards different 
institutional levels. The newly emergent planning institutions of infrastructure projects at 
the regional scale highlight the essential role of regions in an arena for the trends and 
counter-trends of state re-organization. Furthermore, the power reshuffling between the 
central and provincial governments in the case of PRD intercity railway planning has 
showed that the rescaling of planning authority intensifies the bargaining among 
different governments while the increasingly intensive bargaining leads to another round 
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Against the context of soaring globalization, information and decentralization, the spatial scales 
of urban and region have been changed by the extension of 'space of flow' (Castells 1989). For 
instance, growing and expanding metropolitan regions are beyond the parameters of major 
agglomerations (Halbert et al. 2006). The result, as stated by Hall (2006), is the selective 
emergence of enlarged metropolitan regions, many of which are polycentric regions. 
Many scholars, especially geographers are researching into polycentric regions, hoping to 
contribute new insights on this new trend and practical suggestions to governments. The 
corresponding researches on polycentric region typically outlined from three levels - spatiality, 
function and governance (Luo 2008). Hall (2006) indicated that the outcome of spatial multi-
centrality reflected the politics, economy and society in regional development. Multi-centric 
regions' development depends on the intercity functional connections. The successful connection 
lies in the smooth coordination among different levels of states. Therefore, regional governance 
is supposed to be the final determining factor of regional development (Hall and Pain 2006). As 
such, it is not enough for planners to merely concern with the multi-centric spatial structure. 
More emphasis should be put on regional governance, and the creation of regional plans and 
development strategies. 
With the concomitant trends of globalization and urbanization in China, its regional system has 
undergone significant transformation and presented the tendency of poly-center (e.g. Pearl River 
Delta (PRD) and Yangtze River Delta (YRD) )• Due to its important role in promoting urban-
regional competitive advantages in China, inter-city governance is increasingly emphasized by 
the central government (Urban Planning News, 2005). 
More insights on Chinese regional politics are necessary, because there are many difficulties for 
governments on different levels to cooperate with each other. For instance, with the rise of urban 
entrepreneurialism, the PRD witnessed a fierce competition among municipal governments (Xu 
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and Yeh 2005). Accordingly, a lot of problems have risen from spatially fragmenting effects of 
this developmental style, such as the redundant construction of infrastructures from city to city, 
similarity of industrial sectors among cities, and exacerbated competitions to attract investors. 
Obviously, the lack of an applicable inter-city cooperation mechanism among soaring 
polycentric regions of China (e.g. PRD) has been widely noted. Many endeavors have been 
undertaken to cultivate regional cooperation (e.g. Yangtze River Urban Economic Coordination 
Conference). Nevertheless, little is known about their effects, and even less is known about the 
practical process of cooperation, such as the construction of infrastructure. 
This thesis investigates the interaction among multiple jurisdictional states in the polycentric 
regions during the infrastructure planning process. In this study, first, the empirical case will 
focus on regional infrastructure projects. Compared with the former case study, infrastructure 
projects exert an increasing role in the urban and regional competitiveness. It thus provides us a 
more direct and micro viewpoint of current regional politics in China. Second, I will emphasize 
the planning process, which includes the technical planning and the negotiation process. These 
two processes in planning will help to get a comprehensive picture of the interaction among 
various tiers of governments. Furthermore, attention will be paid to possible divergences of 
intentions and power imbalances, which attributed to the emerging round of state re-organization 
in China. 
1.2 Research Problem and Objective 
This research aims to explore how the multiple jurisdictional states in a polycentric region 
interact with each other during the infrastructure planning process. The focus is to describe and 
analyze changes of planning legislation, institutional arrangement and coordinating mechanisms 
relevant to infrastructure planning, and to explore the relationship between multiple jurisdictional 
governments and the emerging institution of planning in the PRD region of China. 
Theoretically, this thesis also attempts to locate state re-organization and planning issues within 
the contextual changes since the economic reform and the institutions being restructured in 
China. Central to this interpretation is the identification of the ways in which pressure for both 
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regional development and spatial fragmentation created by the process of economic reform and 
policy's changes are translated into regional infrastructure planning, and how such regional plans 
in turn impact on the interaction between various tiers of governments. To achieve this aim, an 
extensive literature review is conducted to see how regional planning and state rescaling are 
interrelated in different contexts in order to build up a theoretical framework and an analytical 
structure to interpret cases which are applied in this thesis. 
L3 Research Significance 
We are now witnessing a re-organization of state functions in both western countries and China. 
A large number of studies have been extended on this subject (Brenner 1999, 2004; Buchs 2009, 
Jessop 2002, Kazepov 2008, Wu 2003, Wu and Zhang 2010, Xu 2008, Xu and Yeh 2010). It is 
argued that rather than an erosion of national state capacities, the state space is deliberately 
restructured by the national state to solve the crisis and overcome the hurdles of capital 
accumulation and social reproduction in the face of global changes and market failure (Brenner 
2001). As a result, new scales have been established strategically by the state as to fulfill 
competing objects of economic growth and to counter the crises. On the regional scale, the 
current wave of regional institutions initiatives underscores the role of region as an arena for the 
state spatial reorganization. The national states established new institutional forms at the regional 
scale by scaling up and scaling down certain functions of national states instead of losing its 
authorities (Brenner 2001). Thus, state studies on the regional scale provide an alternative way to 
examine the changing role of states. 
The aims of states' restructuring are to respond to the competitive pressure of global capitals, and 
to tackle governance failures and crises caused by former experimentation of local regulation. It 
was in this sense that the politics and planning of city-regions play a pivotal role in delivering the 
variety of regulatory spaces and facilities needed to lubricate capital flows (Xu and Yeh 2010: 6). 
In fact, the politics and planning of city-regions are the mediums through which the state 
materialize spatial strategies, and restructure of state space. From this perspective, the 
widespread concern of states rescaling may be understood with reference to the formation of 
politics and planning of newly emerging city-regions whereas the state re-organization is being 
articulated. 
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In the case of China, the interest of the transformation of the states in China is how the central 
and local states interact with each other in the policy-making process of cities. However, there is 
a lack of considerations connecting the transformation of states with the changing politics of the 
regions in the current theory. A case study on the planning and politics of the region in China 
will provide some useful insights into the restructuring process of states' space during Chinese 
transitional stage. Moreover, as indicated above, each case of region-wide institutional 
restructuring should be understood with reference to the specific regulatory framework and the 
problems of different national states. Hence, state rescaling at the regional scale should be a 
different story in the context of socialist China. This study seeks to fill the current academic gap 
and contribute a deeper understanding of innovative regional politics and states' re-organization 
in China, in both theoretical and practical terms. It hopes to examine the trends of state 
restructuring unfolded in planning processes on the regional scale. To achieve it, this study 
attempts to shed light on the current trends of state re-organization in China. 
On the other hand, the planning coordination is of great difficulty for many cities in China, 
particularly for cities in the polycentric regions. This is especially evident in the PRD region. 
With the rise of urban entrepreneurialism, the PRD witnessed a fierce competition among 
municipal governments (Xu and Yeh 2005). The spatially fragmenting effects have made PRD 
the least coordinating region in China. The lack of an applicable intercity cooperation 
mechanism among the soaring polycentric regions of China (e.g. PRD) has been obviously. A 
number of endeavors have been undertaken to cultivate regional cooperation. However, little is 
known for their effects, and even less is known for the practical process of coordination. 
In addition, intercity transportation is currently considered as an increasingly important strategic 
vehicle for creating better-balanced urban patterns and promoting regional competitiveness. 
They not only have immense implication for the initial state structure, but also give birth to a 
new form of planning coordination among different jurisdictions. The dramatic changes of state 
interaction at the regional level in planning intercity railways display a vivid case for scholar 
research. The result of this study will have a significant value for local politicians and planners 
by examining the mechanism of planning coordination in the case study of the PRD intercity 
railway. Experiences drawn from the planning coordination in the PRD not only are helpful for 
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improving the efficiency of collaboration in the PRD, but also shed light on similar collaboration 
in other regions of China. 
1.4 Methodology 
Study Steps 
This study generally consists of four steps (see Figurel.l). The first step is to identify the 
research objective. Along with the rise of regional cooperation, a new round of state re-
organization has been identified in China. A renewed examination is necessary to focus on state 
restructuring on the regional scale. The second step is to focus on literature review. Its major task 
is to provide some theoretical basis from theories from western countries and China. It is to form 
an analytical framework for the empirical study taking the PRD region as an example. Some 
propositions are raised from the review of the context of China. The third step is the most crucial 
and time-consuming. The task is to conduct a fieldtrip and collect relevant data in the PRD 
region based on the analytical framework. Three specific case studies are adopted to illustrate the 
planning coordination of the PRD intercity railway. The final job is to fulfill the analysis of data, 
and to make some conclusions according to the propositions raised in the literature review. 
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Figure 1.1: Study steps of this study 
Source: Author. 
As shown in figure 1.1,1 confined my research objective to state re-organization in China. Then 
I fit it into the theoretical background, and conducted literature review on the state rescaling 
theory. In order to understand the rescaling process in a more specific way, I related the planning 
process to the rescaling process, and formed an analytical framework to exam the case. With 
information from different sources, the next step is to use the theoretical part to analyze the case, 
and to see whether my assumptions are right or not. 
Important Term 
The important term to be declared clearly in this study is the “polycentric region". It is used to 
describe the phenomenon "of metropolises, cities and towns that are spatially separated but 
ftinctionally networked, clustered around one or more larger central cities" (Hall and Pain 2006: 
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3). Other terms are also used to illustrate such a phenomenon, like "polycentric mega-city 
regions (MCR)", "polycentric mega city" or "polycentric urban regions". The study will use the 
simple term "polycentric region" to refer to the same phenomenon as indicated above. 
Such multi-center city-regions are becoming significant features of the urban scene under 
conditions of contemporary globalization. The classic example is Randstad Holland consisting of 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Hague, Utrecht and intervening towns. They were adjacent to each 
other, yet maintained their administrative independence. Now they are connected together as a 
single economic arena. There is no dominant central city within the region, but several cities 
have impacts on regional economic growth together. This phenomenon is not exclusive to 
Europe. For instance, the pattern ofPRD and YRD regions in China was recognized as a similar 
one (Xu and Li 1990, Yeh, 2001). 
The polycentric region was also taken as a planning strategy to achieve a more balanced spatial 
pattern of development, and a higher level of competitiveness in the world (Waterhout et al. 
2003). In China, planners have tried to achieve this polycentric pattern. They attempt to develop 
strategic plans oriented to the multi-centered region. Furthermore, the core to realize such a 
polycentric pattern is stressed in intercity commuting. In China, there is a current trend to 
construct intercity railways among developed regions. 
In this study, the polycentric regions are used for two main purposes. One is to refer to the 
polycentric pattern in the PRD region. It tends to indicate the spatial feature of multiple centers 
in the PRD region. According to the study by Yu et al. (2009), the PRD has shown certain signs 
ofpolycentricity in the region. Though considerable connections are identified between the core 
cities in the PRD (Li et al. 2006), the intercity competition has intensified as well. Along with the 
economic reform, there has been a wide spread of localism in cities of the PRD. The municipal 
governments have deployed various development strategies to capture mobile resources. This has 
led to fierce intercity competition and thus a spatial fragmentation. The polycentric region is one 
of resultant spatial patterns. Such characteristic feature can help us understand why planning 
cooperation is difficult in the PRD region. The other purpose is to explain the urgent need of 
planning mechanisms in Chinese regions. Since the polycentric regions are proposed as a 
planning strategy by governments, regional transportation projects have to fulfill demands of 
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intercity commuting. It is for this reason that the planning mechanism of regional infrastructure 
is urgently needed in Chinese regions. 
Study Area 
The study area of this thesis is the PRD region. The PRD is located in Guangdong Province of 
South China, and is comprises of nine municipal cities, namely Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
Dongguan, Huizhou, Zhongshan, Foshan, Zhaoqing, and Jiangmen. The PRD region in southern 
China is low-lying area alongside the Pearl River estuary where the Pearl River flows into the 
South China Sea. The PRD consists of the river's flood plain and surrounding hills, with a total 
land area of 25,300 W (see Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2: Map of the Pearl River Delta in Guangdong Province 
Source: Author. 
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A large number of studies have been unfolded on this region. Different researchers have different 
geographical boundaries concept of the PRD. Some included Hong Kong and Macao (Zheng 
1989, Sit 2001) while others regarded them as external parts (Lin 1997, Sit and Yang 1997). In 
this study, the main concern is the planning process of the PRD intercity railway. Because Hong 
Kong and Macao are not incorporated into the railway plans, the PRD in this study refers to a 
region consisting of nine municipalities under the jurisdiction of Guangdong Province. 
The PRD has been characterized as a relatively free economic circle in the past two decades. 
With an advantageous location on the southeastern coast, PRD cities have enjoyed the benefits 
from the economic reform since 1978. The region is distinct from other regions by its proactive 
tradition, namely "one step forward" in the reform era. The examination of the PRD's experience 
can present a vivid picture of planning coordination to other regions in China. 
Additionally, the PRD has to confront more difficulties than other regions in planning 
coordination. Like polycentric regions in other countries, the PRD has to face problems resulting 
from localism and overwhelming competition. Although its nine municipalities are under 
jurisdiction of Guangdong Province, each city is significantly different from another. In the 
reform era, each of them has developed independently in its own path, as well as competitive 
industries. With traditional bottom-up development pattern, municipal governments have little 
experience in regional cooperation. With strong political fragmentation, the PRD was 
considered as "one of the least coordinated regions in China" (Xu 2008:178). Yet in recent years, 
it was observed that the reform-imposed pressure for change tended to reinforce the growing 
demand for horizontal networking and state intervention at the strategic level (Xu 2008). Thus, 
the complexity of the PRD implies the divergent performance during multi-actor interaction. 
This in turn indicates the potential trend of coordination pattern and the urgency of relevant 
study. 
In the regional configuration of PRD, as suggested by Yuan (2007), inter-city competition 
overwhelmed the trend of cooperation. Competition in infrastructure construction is the best 
example to illustrate it. For instance, in these days, the majority of PRD cities (e.g. Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen and Huizhou) developed infrastructure plans on ports, petrol industry and automobile 
industry respectively. Since cooperation and coordination on the municipal level are not an easy 
task, it is interesting to find out how relevant institutions organized on the central, provincial and 
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municipal levels, and demonstrate how they interact with each other. The study is expected to 
provide more insights into interactions among different jurisdictions in the planning process for 
this purpose, by taking the PRD intercity railway as a case study. 
In 2005, the State Council approved the intercity railway network planning in principle in the 
developed regions in China. The PRD intercity railway is one of the earliest projects stepped into 
daily schedule of both central and local governments. An effective pattern of coordination in 
planning such intercity railway is under its way. The case study of the PRD intercity railway 
presents a good focus for examining the current initiatives in planning coordination by various 
tiers of governments. Particularly, three major lines of the railway network are chosen for the 
further examination. They are Guangzhou-Foshan intercity railway, Guangzhou-Zhuhai intercity 
railway and Guangzhou-Dongguan-Shenzhen intercity railway. These three lines are listed as the 
key projects by the provincial and municipal governments, and some of them have been 
completed by now. These three cases thus can present us a relatively comprehensive process of 
states' interaction in planning coordination. 
Data Source and Collection 
With regards to the research objective, an appropriate means of investigating the topic is 
observation of the plan's changes, especially justification of the PRD intercity railway plan, and 
interviewing officials to catch their interaction and intentions behind formal decision-making 
process. Both unstructured and semi-structured interviews have been used to investigate the case. 
In order to understand multiple actors' interaction and the various intentions of different levels of 
governments, the interviewees were mainly selected from local senior officials who were key 
participants of the coordination meeting in planning processes of the PRD intercity railway. The 
coordination meeting was the major platform that allowed different actors interact with each 
other. The actors involved in the meeting came from relevant functional departments at different 
levels. They were the local experts and represented their corresponding jurisdictions to negotiate 
with others. Interviews with these actors can not only provide a relatively comprehensive picture 
of negotiation processes, but also intentions behind their interacting behaviors. 
10 
Nearly 22 interviews with various key figures in planning were conducted from June 2009 to 
March 2011. With the financial support of South China Program^ I was able to go to different 
PRD's cities without constrains, and tried to obtain possibly comprehensive information of the 
planning process. The interviewees were selected from local officials of various levels, ranging 
from provincial level to prefecture level, as well as urban planners and scholars. The process of 
data collection was started from the provincial level. As early as 2009,1 got the chance to 
interview with some key figures at the provincial level, such as the director from Guangdong 
Provincial Urban Development and Studies Center. With the information provided by the 
provincial level, I decided to choose three main lines for further investigation. Also, I made my 
interviewed questions concerned on several perspectives. In this phrase, the interviewees mainly 
came from functional departments at the municipal level. I have been to seven cities along the 
three main lines and talked with local officials, mainly from Planning Bureau, Land Bureau, and 
Development and Reform Bureau. They were the key persons in charge of planning issues within 
their territories. They were familiar with local conditions and kept frequent contacts with official 
at the provincial level. Compared with the provincial level, the interviews with the municipalities 
were more fruitful and enriched the empirical base of this study. In addition, the interviews with 
planners and scholars outside the governments are also useful. 
The total length of the interviews collected was almost 50 hours, and interview notes reached 
200 pages. Due to confidentiality issues, all interviewees in this study would remain anonymous 
and their real surname would not been included in name list. It merely included general 
information (i.e. their agency and position) (see Table 3.2). The interview outline consisted of 
15 open-ended questions, which were spelt out based on the framework. 
Table 1.1: List of Interviews in the Pearl River Delta 
City Organization Position Interview Date 
Guangzhou Transport Planning Vice M y 16,2010 
Institution Director 
~2 Guangzhou Transport Planning Director July 16,2010 
Institution 
2 South China Programme (project code: 6902649), Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies. 
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3 Guangzhou Development and Official September 9, 
Reform Bureau, 2009 
Transport Office 




5 Guangzhou Guangdon Provincial Official June 10,2010 
Development and 
Reform Commission 
6 Guangzhou Guangdong Provincial Director May 18,2009 
Urban Development and 
Studies Center 
7 Guangzhou Guangdong Provincial Planner May 18,2009 
Urban Development and 
Studies Center 
8 Guangzhou Sun Yat-sun University Professor June 13，2009 
9 Guangzhou Guangfo Railway Director July 15,2009 
Cooperation 
10 Shunde Development Planning Official June 22,2010 
and Statistics Bureau 
11 Foshan Planning Bureau Director June 21,2010 
12 Foshan NanHai Land Bureau Official June 18,2010 
13 Dongguan Development and Vice June 24,2010 
Reform Bureau-transport director 
office 
14 Dongguan Planning Bureau, Project Director June 24, 2010 
Office 
15 Dongguan Planning Bureau Director June 24,2010 
16 Zhuhai Planning Bureau Director June 25,2010 
17 Zhuhai Development and Director June 25,2010 
Reform Bureau- Project 
Department 
18 Zhongshan Planning Bureau, Official July 22,2010 
Municipal Infrastructure 
Department 
19 Zhongshan Development and Official July 30,2010 
Reform Bureau 
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20 Huizhou Development and Official June 30,2010 
Reform Bureau 
21 Huizhou Huiyang Planning and Planner June 29,2010 
Design Institution 
22 Shenzhen Urban Development and Planner March 30, 
Research Center 2011 
Additionally, a variety of secondary data were also used in this study. It included relevant books 
and published papers, statistical yearbooks, government reports, local newspapers and the mass 
news from Internet. These sources provided a rich set of data and information about the 
transitioning context of China, whereas a new round of states' reworking is forming. In addition, 
the officials in Planning Bureau of Dongguan kindly provided the minutes on many coordination 
meetings; the staff in Planning Bureau of Shunde and Shenzhen provided the planning design 
materials of the PRD intercity railway. 
Generally, the majority of information and data was accessed from interviews with government 
officials and planners. This method had both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, 
interviewees provide some key information about negotiation details in coordinating meetings, 
where notes are not available. On the other hand, different interviewees may present different 
arguments on the same issue based on their experiences and positions. Some information may 
not be accurate or representative. In order to reduce the negative effects, I tried to compare 
information obtained from different interviewees, and to find the most objective description of 
the planning process. Also, I made a large number of referrals to other documentary sources to 
see whether the interviews are consistent with them. For instance, to understand the planning 
process of Guangzhou-Zhuhai intercity railway, I compared the information from Zhuhai, 
Zhongshan and Guangzhou, and find the most common discourse. I would also validate them by 
some government documents and news from the Internet. My main concern is to use the data 
collected from interviews to describe the policy-making process. I would not make any personal 
judgment on the interviewees' views. Their opinions were just part of my description of the 
planning, but not the explanations used to solve the research problems. 
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i .5 Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 mainly introduces the research concerns and 
methodology of the study. 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review on the state rescaling theory and its relevant explanation 
on regions in Western countries. As for China, the research of state re-organization by 
geographers is also reviewed. The main purpose is not only to outline some useful theoretical 
perspectives to better understand the states' interaction between different governments, but also 
to highlight the research gap and research problems. It is found that a new round of states' 
rescaling has emerged in urban regions of western countries. There is a lack of consideration on 
connecting the transformation of states with the changing politics of regions in China. A case 
study on the planning and politics of regions in China will provide some useful insights into the 
restructuring process of states' space Chinese transitional period. 
Following the theoretical review, Chapter 3 proposes an analytical framework to link states' 
rescaling with the planning process. It is for the purpose of sorting out the steps to explore the 
research questions. A review of regional planning in the West and China is conducted as to 
clarify the changing role of planning and the need for a new explanation from the political 
economic perspectives. Several important factors that are required for examination will come up 
in this section. The case of the PRD region is chosen for the empirical study. As a rising 
polycentric region in China, the PRD's intercity railway planning can provide insightful 
interpretations to the current round of state restructuring. Briefly, this chapter proposes an 
analytical framework and explains why this framework was chosen. 
Chapter 4 gives a detailed description of the changing context of cross-border railway planning 
since the economic reform. It first examines the changing context since the economic reform in 
1978, when the restructuring of states' power was unfolded with China's transition from a 
centrally-planned economy to a more market-oriented one. The railway boom in China is 
included in this discussion. Second, it intends to identify the institutional arrangement in regional 
railway planning and to see how different jurisdictions work together in terms of railway 
planning. Then, the background of planning the PRD intercity railway is presented to show the 
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necessity of new planning mechanisms to cope with the new round of mass investment in 
railways. 
Chapter 5 employs the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 3 to examine the institutional 
arrangements and coordinating efforts in planning the PRD intercity railway. The whole plan-
making process will be examined in chronological order. The main concern in each phase is the 
scalar relationship of central-provincial-local governments in both the technical planning process 
and the negotiation process. Three main railway lines have been chosen to illustrate the 
coordination process among various tiers of governments. 
The study draws its conclusion in Chapter 6. The main findings of this study are summarized, 
and some suggestions for future study are also discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
State Rescaling and Regional Planning: Concepts and Issues in the 
Western Countries and China 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the 1970s, the domination of national state in western countries has been given way to 
more complex form of regulation that involves both the subnational scale and the supranational 
scale of state power. For Jessop, new geographies of governance are emerging that the state 
power are reorganized both territorially and functionally (Jessop 1997). The reworking of state 
power has serious implications on the ways in which regions are to be planned and governed by 
multi-level actors. For this reason, studies in regional planning are thus linked to the processes of 
institutional "re-scaling" in the western countries and China. 
This chapter first reviews the state rescaling theories, which have been frequently used to 
interpret the changing social-economic and political structure in the capitalist countries since the 
1970s. Then the chapter examines how the state theory explains the rising regional development 
with special reference to the experiences in Europe and the USA. The research of the state by 
geographers who study China is reviewed. The final section summarizes the chapter and 
highlights research issues to be addressed by this thesis. 
2.2 The Reworking of State Power 
Globalization is often described as the global economy phenomenon that is associated with the 
transnational corporations and super-national organizations (Knox and Taylor 1995). The term 
'globalization' is now discussed at a wider range of topics. Many studies have devoted detailed 
attention to the question on how the geographies of social, political and economic life are being 
transformed under contemporary conditions. Major strands of contemporary studies on 
globalization are permeated with geographical concepts, such as "space-time compression" 
(Harvey, 1990), "space of flow" (Castells, 2000), "globalization" (Dickens 2007), and "space of 
places" (Castells 2000). Different from the common thinking that globalization is shaping a 
"borderless world" (Ohmae 1993), some sophisticated views argued that the state is essential in 
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providing the favorable local conditions to the global economy (Yeung 1998). Meanwhile, a 
variety of geographical prefixes have been used to describe the transition of state regulation 
associated with changing geographies of economics during the globalization process. There is an 
increasing agreement that inherited nationalized formations of political-economic space are 
today being significantly reworked. New forms of institutional organizations, political authority, 
and economic coordination appear to be proliferating above and below the national scale of state 
power (Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997: 470). 
2.2.1 From Fordism to Post-Fordism 
The economic landscape of the western countries from the 1950s to the early 1970s was often 
depicted as "Fordism" which was characterized by standardization and mechanization of 
production, scale economies and mass consumption (Amin 1994). In this context, the Fordist 
system was regulated by Keynesian macroeconomic policies (Martin and Sunley 1997). The 
national scale was assumed as the most important scalar for the economic growth under Fordist-
Keynesian capitalism. The national state provided a distinctive set of national policies to support 
mass production and consumption from a demand perspective. Moreover, the national state acted 
as the "preeminent scale at which both conflicts and tensions were negotiated" (Swyngedouw 
1997: 153). 
However, since the early 1970s, economic recession and the growth of transnational corporations 
have brought industrialized countries to a crisis. The crisis involved the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods ^compromise between capital, labor and the state, widespread de-industrialization, 
and the fiscal crisis of the state. 
Responding to such crisis, there was a change from a Fordist to Post-Fordist mode of production. 
Post-Fordist mode of production was characterized by specialization and flexibility (Lauria 
1997). The change in production and economic organization laid a profound impact on the 
Fordist "institutional fix". Swyngedouw (1997: 153-4) argued that the institutional rupture was 
mutually constituted alongside "a profound reworking of geographical scales" in the regulation 
3 The Bretton Woods is a monetary management system that negotiated among the most developed countries 
in the 1950s. The system is established to set down the rules, institutions and procedures to regulate the 
monetary relations among these nation-states. 
17 
of production, money, consumption and welfare. Other scholars, such as Jessop, also raised 
similar argument that in the globalizing era, new geographies of regulation were emerging and 
the state capacities were being reorganized both territorially and functionally (Jessop 1997). 
2.2.2 Globalization and the Rise of New State Scale 
Since the 1990s, the global economy has impacted the production mode greatly in the worldwide, 
resulting in the emergence of new scalar organizations of economic expansion both from above 
and below. As the globalization intensifies, a "new international division of labor" has been 
applied widely in the condition of the massive expansion of foreign direct investment and the 
mass international labor migration around the global world (Dicken 1998). The highly mobile 
capital, corporations and the commercial transactions between states actually lie beyond the 
national economic systems existing previously. As national economy becomes more permeable 
and more tightly intertwined on a global scale, the territorial forms of economic regulation 
within the borders from state to state are undermined. Under these conditions, a new kind of 
supranational and cross-border institutions has been established to enhance the integration of 
world economy. From EU, NAFTA, APEC, ASEAN to the IMF, the World Bank and the G8, 
such supranational institutions have played a pivotal function in establishing the political 
preconditions for the expansion of international trade and investment flows and facilitating the 
intensified geo-economic integration. The other form of institution at the sub-national scale is 
also enhanced throughout the world economy. Under conditions in which geo-economic 
integration is intensifying, locally embedded economies have become basic preconditions for 
globalized capital accumulation (Sassen 1991). A large body of literature on global cities (Sassen 
1991), learning regions (Morgan 2007) and other new industrial spaces (Scott 1988) has 
proposed that these sub-national territorial formations represent the "motors of the global 
economy". These regions compete ever more directly with one another for the major factions of 
industrial, financial, and service capital (Storper 1996, Scott 1996). It is in this context that new 
forms of local and regional state regulation are being mobilized at once to promote this re-
concentration of capital, and to exercise control over the local spaces in which it occurs (Brenner 
1999). 
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Since the world economic crises in the early 1970s, the new scalars both from above and below 
have emerged as the privileged scales in national development. The older industrial states of 
North America and Western Europe have been restructured to provide capital with ever more 
territorial preconditions and collective goods on both sub- and supranational spatial scales 
(Cerny 1995). The notion 'denationalization' refers to a shift in the territories of state capacities 
upwards and downwards. Meanwhile, It is underlined that the expansion of supranational state 
institution as well as the resurgence of regional and local governance (Jessop 1997). Such 
development of new institutional organization both above and below the national scale of state 
power indicates that the "institutional arrangements that at one time were congruent at the 
national level are now more dispersed at multiple spatial levels" (Boyer and Hollingsworth 
1997:472). 
In this context, the ongoing state restructuring has been thrown into sharp attention in temporary 
studies. Academic debates (Smith 1992，Jessop 1997 and Brenner 2001 et al.) over the last 
decade have attempted to indentify and understand recent and profound changes in the state's 
institutions associated with the shifting economic geographies under the globalization dynamic. 
A well-established body of work has located at the investigation into contemporary rescaling 
processes of state regulation. Their assumption is that the geographical scale at which power and 
authority is located does not follow a fixed order, but rather is constantly constructed and 
subjected to the change (Leitner 2002). A key agenda of their studies is to understand the origins, 
dynamics and consequences of the changing state regulatory activities in the scalar turn. 
2,3 The Rescaling Concept 
Since the 1970s, political economic geographers have advanced the perspective 'scale' (e.g. 
urban, regional, national, global scale, etc.) at which state activities are organized. This 
perspective is helpful to explain the restructuring states under the conditions of contemporary 
globalization. Smith (1992) also introduced the notion of the 'politics of scale' to associate the 
role of geographical scales with the socio-spatial transformation. The concept of scale here is 
used to refer the political and spatial arena where different kinds of state relations are constituted. 
The shifts in the scalar organization of capitalism have been equally described as processes of 
"rescaling". The scaling process generally refers to the building process of new political 
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economy of scales. The rescaling process means the shifting in the power and control over scales. 
It often involves two or more scales. Recently, lots of studies on the politics of scale have 
highlighted the idea of 'rescaling the state'. Its concern is the manner by which state institutions, 
policies, and governance processes as a whole are reorganized across geographic territory 
(Brenner 1999, 2004; Buchs 2009, Jessop 2002, Kazepov 2008). 
For Jessop, the ongoing rescaling of territoriality is simultaneously transferring state power 
upwards to the supranational agencies, downwards towards the local and regional levels, and 
sideways in the form of trans-local and regional linkages (Jessop 1997). The trends can be 
illustrated through the growing importance of supranational organizations like the EU, NAFTA, 
the WTO, and the G7 on one hand, and on the other hand are the emerging regional and local 
institutions as mentioned above. These trends have been articulated in conjunction with an 
intensification of horizontal networking, trans-local linkages, and cross-border cooperation 
initiatives among local and regional authorities (Perkmarm and Sum 2002, Hocking 1996). The 
search for cross-border support is most evident in North America with cooperation among local 
states in Canada and the USA, as well as among municipal governments in different provinces or 
states (Jessop 1999). 
2.3.1 Relativization of Scales 
The rescaling processes have firmly demoted the national scale as the basis for organizing 
economic, political, and social relations previously. The new scalars both from above and below 
emerged as the privileged scales in the territorial development. From the early 1970s onwards, 
the previous dominance of the national state as a scale level has changed to give way to new 
spatiality of state institution (Swyngedouw 1992). However, the proliferation of new scales for 
regulation does not necessarily equate to the demise of predominant scale, or the rise of new 
scale that won a similar primacy. Instead，there is no relatively privileged level in and through 
which other scales are managed (Jessop 1998, Peck and Jessop 1998). Different scales of 
economic organization are being developed strategically by the state as to fulfill so many 
competing objects of economic management. In comparison with earlier structure of state 
institutions, this phenomenon can be usefully described as the 'relativization of scale' (Collinge 
1996, MacLeod 2001: 11). For instance, in Europe, the rise of multilevel of governance is 
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conceived as the result of the "relativization of scales" by many scholars. The emerging network 
of global cities is not contained within any given national territory. Another example is the rise 
of "region" which now becomes a focal point for economic organization. The idea of 
'glocalization' has been introduced by Swyngedouw (1997) that global, local and other relevant 
geographical scale levels are the result and product of a deeply heterogeneous, conflictual, and 
contested process. In this sense, the present "relativization of scales" indicates that the 
geographical scale at which power and authority is located does not follow a fixed order, but 
rather is constantly constructed and subjected to change (Leitner 2002). It is in this context that 
we are witnessing a proliferation of spatial scales, and an increasingly convoluted mix of inter-
scalar strategies, as various economic and political forces seek the most favorable conditions for 
their global competitiveness (Jessop 2001: 25). 
2.3.2 The State's Role: Still Dominant? 
Attempts to understand the changing scale of state authority have been linked to transformations 
in the role of state. Rather than be dismantled in such placeless world, the territorial states are 
struggling to reorganize regulation and practices at various spatial scales in response to both 
global and domestic pressures. The changes in the role of geographical scales have been drawn 
on increasing attention in the state studies. 
In the face of the transition of economic and political scales, many authors start to question the 
importance of the national state's role. Some authors proclaimed that nation states declined in 
power and significance due to the parallel challenges of global and regional economic integration 
and the diffusion of neoliberal political ideology (e.g. Appadurai 1996, Olimae 1995, Strange 
1996). Their prevalent arguments are as three folds. First, "from above", intensified economic 
globalization was said to firmly weaken the state's ability to regulate economic activities within 
its boundaries. Second, "from below", the nation state is now undergoing a process of 
decentralization, transferring the powers and resources to sub-national scale of government. And, 
finally, "from within", the spreading of free market ideologies are questioned the capacity of 
state intervention in the economy and about the social model associated with it (Lobao et al. 
2009). 
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Whilst, the above positions have been called into questions very lately in the face of increasing 
engagement of national state, particular in European countries, such as France, Britain and 
Germany (Yeung 1998, Brenner 1999, Le Gales and Lequesne 1998, Hudson 2001). The early 
contributions came from researchers analyzing the European integration. The core of their claim 
was that European integration was revitalizing instead of weakening nation states by allowing 
them to shape activities beyond the rigid constraints of their boundaries (Milward 1992). A key 
role still remains at the nation scale now. The national state represents the most significant scale 
of struggle among competing global, triadic, supranational, national, regional and local forces 
(Jessop 1999). A number of authors from human geography, political science and sociology put 
great effort into this thesis. Most of them often started the topic with discussing what role and 
how the state played the role. The chief recent contributions perhaps come from Jessop (1999, 
2001) and Brenner (1999, 2003a, 2004). 
Jessop (1999) proposed two fundamental premises that are helpful to look into what role should 
the state play. First, the capitalist mode of production is always the main target of regulation by 
the state. The reason is that the process of production rooted in the spread of the market 
mechanism generates contradictions, which cannot be resolved by the market itself. The second 
premise is that the capitalist state reorganizes itself to solve the contradictions presented in the 
context of regime shift, globalization, and regionalization. Building upon these, Jessop (2002) 
theorized political economic change in terms of the relationship between capital accumulation 
and its regulation under capitalism. 
After the Second World War, the economic growth was driven by mass production and mass 
consumption, which was so called "Atlantic Fordism". The Keynesian Welfare National states 
(KWNS) targeted the national economies as functional wholes, and worked to stimulate national 
consumption through a variety of social welfare programs and, thereby, to encourage the 
reproduction of capital accumulation. Such an intervention on a national scale was to prevent 
market failure. Yet changes started from the 1970s: the KWNS was no longer able to solve the 
capitalist crisis. In order to sustain capital accumulation, capitalist state transformed itself from 
KWNS to "Schumpeterian competition state". The post-Fordist accumulation regime oriented 
towards the supply-side rather than demand-side policies to develop the capacity of structural 
competitiveness and facilitate labor market flexibility and mobility (Jessop 2002). At the same 
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time, the way in which national state played its role was in turn organized一functionally, 
institutionally, and geographically一in conjunction with the role (Brenner 2001). The reworking 
of state organization and strategies suggests a shift from primacy of state intervention to 
"relativization of state scale". By scaling up, scaling down and scaling out the state functions, the 
urban and regional strategies of economic development can be mobilized and achieved. In this 
sense, the rescaling of state cannot be understood merely as defensive responses to intensifies 
global economic competition, but represents expressions of political strategies in order to cope 
with the global pressure and market failure. Brenner argued at length that state re-construction as 
a politics of scale can be construed as a sequence of grouping, trial-and- error strategies to 
manage the intensively conflictual forces of globalization through the continual construction, 
deconstmction and reconstruction of relatively stabilized configurations of territorial 
organization (Brenner 1999: 447). State rescaling served as a strategy of "re-regulation" to 
construct new institutional capacities for promoting capital investment within specific place 
(Brenner 1999:440). 
Despite these various upward, downward and outward shifts in political organizations, the state 
retains crucial political functions. To explain this, Jessop first distinguished three major trends of 
state reorganizat ionthe internationalization, denationalization and destatization. Furthermore, 
Jessop (2000: 353-5) proposed that each of the three trends provoked a counter-tendency of state 
reorganization, namely an "interiorization" of state reorganization, growing inter-scalar 
strategies by the state, and an creasing role for the state in meta-governance (Jessop 2000). 
Crucially, rather than a single transition from one form to another, the trends and counter-trends 
were intertwined with each other. The counter-trend should be viewed as "reactions to the new 
trends rather than as survivals of earlier patterns" (Jessop 1999b: 26). Central to Jessop's 
argument was that the interplay between each of the trends and counter-trends of state 
reorganization was closely in relation to the national state's role (2002). The counter-trends of 
locational policy, inter-scalar management and meta-govemance might be understood as political 
strategies through which the national state was attempting to regain its functionality in the 
processes of decentralization (Jessop 2002: 201). In this context, the national state maintains a 
continuing role in managing the "political linkages across different territorial scales" (Jessop 
2002: 212). The restructuring of the capitalist state should not be discussed in terms of the 
decline of the national state (Jessop 2002). Instead, the state space is deliberately restructured by 
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national state to solve the crisis and overcome the hurdles of capital accumulation and social 
reproduction in the face of global changes and market failure. 
2,4 The State Rescaling Concept, Regional Development and Rescaling Process 
in Regions 
Since the late 1980s, there has been considerable academic interest in analyzing the shifting 
structures and regulatory frameworks of economic development under capitalism (Amin and 
Thrift 1994, Duncan and Goodwin 1988, Imrie and Thomas 1999). One of their concerns is 
directed towards connecting the regulation of contemporary state and its territorial form. Across 
these literatures, a number of scholars have hypothesized that new political spaces are formed as 
post-Keynesian national states attempt to confront many contradictory tasks of territorial 
regulation within contemporary capitalism. New institutional spaces and new state spaces are 
being re-forged with regional scales (Keating 1998, 2001，Yeung 1998, Storper 1997). 
2.4.1 The Rise of Region 
Since the 1990s，a proliferation of regional development policies and regional economies has 
been witnessed in the advanced countries. Many observers viewed regions in general as the locus 
of competitive advantages (Krugman 1991, Porter 1990, 1998; Moss-Kantor 1995, Storper 1995, 
1997; Scott 1998，Lawson 1999). This new thinking of regional development assumed the face-
to-face interaction, learning and innovation in specific region were essential to the growth of 
national or even global economy in the information era (Friedmann 2000). All the regional 
elements, such as physical setting, historical trajectory, and set of external economies were 
considered to trace the distinctive profile of regional economies (Storper and Salais 1997, 
Storper 1997). Scott (1998) used the pose-Fordist approaches to associate the rise of region with 
an economic logic. It was proposed that the vertical disintegration of production played a vital 
role in the formation agglomeration economies, which in turn encouraged clusters of industrial 
districts to locate in the subnational scale. Another perspective showed a concern on the 
changing labor markets by the new production mode. The region was considered as the most 
appropriate scale to govern a knowledge-intensive economy based on jobs relating to the 
research and development sector (Leadbetter 1998, Sassen 1994). The most well-known example 
24 
of the rising region is Western Europe, whose economic success can be mostly attributed to a 
limited number of metropolitan regions. American Economy was proposed by Pierce (1993) as a 
set of interactive regions based on key cities such as Los Angeles, Seattle, Denver, Dallas, 
Chicago, New York, Miami, and so forth. The similar observations can also be seen in China, 
India, Russia, and Australia. 
With the proliferation of regional economies, things are beginning to change. The current round 
of geo-economic integration indeed rendered national boundaries more permeable possibilities of 
transnational flows of capital, commodities, people, information and images (Amin 1994). The 
national boundaries were no longer assumed as the only way to conceive of territorial economies 
(Friedmann 2000). There were alternative constructs that would take the region as geographers' 
basic unit for analysis (Perloff and Leven 1964). The picture emerging was that local and 
regional renaissance came into being in the form of dense agglomerations, linking functionally 
together in a global division of labor (Scott 1996). As an important tier between local and global 
scale, 'region' was increasingly acknowledged with its role as engines of industrial growth in a 
global era (Brenner 2001). Due to the greater freedom of location, the local and regional qualities 
played a growing role in the location decisions of firms, professional workers and tourists 
(Meijers et al. 2003). 
As mentioned above, opportunities as well as responsibilities for territorial competition have 
been scaled down from national states to city region area. From the political economy 
perspective, the successful operation on regional economy evokes a political response as state 
authorities and business leaders can harness the benefit of regional cooperation in providing 
public services, and also can address the negative externalities (Glodin and Vogel 2010). Against 
this context, making policies at regional scale, such as territorial economic competitiveness, 
efficient service provision and environmental agenda, is viewed as the mainstream approach for 
territorial social-economic goals (Scott 2001). The national states under western capitalism are 
making great efforts to create regional political institutions and promote policy coordination in 
order to enhance the economic competitiveness of region. 
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2.4.2 The Evolution of Regional Institutions in Capitalism 
The institutional arrangements for patterns of large-scale urban regions have long been a topic of 
intense debate in the west countries. In the Western Europe, from public infrastructure 
investment and fiscal policy to spatial planning, regional political structures have played a 
leading role in combining the socio-economic geographies with the developmental trajectories of 
city regions throughout the 20出 century (Goldsmith 2001). Region forming takes different forms 
in different contexts (Macleod and Goodwin 1999). The historical evolution of regional 
institutional arrangements has been closely linked to the regulation regime of capitalism in the 
western countries. 
During the Fordist-Keynesian period, the regional political institutions were introduced widely 
among the North American and western European city-regions, such as Newcastle, Great 
London Council and the Greater Copenhagen Council since the 1950s (Keating 1998). Between 
the World War II and the early 1970s, the western countries have made their economy successful 
within the nationally organized macroeconomic policy frameworks of the KWNS. The main task 
for the regional institutions was to undertake the national policies by delivering the public 
services and regional planning, and also by alleviating inter-regional disparities across the 
national boundary. Under the contexture of Keynesian capitalism, the national state held a strong 
control on the economic development at the national scale in conjunction with the spatial 
production, whilst these sub-national institutions served as a key instrument of national spatial 
policies. Therefore, under the Keynesian capitalism, the national scale continued to be the most 
important scale for the spatial production. The sub-national administrative structures were 
consolidated politically by the national state as the most effective means of intervening into 
urban and regional development (Bollens and Schmandt 1982, Brenner 2003). 
By the early 1980s, the global economic recession has spread through the older industrialized 
world. The traditional mass production industries declined due to intensified international 
competition, market saturation, and accelerated technological change (Lipietz 1987). The geo-
economic trends made the traditional Keynesian macroeconomic objectives more difficult and 
the top-down administrative form of the region became increasingly problematic. Under these 
26 
conditions, a lot of western countries attempted to confront this problem by mobilizing a variety 
of post-Keynesian regulatory experiments and establishing a more fragmented, multitiered，and 
market-oriented regime of state regulation than before (Cerny 1995). As such, the national states 
lost many of their powers in controlling economic development and dismantled the policies of 
welfare redistribution and the forms of regional institutions gradually. In the meanwhile, the 
local governments obtained certain authority from the national state. They began to mobilize new 
strategies of flexibly economic development to adjust to fiscal constraints and to attract new 
sources of investment (Eisenschitz and Gough 1993). 
In the context of entrepreneurial urban policies, the regional institutions were regarded outdated. 
During the mid- to late 1980s, many region-wide institutions were abolished or weakened their 
initial functions if formally preserved in both Western Europe and North America. Also, the 
number of official support for region-wide strategic planning projects was cut down. The reason 
to reduce of region-wide institutions during the 1980s was not only the external pressure like 
economic recession, but also from the accumulating internal problems. The region-wide 
institutional frameworks were designed according to a single formula and imposed from above. 
The resultant authorities at the regional scale were vulnerable to the changing conditions from 
the outside as well as political conflicts between competing sociopolitical forces at different 
geographical scales (Brenner 2003b). What's more, most of the regional authorities were 
relatively weak, and their planning agendas were thus easily intervened or neglected by other 
agencies of territorial administration within the region, such as provincial or central state 
authorities, central city cores, suburban municipalities (Sharpe 1995: 20-7). 
Yet, the region-wide political institutions did not lose its attention for long. During the 1990s, the 
installation of new regional institutions has backed on the agenda in the western European urban 
system. For instance, in Europe, the local and regional economic development institutions 
became favorable among the European countries (e.g. Regional Development Agencies) 
(Glasson 1992). Such regional organizations were established to promote the economic 
development jointly and its financial administration outside the system of central and local 
government (Halkier and Danson 1996: 9). As for the USA, the administration at the regional 
scale was reconsidered due to the urban sprawl problems in the large cities. 
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Rather than a political framework imposed from above, the new regional institutions were 
observed 'as a product of the system of actors as the process of institutional reform unfolds' 
(Lefevre 1998: 18). In each of these city regions, the national and local economic policies were 
being related more directly to the issues of spatial planning, infrastructure investment and 
political-economic coordination on a regional scale. In this sense, the introduction of new 
frameworks for new regional administrative structures was justified as a basic institutional 
precondition for political negotiations with respect to various major regional issues, such as 
inter-local cooperation, regional infrastructure planning and regional sustainable development. 
In the conjunction of the institutional change and the regulatory experiments in the urban regions, 
a resurgence of regional institutional arrangement is in the process throughout the western 
countries (see Aigner and Miosga 1994, Heinz 2000, Sailer 2000, Herrschel and Newman 2002, 
Salet et al. 2003). The current wave of resurgence of regional institutional reform in the Western 
Europe has been quite different from the previous ones. The first characteristic of the new 
regional institution is contributed to their competitive orientation (Jonas and Ward 2002). The 
primary concern of the state is to create an administrative means to integrate the strategies of 
urban economic development and thus to adapt to the perception of the challenges of global 
competition in the form of urban agglomerations. This strategy can be understood as a new 
"locational policy" through which local and regional growth strategies are combined to enhance 
the competitive advantages of strategic regional economics (Brenner 2001). 
The second characteristic is the negotiation mode in the constitution of new structures. Different 
from the hierarchical institution that prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s, the newly emergent 
regional institution is grounded upon the relation of the negotiation, partnership and voluntary 
participation (Lefevre 1998: 18, Healey 2000). The negotiation process not only includes the 
vertical coordination within a national administrative hierarchy, but also a horizontal and 
competitive relationship between sub-national economic territories within the competition for 
attracting capital investment. 
In cities like Copenhagen and Hanover new frameworks of regional regulation have been 
constructed in various major regional issues, from regional planning, economic policy to 
suburban sprawl (Barlow 1991). The central officials of London placed the strategic function of 
regional development in a new metropolitan government. In Toronto, the provincial Ontario 
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government took over the responsibilities of policy-making rather than decentralized it to the city 
level. In the instance of Asian, the approaches are similar that the national state granted the city-
region an extraordinary degree of autonomy compared to other cities in order to facilitate the 
control by national government (e. g. Tokyo, Shanghai). 
2.5 The Regional Scale of Politics: Expressions of State Rescaling 
The current round of interest in the regional governments and institutions has been shifted to the 
analysis of the region forming process. It is stressed that current region wide institutional 
projects should not be limited within the discussion on the local and regional economies. This 
contemporary phenomenon should be interpreted with reference to the different levels of state 
interacting on the regional scale. In this context, an increasing amount of scholars have attempted 
to examine the emergence of this new scale of institutional activities and demonstrated how such 
profound reshufflings represent key moments of the state re-organization. 
Jones and MacLeod (1999) sought to link the urban and regional research with the state rescaling 
perspectives basing on the state theory and the 'politics of scale'. He argued that the political 
economic activity of cities and regions could be considered as a series of politically constructed 
process in the specific condition. Jones and MacLeod (2007) also considered that the resurgence 
of city-regions as economic spaces was accompanied by their re-emergence as political spaces. 
These emerging scales represented particularly significant strategic sites in the performance of 
accumulation, regulation, and political compromise (MacLeod 2001: 815). As Brenner (2003) 
claimed that city-regions became the key geographical sites in which various trends and counter-
trends of state reorganization were being articulated. 
Trends and Counter-trends of State Reorganization 
Some of the scholars point out the current trend of state decentralization at the regional scale, 
and suggest the enhanced roles of sub-national institutions in the new term of regulatory 
infrastructure for economic governance. Since the 1970s, the national states have began to 
decentralize some authorities of development to local and regional scale in order to encourage 
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industrial restructuring and to facilitate the process of regional economic. The national scale is 
being challenged by the local authorities, whilst the regional scale is viewed as the breeding 
ground for regulatory experiments in the governance of economic development (Lipietz 1994). 
Meanwhile, the nation-state is being 'hollowed out' through complex processes of 
denationalization, destatisation, and internationalization (Jessop 1994). 
As such, the national scale of political-economic regulation has been destabilized as the new 
scale of state institutional structure, and regulatory activities have been forged. However, the 
development of regional institutional projects does not mean a retreat of the national state form 
or a decline of national state authority. Brenner deployed the state theory to interpret the 
metropolitan governance reform in western European city-regions. Central to his idea is that 
within these scaled organizations of state power, and regions have become important spatial 
scale for a variety of institutional changes and policy experiments (Brenner 2001). From this 
perspective, it can be understood that the national states establish new institutional forms at the 
regional scale by scaling up and scaling down certain functions of national state instead of losing 
its authorities. To map the newly emergent regulatory arenas by the national state, Brenner 
further examined the roles of different levels of governments, and sorted out three structural 
tendencies and the corresponding counter-tendencies of state rescaling that shape the formation 
of region. 
The region-wide reform advocates towards a trend of internationalization because they are 
established in the form of regions to respond to the pressures of global territorial competition; 
they are towards a trend of denationalization because the primacy scale for political economic 
regulation is down scaled to the city regions; and they are towards a trend of destatization 
because the non-state actors from the market now are allowed to join in the planning and 
implementation of major regional policies. 
In the meanwhile, the three counter trends of state restructuring have also been mapped. As for 
the counter trend of internationalization, the region-wide development can be viewed as new 
forms of place-specific policy for the global competition. As such, this initiative has substituted 
the earlier forms of urban development policies onto a regional scale. The up-scaling institution 
has more advantages in the global competition; As for the counter trend of denationalization, the 
region wide institutions are established as a means to alleviate the conflicts and tensions brought 
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by the earlier inter-local competition within the regional scale. Therefore, the city regions act as 
an agent of inter-scalar regulation and coordinate the competitive interactions that undermined 
the integrated economic development; As for the counter trend of destatization, it is recognized 
in many cases that the national and local institutions attempt to maintain the pivotal regulatory 
power of coordination over the non-state actors. In this sense, this initiative may be understood 
as a response to the increasing fragmentation of multiple actors outside the state. In fact, the non-
state actors and organizations are constrained to participate in the negotiation within a state-
central organization system. 
From the perspective developed above, Brenner's viewpoint on the current wave of regional 
institution initiatives underscored the role of region as an arena for each of the trends and counter 
trends of state spatial reorganization. Similar with Brenner, other scholars have also proposed 
that the regional scale should not be treated as pre-given, but viewed in relation to the 
condensation of contested processes of struggle (Swyngedouw 1997, Jones 2001). 
It has to point out that on one hand, the rescaling process is not intended as some deep 
explanatory framework to explain the regional development but as help to represent the ongoing 
phenomenon of the changing statehood organization. On the other hand, these trends will not 
happen necessarily, but are generated contingently within some particular context, institution and 
agency. Therefore, the concern of the rescaling process is to identify the trends and counter-
trends in particular conditions，and to explain why and how these trends happen. 
As Brenner (1998c, 2000) explored at length in the contemporary Western Europe, he attempted 
to make connection between geo-economic restructuring and the rescaling of state power. It was 
argued that the on-going institutional changes and shifting state spatial intervention couldn't be 
understood merely as passive responses to intensify global economic competition, but represents 
a series of political strategies through which state institutions are attempting, at various spatial 
scales, to facilitate, manage, mediate, and redirect processes of geo-economic restructuring. In 
case of regional scale, Brenner (2003b) further argued that city-regions and metropolitan areas 
have become important sites of policy experimentation in which a major rescaling of national 
state power has been unfolding. The intensified national targeting of regional scale during the 
last two decades has been enabled by, and has in turn accelerated, a fundamental transformation 
of state scalar institution (Brenner 2004). Brenner developed the similar idea about the 
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metropolitan development in the study case of the USA. Rather than an integrated regional 
organization, the metropolitan institution acted as a "new politics of scale". This new scale 
provided an opportunity for multiple levels of governments to cooperate with each other in order 
to adjust to diverse restructuring processes (Brenner 2003b: 3). This perspective in effect 
provided an alternative way of examining the changing role of states. It did not treat the regional 
institution as a pre-given form and the core was to see the dialectical ways in which regions were 
produced. 
The pace of change in the regional institutions and the state scaling has been matched by rapidly 
expanding bodies of empirical work. The interstate highway of the USA, and especially its 
funding system based on the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 have received high attentions 
(Levy 2008). Europe as a space of regions has also been a long-standing focus for geographers. 
Marks (1993) proposed an idea of multilevel governance suggesting that the relation between 
European, national, regional and local governments constitute a new form of politics. The idea of 
a European Union suggested a weakening of the national level, while the multi-level states were 
exerting an increasingly influential role. In the context of Europe changing policy foci and 
funding regions (e.g. Netherlands), attention was centered on the competitiveness promotion of 
cities and regions, and produced a wide range of institutional responses at national and sub-
national level (SPESP 2000). Now the focus shifts to examine how national and local factors 
interact to shape new regions at a range of scales (Tassilo and Peter 2002). Detailed relationships 
between cities and regions are expressed in the relative roles of planning and strategic policy 
making. 
2,6 The State Restructuring and the Rise of Regions in China: A Review 
There are a huge number of literature on analyzing the transitional state structure and urban 
development in China. The pre-reform regime was based on the highly concentrated planning 
economies. All the production activities were organized by the central government. It was such 
an age that the governments did everything and also sub-national. Since the economic reform in 
the 1980s, China has seen a transformation both on the capital regime of accumulation and the 
state institutional structure. The market-oriented reform has brought about a transitional 
economy, which is characterized by the co-existence of planned and market economies (Nee 
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1989, Bian and Logan 1996). The regime of post-reform is positioning the intensified targeting 
of cities as strategic sites for accumulation strategies and regulation (Xu 2008). The central 
government conceives the cities as the means to overcome the constraint of accumulation, by 
decentralizing some of its fiscal and function to the sub-national level. The shifting to the urban 
development strategies has led to an increasing interest on the changing state structure among the 
geographers. The main concern is to see the manner in which the different jurisdictions of 
governments mould the urban development and the state structure that the resultant politics of 
cities shapes. Most of the literature is developed based on the empirical observation and analysis 
on the large cities in China, like Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Shanghai. The empirical cases used 
to examine the topic are mainly focused on urban land regulation, urban planning issue, and 
infrastructure provision in cities. 
Based on these studies of contemporary cities in China, it can be summarized into two different 
arguments. Some authors have emphasized the increasingly significant role of local state and the 
'downward scalar shift' of state regulatory power and responsibilities from the central to local 
state (Qi 1992, Walder 1995, Duckett 1998, Wu 2002b). It is argued that the economic 
decentralization combined with delegated regulation allows the local state to play an increasingly 
important role in urban development (Qi 1992, 1995). The empowered local state starts to 
involve economic activities by setting up its own companies. The promotional activity by local 
state is described by the notion of 'entrepreiieurship' because of the direct involvement in the 
profit-seeking as well as risk-seeking business (Duckett 1998). Wu (2002a) has argued that the 
centrally controlled institution is now undergoing a process of dehierarchisation. The central 
government has become less influential and relevant in urban development resulted from a series 
of decentralized reform (Wong et al. 1995). The local government is shifted from a passive agent 
of the centre to an active promoter and manager of urban development (Xu 2005, Xu and Yeh 
2009). 
However, the arguments of decentralization of statehood are subjected to some criticizes that 
they focus only upon one side of changing state institution (Xu and Yeh 2009). It is argued that 
their analyses neglect a counter-trend in which the central government has recentralized and 
deterritorialised some key functions through the state regulatory regime (Xu and Yeh 2009: 560). 
In fact, the decentralization of economic governance is counteracted by the emerging state 
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strategies through which a more centralized top-level control can be achieved (Xu and Yeh 
2009). By adopting the scale theory to explain, Shen (2007: 314) proposes that, although there 
have been conflicts, intense interaction and negotiation between the central state and the local 
state, the central state often assumes a leading role in the final resolution of scalar 
reconfiguration. In fact, the discussion puts on increasing attention on the interaction between the 
national and local state in developing urban economies. Some authors even argued that the 
restructuring of the Chinese state is not simply one side of power from the central to local 
governments. Rather, it is a reshuffling of power among different geopolitical scales (Ren 2008). 
Above all, it can be seen that the core of the argument comes down to whether there is a 
dominant scale of state in the urban transformation of China and which scale (central state or 
local state) has the larger influential to the urban transition in China. The interest of the 
transformation of the state in China thus turns to how the central and local states interact with 
each other in the policy-making of cities. However, among the literature, there is a lack of 
consideration on connecting the transformation of state with the changing politics of region of 
China today. 
The Rising Region in Contemporary China 
Compared to the cities, the regions in China have not paid much attention by the state until 
recently. As early as 2000, the regional development as a national strategy was incorporated into 
the country's socio-economic plan. Up to 2009, seven economic regions have been listed by the 
central state as the privileged development area. (China Daily 2009). Not only the central 
government, but also the local governments have actively joined in the policy making at the 
regional level The local governments within region started to conduct activities to develop some 
coordination mechanisms. A variety of forms of informal alliances and associations have been 
established among the cities, such as the Coordination Association of Urban Economies in the 
Yangtze River Delta (Luo 2008). Moreover, there is a wide range of new regional strategic plans 
prepared by local governments, such as regional railway. 
In fact, regions in China have also seen a similar process from rise to fall, and from fall to rise. 
China has undergone a series of transitional reforms since the 1980s and the central government 
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has intended to perform the experiments of politics and economics primarily on urban and 
regional level, which is so called 'crossing the river by feeling the stone'. The gradual reform 
associated with a series of reform packages has determined the regional administrative form and 
configuration are not fixed in advance but an ongoing changing, evolving process. 
As early as the 1980s, the central government has established a number of economic regions with 
the aim at advancing the development of central cities and their network with surrounding 
jurisdictions under the market-oriented dynamics (Wu 2006). The institutions of these economic 
regions are mainly made up of informal government coalitions and alliances that are loosely 
organized (Xu 2008: 162). However, by the mid-1990s, a majority of the economic regions have 
been dismantled. Until recently, the city regions have seen a renewed interest both by central and 
local governments. Xu (2008) summarizes the reasons for the current imperative of mega-city 
regions in China. Within the rise of urban entrepreneurialism, the strategic planning at the mega-
city region level becomes a key political strategy for the centre to regain control as well as 
importance of local and regional governance (Xu and Yeh 2010: 18). For the provinces and local 
governments, proposing mega-city regions to the national planning can help to promote the 
strategic position of economic development, and also to facilitate from the policy support of 
central state (Xu and Yeh 2010). As the important scale for the new experiments of socio-
economic development, a city region also sees a complex arena on which conflicting and diverse 
interests are unfolded. The formation process of city regions is not a single directed activity, but 
achieved through both top-down and bottom-up processes (Wu and Zhang 2010). For local 
governments, the entrepreneurial urbanism is observed to extend from the urban to regional scale 
while the central state attempts to consolidate a regulatory institution at the regional level in 
response to the growing ramifications of entrepreneurial cities (Wu and Zhang 2010: 63). In this 
sense, the emerging city regions in China can be seen as a result of contested politics at different 
levels of state. As such, we should see the rising region in China as a scale-building process 
grounded upon the analytical framework proposed by Brenner (2004a, 2004b). Therefore, 




This chapter briefly reviews previous studies on the state rescaling theory and its interpretation 
of the contemporary resurgence of regional institution. The concept of the rescaling state has 
been widely used by the geographers and is helpful to understand the changing state spatial 
organization in the western capitalist countries. We are now witnessing a re-organization of 
regulatory state scales as the certain functions of the national states are being scaled up, scaled 
down and scaled out towards different institutional levels. Rather than an erosion of the national 
state capacities, the state space is deliberately restructured by national state to solve the crisis and 
overcome the hurdles of capital accumulation and social reproduction in the face of global 
changes and market failure. As to regional scale, current wave of regional institution initiatives 
underscores the role of region as an arena for each of the trends and counter trends of state 
spatial reorganization. Thus, the state studies at the regional scale in effect provide an alternative 
way of examining the changing role of states. It does not treat the regional institutions as a pre-
given form but the core is to see the dialectical ways in which regions are produced by the 
interaction between different jurisdictional governments. The aims of the state restructuring are 
on one hand to response to the competitive pressure of the global capitals, and on the other hand 
to tackle the governance failures and crisis caused by the former experimentation of local 
regulation. It is in this sense that the politics and planning of city-regions play a pivotal role in 
delivering the variety of regulatory spaces and needed facilities to lubricate capital flows (Xu and 
Yeh 2010: 6). In fact, the politics and plan of city-regions are the medium through which 
governments materialize the state spatial strategies on one hand, on the other are the outcome of 
the restructuring of state space. From this perspective, the widespread concern of state rescaling 
may be understood with reference to the forming politics and planning of newly emergent city-
regions whereas the trends and counter-trends of state rescaling are being articulated. 
In the case of China, however, there is a lack of consideration on connecting the transformation 
of state with the changing politics of regions. A case study on the planning and politics of 
regions in China will provide some useful insights into the restructuring process of state space in 
the period of Chinese transition. Moreover, as indicated above, each case of the region-wide 
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institutional restructuring should be understood with reference to the specific regulatory 
framework and also the problems that are confronted with by different national state. Hence, the 
state rescaling at the regional scale should be a different story in the context of socialist China. 
According to the theoretical findings in capitalism countries, several research questions can be 
raised. First, since regions in China currently are being actively constructed both by the central 
and local governments, what is behind this renewed interest of regions of different jurisdictions 
(e.g. national, provincial and municipal state)? Second, how is the emerging politics of regions 
related to the on-going transformation of state? Can we identify the processes of scaling up, 
scaling down and scaling out from the constructing process of region? Third, is there a 
dominated role of state in the rescaling process and why? 
The examination of these questions needs grounded upon some specific framework. After fitting 
the research topic in the theoretical background, the next step is to build up a framework in order 
to sort out the specific steps logically to tackle with the research questions. 
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Chapter 3 
Conceptualizing Spatial Planning as a Process of State rescaling: 
towards an Analytical Framework 
Based on the review of state rescaling theories in the western countries and China in the previous 
chapters, this chapter aims at sorting out the steps logically to explore the research questions. 
The main concern of this study is to identify the trends and counter-trends of state rescaling 
process in China's regions, and to discuss the role of state and mechanisms during the planning 
process. Thus, the key theme needed to explore in the framework can be summarized as the 
"state rescaling process". The first section of this chapter defines the state rescaling process, and 
proposes the spatial planning as one important perspective to observe the reworking of state 
organization. A review of regional planning in the west and China was conducted as to clarify 
the changing role of planning and the need for a new explanation from the political and 
economic perspectives. Several important factors required to examine would come up in this 
section. Second, the case of the Pearl River Delta (PRD) is chosen for the empirical study. As a 
rising polycentric region in China, the PRD's intercity railway planning can provide insightful 
interpretations on the current round of state restructuring. The third section proposes an 
analytical framework and explains why this framework is chosen. Introducing the research 
methods and data sources in the empirical study are arranged in the last section. 
3 J Conceptualizing the Spatial Planning as a Process of State Rescaling 
To summarize the theoretical review of the state rescaling in the previous chapter, there are four 
main important messages useful for the following examination. First, there is a reworking of 
state regulatory scale in both the western countries and China. Some functions and power of 
national state have been scaled up, scaled down and scaled out to other levels of governments or 
the institutes outside the state. Second, no scale of regulatory government dominates. The 
national state is still important because the rescaling process is deliberately designed to enhance 
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the state regulation. Each trend of state restructuring is followed by a counter-trend through 
which the state regains its importance of regulation and governance. Third, the city regions are 
becoming the main arena for the state restructuring. Rather than a directed activity, the regional 
formation is achieved through dialectical ways in which different jurisdictional governments 
interacted with each other. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the contemporary process of state reorganization must be 
understood from the emerging politics of the region. The question is how to identify these 
processes at the regional scale? How is the emerging politics of the region related to the on-going 
transformation of state? 
To understand the interaction process between states，it is necessary to explicate the concept of 
state rescaling first. As defined in the previous chapter, the term "state" means the function and 
authority of the national state. “Rescaling，’ is the scaling up, down and out of the state's function. 
And the "process" refers to the ongoing interaction process, including the trends and counter-
trends of state re-organization. None of the concepts above are easy to imagine and to understand 
specifically. That's why much of the discussion about the state rescaling has focused on the 
planning process. 
3.1.1 Changing Definition and Concept of Planning 
In the early twentieth century, there were two strands of planning thought that prevailed in the 
western countries. One strand was concerned with the distributions of economic activities. 
Regional planning is used to achieve the spatial balance at the regional scale, and thus is often 
conducted as the guideline for the regional infrastructure construction and the location of 
industries. The other strand was related to the problems of urbanization resulted from the 
Industrial Revolution (Hall 1992). Regional planning is advocated to manage the spatial 
organization of urban regions and to provide the guidelines for development between two 
adjacent cities. Both of these two strands stressed the role of regional planning as spatial tool for 
management and implementation of economic policies. 
Such thought of planning is derived from the government's strategies of the region. Since the 
World War Two, the main role of government was to regulate the national economy from the 
demand perspective. The welfare policies were thereby set up for the citizens. Providing a 
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framework for such provision of welfare services and infrastructure became regional planning's 
objective. At that time, solving regional problems and achieving economic development, high 
quality of the environment and the coordinated social conditions in the region-wide area mainly 
relied on a state intervention (Glasson 1992). The decision-making of regional planning 
belonged to the national level of governments who primarily took in charge of the demand 
management. As such, making regional planning mainly depended on hierarchical organizations, 
planners and the directed relationship between the governments and the citizens (Esping-
Anderson 1990). The planners played an important role in making the regional plan, and 
technical rules of planning were taken as the priority principle in the decision-making process. 
Various Tiers of Government's Demands 
The thought of regional planning has seen profound transformation since the early 1980s. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the regulatory function of the state has been "scaled" up, down 
and out as to response to the economic restructuring, and to tackle the crisis caused by the former 
regulation. Within this background, multiple tiers of governments that obtained certain power 
came to intervene in the issues of territorial development. One of the reasons is that the state 
space becomes the popular means to facilitate the implementation of development policies and to 
achieve the economic goals. 
The most evident phenomenon is the renewed interest of region by different governments. The 
economic restructuring and globalization attract great concern on the qualities of regions. This 
further fuels the governments to reconsider the regional development. As an important tier 
between the nexus of the local and global, the regional scale is targeted as the priority by the 
governments to enhance the economic competitiveness in the world. Within this context, the 
governments, both the central and locals, are seeking to make city regions more economically 
competitive, more environmentally friendly and to provide efficient infrastructure and services. 
The regional plan, especially the spatial plan, is once becoming the favorite planning tool among 
the policy makers. 
The changes of strategic target for the region are accompanied by the changing role of planning. 
Different from the previous planning, the new regional plan has to fulfill different demands for 
space and regulation from different tiers of governments. Planning is not only a technical tool for 
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the governments to materialize their development strategies at the regional scale, but also a 
political role for various governments to achieve their interests. Both the central and local 
governments may need planning for the regulation target. As for the central government, the 
regional plan is used to tackle the governance failures and crisis caused by the former 
experimentation of local regulation, such as the problems of coordinating public policy in 
particular localities (Healey 2004). The regulation problems concerned by the national state were 
derived from the prevailing "New Localism" in the 1980s. It stressed the growing urban 
entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989) and advocated the territorial competition among the local 
governments (Peck and Tickell 1994). The over-emphasized competition between cities resulted 
in political fragmentation within region. This in turn leads to the weakening capacity of the 
higher-level governments. 
As for the local governments, the regional plan is more like an opportunity to grasp the political 
resources from a higher level of governments. The local governments are able to articulate their 
development strategies onto the spatial plan. By this means, they may get the material assistant 
from the central or regional governments. To a larger extent, the regional plan may help forming 
the coalitions of small municipal governments. It is likely to invoke the attention of higher- level 
governments or the potential stakeholders important to the development within the region 
(Beauregard 1995). 
In this context, the diversified demands of different tiers of governments call for a new type of 
regional planning. In Europe, strategic spatial plans and perspectives are actively being promoted 
by the planning agencies (Salet and Faludi 2000). Within the "multi-level" governance 
background in the European countries, the strategic spatial planning attracts great attention from 
different jurisdictions to fulfill their demands for space and politics. There is a trend towards 
replacing hierarchical and functional planning with horizontal and network-based planning 
(Williams 1999). Regional planning becomes an important arena where different levels of 
governments come to express their demands and achieve their interests with a spatial dimension. 
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3.1.2 Coordination among different agencies 
The current prevailing planning at the regional scale opens the access for different tiers of 
governments to capture their interests and demands. But it does not mean they can include their 
strategic orientation into the plans completely. It is argued that the actors often find themselves 
involved in a "shared power world" during the planning process (Bryson and Crosby 1992). No 
one could control the final decision making of the plans. Within the shared-power world, all the 
actors are constrained by the complex relation network of power, such as the power to issue a 
permit, the power to set up a plan, or the financial power for investment, or the political power 
carried within resourcing regimes (Giddens 1984). It is proposed that "whatever can be done at 
the level of the network needs to involve progressively multilevel and inter-jurisdictional 
dimensions" (Albrechts 2010: 90). It is in this sense that the coordination among different 
agencies is of importance to the planning. In fact, in order to ensure that a region-wide network 
project can be realized, a coalition of diverse institutional actors is necessary for the plan 
formation and implementation (Salet 2010). The interaction and negotiation among the local, 
regional and national levels of governments as well as the external forces can lay an effective 
effort and support to settle the agendas involved in the project implementation. It is for the 
reason that planning is frequently discussed in the relation with the urban and regional 
governance. The planning is not just a technical tool for the project implementation, but 
understood as a social process through which all the actors are mobilized to design the plan and 
to develop strategic agendas within the "power-relation" context (Healey et al. 1997, Salet and 
Faludi 2000, Fiirst and Kneilung 2002). The process aims at reaching a decision framework 
among all the relevant governments and agents on the strategic development of the region 
(Healey 1997). 
3.1.3 Changing Planning Practices and Rescaling Process 
The changing role of planning points to the need of new interpretative modes for understanding 
the emergent political process of planning. One useful assumption is that the planning process is 
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not a static pattern, but an on-goingly changing, evolving process. Much of the evidence shows 
that plans are not always realized through actions. The nature of the planning is recognized as a 
process that collects each actor's ideas as to realize their own interests (Hoover 1961, p. 293). In 
many cases, the implementation of the plan relies on the joint efforts of all the state actors. In 
fact, the actors might try to change the existing way things are conducted, to deploy new ideas 
and policies for the development, or even substitute new approach with another (Healey 2004). 
The planning is also understood as a process of interest meditation (Healey 1998). In view of 
Flyvbjerg (1998), the key point for analysis of planning practices is to examine how the actors 
change the plan and their reasons. 
That is to say, the planning is no longer a technical process, but a political one through which 
different actors are able to negotiate with each other. A large number of discussions about the 
planning now focus on process, on how the government actors interact with each other as to 
develop the planning agenda within the complex network of power context (Healey et al. 1997, 
Salet and Faludi 2000, Albrechts et al. 2001). It is stressed that planning requires a processing 
analysis of the interacting agendas in both formal decision-making and implementation. That is 
the transition period from plan to the actual implementation, during which many changes caused 
by the actors would happen (Friedmann 1998). 
The changes are reflected in the planning practices in the formal or informal way. The 
interpretive and institutionalist approach have been developed to the analysis of planning 
practices (see Irmes 1995, Healey 1997). The institutionalist approach in the planning process 
involves not only the formal organization that set up by the institutional system, but also the 
informal relationship through which different governments coordinate together to conduct the 
planning project (Healey 2006). Two useful concepts are proposed to represent the two level of 
governance. They are the "planning system" and "planning practice" (Healey 2006: 73). 
Some scholars linked the plan-making process to the process of institutional "re-scaling" 
(Brenner 1999, Macleod 1999). As mentioned above, the current planning is required to fulfill 
demands from the various actors. From the other perspectives, the planning is an effective means 
by which different agendas on multi-level scale are able to coordinate on the spatial issues. On 
the other hand, the changeful planning process might have the potential for rescaling up from the 
municipal state and down from the national state (Albrechts 2010). The emerging rescaling 
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perspective in analyzing the planning practices seeks to identify both patterns of state interaction 
and forces that drive them during the planning process. The ideas that conceptualizing plan-
making practices as a process of state re-organization is proposed to the analysts of such 
planning activity and to the various actors' behavior involved in it (Healey 1997). For instance, 
Salet (2010) seeks to examine the rescaling practices within the region through the current 
planning process in Dutch Randstad. In Europe, 'polycentricity' was proposed as a crucial 
strategy to achieve functional linkages and interdependence within city-regions (Hall and Pain 
2006). The emerging mega-region in North America is listed as one of national strategies for 
future development (more detail, see America 2050). Now the focus shifts to examine how 
national and local factors interact to shape new regions at a range of scales (Tassilo 2002). 
Detailed relationships between cities and regions are expressed in the relative roles of planning 
and strategic policy making. The dynamic that generating the actual practices is diversified and 
much related to the local context (Healey 2003). A large number of planning experiences in 
Europe are documented to support this viewpoint (Healey 1997, Albrechts et al. 2001, Healey 
2007，Balducci 2008, Xu and Yeh 2010). 
In sum，the relation between the governments can be fitted into the analytical framework of 
planning, and examined "within a given context of place, time and scale regarding specific issues 
and particular combinations of actors" (Albrechts 2010: 86). 
3.2 Regional Planning in China 
3.2.1 Evolution of Regional Planning 
Regional planning in China is usually understood from the political-economic perspective, 
especially in the pre-reform period. Before the economic reform, the national state carried out the 
redistributive functions in the territorial development (Wu and Zhang 2010). Economic and 
social development was a main task for a region at that time. Regional planning was an 
important part of strategies for resource allocation. It was used to distribute large manufacture 
projects across the province. The regional plan to relocate industries from one place to another 
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was part of the state's political consideration on national defense in the Cold War. But at the 
same time, the regional plan was also adopted to address regional inequalities resulted from the 
previous distribution. During the centrally planned economy period, making regional plans relied 
relevant ministries at the central level. The coordination and decision-making were thus reached 
within the hierarchal system. Two kinds of regional planning can be summarized in terms of the 
state level. One is territorial planning that performed at national and provincial level. It was 
responsible by the State Planning Commission (SPC) ijiwei) and the National Territorial Bureau 
{guotu ju). It mainly tackled the issues of industries allocation. The other one is planning in a 
given region subordinated to the province, like an urban area. This regional planning was used to 
deal with the agendas of the urban system, and was responsible by the Ministry of Construction 
(MOC). The role of regional planning is argued to reinforce the central power or to fulfill the 
demand of industrial production, but not for the better regulation or economic development (Xu 
2008). 
Since the economic reform, the transition from the command economy to a more market-oriented 
one served the context for the changing regional planning in China. In the 1980s, the state started 
to initiate a series of reform policies and to introduce market incentives to the national 
development. The regime of post-reform stressed the development of market economy and 
positioned cities as strategic sites for accumulation and regulation (Xu 2008). The city was 
conceived as the means to overcome the constraint of accumulation and was decentralized some 
of the functions from the central government. A bunch of special economic zones were 
established by the central government as to stimulate the development of the central cities and 
their surroundings. As such, the concern of regional planning shifted to the resource coordination 
between cities within the region. There were two kinds of regional planning that were 
remarkable at the beginning of the reform. One is the land use planning, which was initiated by 
the central government in 1981. As the urbanization process speeded up in the nationwide, the 
land was a great demand for local governments. In order to regulate the land use and to protect 
the farmland, the central government assigned SPC to take charge of land planning {guotu 
guihud) at the central, trans-provincial, provincial, regional and city levels (Xu 2008). Following 
the example of the West Europe and Japan, this kind of planning aimed at regulating and 
protecting the land resource from a multiple perspective, such as population, resource and 
environment (Hu 2006). The other one is the urban system plan (chengzhen tixi guihua) under 
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the oversight of MOC. With the increasing importance of urban development, it was recognized 
that the central city must be planned from the perspective of a larger area, the region. The urban 
system plan was believed to provide the functional, hierarchical and spatial instructions for the 
regional infrastructure and urban areas (Xu 2008). In 1989, the urban system plan was included 
into the part of urban planning procedure (Hu 2006). This kind of regional planning, though 
seems creative in serving a good balance of intercity development, was not attained much 
attention from the local governments and therefore functioned little in reality. 
Until recently, the city regions have seen a renewed interest by central and local governments. 
Xu (2008) summarized the reasons for the current imperative of mega-city regions in China. 
With the rise of urban entrepreneurialism, strategic planning at the mega-city region level 
became a key political strategy for the centre to regain control and importance of local and 
regional governance (Xu and Yeh 2010: 18). For the provinces and local governments, proposing 
mega-city regions to the national planning could help promote the strategic position of economic 
development, and also facilitate policy support from the centre (Xu and Yeh 2010). 
3.2.2 The Rise of Polycentric Region and the Difficulty in Planning 
The renewed interest in regional planning among local governments is accompanied by the 
emergence of enlarged metropolitan regions in China. With the concomitant trend of 
globalization and urbanization in China, its regional system has undergone significant 
transformation and presented the polycentrial tendency, such as the PRD, Yangtze River Delta 
(YRD), and so on. The former peripheral towns and rural areas grew into developed economic 
centers with dense population (Xu 2008). The resultant spatial structure is now described with 
the term as polycentric region. 
The term polycentric region is used to describe the phenomenon of metropolises, cities and 
towns spatially separate but functionally networked, clustered around one or more larger central 
cities, 'drawing enormous strength from a new functional division of labor' (Hall and Pain 2006: 
3). A lot of work has identified the emerging regional pattern around the world. For instance, the 
PRD and the YRD regions are recognized as polycentric meg-city regions in China (Xu and Li 
1990, Yeh 2001, Xu and Yeh 2010). Also the Tokaido (Tokyo-Osaka) corridor in Japan, Greater 
Jakarta and the ten 'megalopolitan areas' in America are recognized as the same pattern as mega-
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city-regions (McGee 1995, Yeung 1996, Scott 2001’ Lang and Dhavale 2005). There is no 
exaggeration to conclude that polycentric region was the emerging urban form at the beginning 
of the century (Hall 2006: 1). 
Such polycentric patterns have received increasingly high attention among spatial planners as 
well as policy makers. Polycentricity in general is considered as means to achieve both a more 
balanced spatial pattern of development and a higher level of international territorial 
competitiveness of the area at stake (Waterhout 2003). Recently in China, planners have attached 
great value to such polycentric pattern and attempted to develop strategic planning for 
polycentric metropolitan, such as the latest planning of Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing and 
Guangzhou. 
3.2.3 Pearl River Delta: a Growing Polycentric Region 
The PRD covers nine prefectures of the province of Guangdong, namely Guangzhou, Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Foshan, Huizhou, Jiangmen and Zhaoqing (see Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1 Geography of cities in the Pearl River Delta 
Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council (www.hktrader.net) 
Since the economic reforms in the 1980s, the PRD has developed into a dynamic polycentric 
region in 
South China (Wuttke 2008). In 2008, the population of the PRD reached 60 million 
47 
people, accounting for nearly 63% of the population of Guangdong Province where the PRD is 
located with its land area amounting to only 11.9% of the province's total. 
As the "South Window of China", the PRD region became the initial institutional laboratory for 
market-oriented reform. The PRD has been characterized as a relatively free economic region 
since the beginning of the opening-up and reform policy. A flood of investment turned it into the 
mainland's economic powerhouse. The PRD's startling growth was fuelled by foreign investment 
largely from Hong Kong that moved their manufacturers into the PRD. Foreign enterprises, most 
of which were from Hong Kong and Taiwan, accounted for 62.9% of Guangdong's total exports 
in 2000. Shenzhen, Dongguan and Guangzhou, with advantage of geographical proximity to 
Hong Kong, are the three cities in the PRD that attracted the most foreign direct investment 
(FDI). As showed by Table 3.1, the eastern side of the PRD (Shenzhen, Dongguan), dominated 
by foreign capitals, is more developed economically. The western areas (Foshan, Zhuhai, 
Zhongshan, Jiangmen), dominated by local private capitals, are open for development. 
Prior to the economic reforms of 1978, Guangzhou was the region's undisputable economic and 
political center followed by Foshan, a medium-sized city lying 20 km southwest of Guangzhou. 
Together with a number of smaller urban places close by, the cities of Guangzhou, Foshan, 
Jiangmen and Zhongshan constituted the hearth of the PRD Region. With a land area amounting 
to 52.1% of the region's total, this core area covered 89.7% of the region's total industrial 
product in 1978 (Xu 1990. In fact, the southern and western parts of the region including Zhuhai, 
Shenzhen, Doumen, Enping and Keshan were relatively undeveloped, with slow economic 
development and low standard of living. 
The most significant change after the introduction of the open door policy was the emergence of 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai as major urban centers (Xu 2001). In the early 1980s, the central 
government established 14 special economic zones along the southeastern bank of China, and 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai were included and they were able to enjoy the open policy to the foreign 
market. Naturally, the rapid economic development in areas outside Guangzhou emerged. The 
central position of Guangzhou is challenged by other rising economic regions. Within the delta, 
Guangzhou is the largest city in terms of population, but manufacturing centers have flourished 
around it in the counties of Dongguan, Foshan and Zhongshan, not to mention Shenzhen and 
Zhuhai as the thriving special economic zones. Each city specialized itself in some specific 
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manufactured products (see Table 3.1). Foshan is especially noted for the assembly of consumer 
electronics, textiles, and toys, and Dongguan has a reputation in ceramics and clothing. 
Table 3.1 Clusters in the PRD Cities 
City Clusters 
Guangzhou Autos and parts, transport equipment, electrical products, electronics, 
chemicals, garments, textiles, business services, software, toys 
Panyu* Sports goods, textiles, garments, jewellery, toys, electric supply equipment, 
shipping containers 
Shenzhen Electronics, computer products, telecom products, ICs, toys, plastics, watches, 
clocks, oil paintings, port services, logistics, finance, printing, artificial trees 
Dongguan Electronics computers, components, peripherals, garments, furniture, shoes, 
toys, watches, clocks, cutlery, kitchen tools, soldering machinery, angling 
equipment 
Huizhou Laser diodes, digital electronics, CD-ROMs, telephones, batteries, circuit 
boards, precision machinery, plastics, chemicals 
Zhongshan Lighting fixtures, lamps, metal products, motorcycles, casual wear, locks, 
audio equipment 
Foshan Industrial ceramics, ceramic artwork, needlework, textiles, children's garments 
..Chencun* Flower farming, ornamental fish, turf fanning 
..Nanhai* Textiles, aluminum products, motorcycles, underwear 
..Shunde* Electrical appliances, woodworking, shipping containers, furniture, 
machinery, bicycles 
Jiangmen Textiles, garments, paper, batteries 
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* Panyu is a district of Guangzhou. Chencun, Nanhai and Shunde are districts of Foshan 
Source: Michael J. Enright, Edith E. Scott, Ka-mun Chang, "Regional Powerhouse: the Greater 
Pearl River Delta and the Rise of China" John Wiley and Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd, 2005. 
The PRD's broad range of manufactured industries has developed in clusters. Weng (2006) 
deployed the location quotient (LQ) values to identify the industrial distributions in the PRD 
region, and found that each city was specialized in different manufactured industries. In general, 
the two banks of the delta present different industry profiles. The east bank focuses on 
electronics and IT products while the west bank is famous for household appliance products (Xu 
and Yeh 2010). However, most of the cities within the region put their effort on the similar 
manufactured industries. This in turn increased the competition possibilities in the manufactured 
industrial sectors among the nine cities (Xu and Yeh 2010). With regards to the urban strategic 
plans, the majority of the cities have positioned their leading industrial sectors at electronics and 
information, biotechnology, new materials, and new energy (Xu and Yeh 2010: 221). 
Furthermore, with the employment data, Yu (2009) conducted a statistical analysis to examine 
the regional pattern of the PRD. It is found that the regional spatial structure is unfolded as 
"core-periphery-fringe" pattern, from which certain signs of polycentricity can be identified. 
The polycentric spatial structure is not only a product of the economic competition among the 
municipalities, but also accompanied with the rise of urban entrepreneurialism (Xu 2008). The 
economic reform in the 1980s granted local governments' greater freedom to develop their own 
local economy. Moreover, the fiscal system has shifted from the central-dominated pattern to the 
tax-sharing system between the center and the locals. The local governments are able to attain 
some revenue to support their strategic plans within the city. The local revenue also stimulated 
municipal governments to promote economic activities. Under such circumstance, local 
governments began to adopt proactive policies to develop local economy and improve the 
infrastructure in the intense competition for capital and resource. 
The behaviors of local governments are described as an entrepreneurial actor acting like an 
industrial firm (Zhang 2002, Zhu 1999). In the market-oriented transition of China, the 
competition for capital becomes one essential force that drives the local governments to adopt an 
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entrepreneurial approach in order to keep in the advance within the region. Unlike the 
entrepreneurial governments in capitalism, local governments in China are protected by the soft 
budget constraints and didn't need to pay for their investment loss (Xu and Yeh 2005). It is in 
this sense that Chinese local governments are characterized with the entrepreneurial nature in 
form but not in essence (Xu and Yeh 2005: 284). This leads to a tendency towards over-
ambitious urban development and overwhelming investment of infrastructure at local scale. 
With the rise of urban entrepreneurialism, the PRD witnessed a fierce competition among 
municipal governments (Xu and Yeh 2005). Yuan (2007) argues that intercity competition 
overwhelmes the cooperation trend in the PRD. It is argued that the competition in PRD lay a 
positive effect on the territorial economic development in the early days of economic reform 
(Wuttke 2008). The efforts to retain and promote competitiveness by rising entrepreneurial cities 
facilitate the growth of local capacities. It is claimed that the local governments' capacities 
compensate for a lack of capacity at the regional level. Currently, a growing body of studies has 
indentified an increasing competition among the jurisdictional state, and such competition, 
however, is subjected to critique (Liu 2002, Xu and Yeh 2005). The spatially fragmenting effects 
evolving from the former development started to cause a lot of problems, such as the redundant 
construction of infrastructures from city to city, the similarity of industrial sectors among cities, 
and exacerbated competitions to attract investors. The majority of the PRD cities (such as 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Huizhou) have developed their own infrastructure plans on port, 
petrol industry and automobile industry respectively. As such, the lack of an applicable intercity 
cooperation mechanism among the soaring polycentric regions of China similar to the PRD is 
widely noted (Xu 2008, Luo and Shen 2007, Xu and Yeh 2010). A number of endeavors have 
been undertaken to cultivate intercity cooperation, such as the Yangtze River Urban Economic 
Coordination Conference. In recent years, it's evident that the regional plans become a political 
option to address the problems of intense urban competition. This new kind of regional strategic 
planning is favored with both the central and local governments. Planning at the mega-city 
region level is increasingly becoming a key political strategy for the central government in space 
commodification (Xu 2008: 169). As for the local governments, the region-wide planning can 
help attain the political and economic support from the central government. In the face of the 
intense competition between cities or even regions, the official status of regional plans can no 
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doubt facilitate the funding for large infrastructure projects and enhance the competitiveness of 
cities within a region. 
Since 2003, new regional plan has prevailed in the PRD region. Unlike previous plans, the 
region-wide planning is initiated to coordinate interests of various government entities. Rather 
than the hierarchical control, such regional planning stresses the coordination among the political 
actors within both the hierarchical structure and the horizontal network. Therefore, regional 
planning is considered as a new form of state regulation and governance by the researchers (Ng 
and Tang 2009, Luo and Zhang 2004). 
Many researchers began to examine such kind of regional plans in the PRD region (Xu 2008, Xu 
and Yeh 2010). It is noted that the agreement on planning the region is not easy to reach among 
the multiple governments during the planning process. The problem is that, without consensus on 
the planning issues, the ambitious regional plan will fail to be implemented effectively, or to be 
funded in time. In this case, the coordination efforts to enhance the planning effect are made both 
by the higher-level governments and the inter-jurisdictions. How do they interact with each other 
in order to maximize their own interests in the plan? Why they failed to reach an agreement 
before and why they change their minds after? To answer the questions, tracing the changing 
process of planning and examining the interacting interests and behaviors during the plan 
formation and implementation process are necessary. 
The contents of the regional plan are usually extended in five categories: economic planning, 
spatial planning for urban system, ecological conservation, coordination policies and 
infrastructure planning. The planning process of the first four items is difficult to assess because 
they stress the policy basis of the coordination and are biased towards the macro strategies of the 
plans. The consensus on the planning coordination on these topics is so fuzzy that we can not 
attain a clear and concrete picture of their interests and interaction behaviors. Usually, the 
planning targets of these items are unlikely to be realized in the short term. The implementation 
achievements are difficult to trace in a period of time. However, the cooperation between 
different governments to reach agreement is more evident in planning infrastructure projects. 
Compared to other planning strategies, infrastructure projects are more straightforwardly related 
to the cost and benefits (McCarthy 2010). As the task of the infrastructure projects is divided 
down to the relevant agencies of different governments，the various actors are forced to make 
52 
clear of responsibilities and arrangement in the planning process to fight for their own interests. 
Hence, the infrastructure planning process can provide more direct insights onto the interacted 
behaviors of the different jurisdictions. 
As for the regions in China, different jurisdictional states are attempting to construct a new type 
of regional transport system, namely intercity railway to counter problems caused by the spatial 
fragmentation and enhance the regional competitive advantages. The State Council approved the 
intercity railway network planning in the polycentric region in principle, such as the Beijing-
Tianjin-Hebei Bohai Sea area, the YRD and the PRD (see China Economic Times 2005). Inter-
city railway construction, under way in China, will be a crucial regional infrastructure and play 
an indispensable role in the region governance. 
3.3 Towards a Theoretical Framework 
The research aimed at depicting a vivid picture on how different jurisdictions in the polycentric 
region interact with each other during the planning process of regional infrastructure projects. 
The empirical study case is the PRD intercity railway network. 
Based on the above discussion, an analytical framework is proposed to conceptualize the plan-
making process as the state restructuring process. According to the review of existing theories, a 
comprehensive conceptualization of regional planning must incorporate two perspectives. 
First, the role of planning has shifted to a more policy-base one, on which various governments 
can achieve their spatial interests. Different jurisdictions within both hierarchical structure and 
horizontal network are involved in the planning process to fulfill their spatial demands of future 
development. However, no one could control the final decision-making by himself. The effort to 
coordinate among different agencies is indispensable during the plan-making process. Currently, 
the coordination has been identified as a major challenge in planning cross-bordered 
infrastructure in most countries. The new forms of public actions emerging in most western 
countries were characterized by more complex systems of actors (Gaudin 1993). The PRD, a 
polycentric region, has also seen the complexity of the governmental system and also the over-
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competed problems between different jurisdictions. To uncover the different interests and 
interaction behaviors of planning actors, it is necessary to sort out the different relationship 
between the governments. In case of the PRD intercity railway, four dimensions of relationship 
among different jurisdictions can be sorted out: ministry and province; the province and 
municipal governments; ministry and municipal governments, and the intercity (see Table 3.2). 
Generally, governments in China are organized hierarchically at the central, provincial and 
municipal levels. There is no legitimate government organized at the regional scale, nor is there 
any law that requires cities to cooperate with each other (Xu 2010). The PRD region contains 
nine jurisdictions under Guangdong province. Both the province and the central government can 
enforce coordination in the city region. The municipal governments are the key operators in the 
planning implementation, and may have lots of interactions with higher levels of governments. 
Generally, four dimensions of relationship can be examined in the planning process. As for the 
horizontal level, regional planning requires cooperating efforts between different cities. As 
discussed about the PRD, the increasingly intensive competition between cities makes the 
intercity cooperation more difficult in practices. Their interactions - formal or informal efforts-
are important in understanding plan-making process. 
Table 3.2: Four types of relationship among different jurisdictions 
Ministry and Province 
Vertical Province and Municipality 
Ministry and Municipality 
Horizontal Intercity 
Second，spatial planning literature suggests the multiple states' interaction process is path-
dependent, in the sense that the PRD intercity railway plan is not static but an on-going changing 
and evolving process. As is argued in the state rescaling, the institutional arrangement is not 
fixed in advance but becomes a product of the process, which suggests that the government 
arrangements and planning process should be considered together. New arrangements of 
governments might need to set up before the planning could commence or may be developed as 
part of the planning process (John 2010: 186). It is also believed that planning in system with 
multiple actors "usually involves some institutional transformation or change to enable actions in 
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this intrinsically changing and uncertain context" (Alexander 2009: 518). Thus, this study tries to 
understand the interacted behaviors from two perspectives. One is the technical planning. The 
fixed planning institution and mechanism which regulate the coordination. The second one is the 
negotiation process. Once the conflict occurs, there might emerge another coordination practices 
through the interaction. This might lead to a new mechanism to coordinate the different interests. 
During the latter process, it aims at observing the specific responses of different levels of 
governments, from the central level, the provincial level and the municipal level Compared to 
the former, the new coordinating mechanism is not fixed in advance, but generated ad hoc 
through the various governments' bargaining processes. The planning practices offer a good 
chance to observe some interaction outside the fixed institution, and thus to get more insights on 
the rescaling process. The processes, including the technical planning and negotiation process, 
play an important role in the forming of the state reorganization. Thus, we divide the PRD 
intercity planning process into technical planning and negotiation process, through which to 
investigate the interacted behaviors in a comprehensive and clear perspective. 
The analysis will focus on specific interactions in both the legitimate planning phase and the 
planning practices for the PRD intercity railway. Over the time span considered, the framework 
is set up to answer following questions: 
1. The PRD intercity railway planning process 
Who initiated the PRD intercity railway plans? Which level of states have actually participated in 
making decisions in the PRD intercity railway planning, and what are their roles in it? 
What is the intention and target of each government regarding the PRD intercity railway? 
How do different levels of governments negotiate with each other to achieve the final PRD 
intercity railway plan? How about their role and status in it? 
2. The negotiation process in planning the PRD intercity railway 
What are the problems or conflicts preventing the implementation of the PRD intercity railway? 
Which new actors have participated in the negotiation in the new round of planning? 
How do different jurisdictions negotiate with each other, and what is the outcome? Why do the 
different governments justify the initial PRD intercity plan, what main factors do they concern? 
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Last but not least, it is interesting to find out the mechanism of planning coordination. If there is 
a fixed pathway to solve the conflicts between different jurisdictions, which level of government 
dominates the final decision-making? In order to answer these research questions, an analytical 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As is argued in the state rescaling, the institutional arrangement is not fixed in 
advance but becomes a product of the process. The institutional arrangement may be 
shaped by the practices in the state project. Two similar factors are also identified in 
the planning process. The study tries to understand the interacted behaviors from two 
perspectives. As illustrated above, one is technical planning process. I want to 
examine the planning institution and mechanism. Once a specific problem arises, 
there might emerge another coordination practices through the interaction. This might 
lead to a new mechanism to coordinate the different interests. The negotiation process 
offers a good chance to observe some interaction outside the former institution, and 
thus to get more insight on the rescaling process. 
Based on the framework, three specific concerns can be narrowed down. The first one 
is the institutional form for planning. Which actors involve in the planning process 
and what their roles are? The second one is about the planning coordination 
mechanism. That is the coordination channel for different jurisdictions to express 
their interests. The last question is how the planning process relates to the state 
rescaling process. The core is to observe how different governments and agencies 
interact at both vertical and horizontal dimensions. Specific cases may need to 
illustrate the detailed conflicts and how the actors interact with each other to respond 
to the difficulties. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter conceptualizes the plan-making process as the process of state 
restructuring. Attention focuses on the planning process and the complex system of 
different jurisdictions, new institutional arrangements may be established before 
planning issues are initiated, or may be developed during the planning process and 
also as one part of plan implementation (Abbott 2010).In addition，it is contended that 
the current regional spatial planning highlights different political interests and 
coordinating efforts are indispensable (Healey 2004). Thus, the changeful planning 
process might have the potential for rescaling up from the municipal state and down 
from the national state (Albrechts 2010). 
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In case of the PRD, the problems of over-competition and political fragmentation 
prevail in this growing polycentric region. To plan infrastructure within the region, 
cooperation efforts should be made between different jurisdictions. The planning 
process may thus become the arena for the meditation of different interests, and the 
ideas of plans may be subjected to change by some actors for their own interest. The 
interaction among various tiers of governments may carry the possibilities of state 
restructuring, which encompasses the trend of scaling up and scaling down of state 
functions. The focus of planning process is thus to analyze the ways in which multiple 
jurisdictions may change the existing plans and deployed new ideas for their interests. 
This study proposes that a research framework of rescaling study should identify the 
different actors' interests during the plan-making process and examined their 
interaction behaviors when conflicts occurred. The framework stresses the four kinds 
of relationship between the governments, and the planning process as interaction 
process of multiple jurisdictions. The coordinating problems need to be solved not 
only at the vertical dimension, but also the horizontal dimension. They have to come 
together and form a new planning arrangement in regional planning. Furthermore, the 
planning arrangement is not fixed in advanced, but becomes a product of state 
interaction process. Both the fixed institutional arrangement and negotiation practices 
must be considered in plan-making process. The previous state arrangement may 
change in the negotiation process. The changing activities of state functions may 
reflect the trends of scaling up and scaling down. Therefore, the interaction to change 
the plans represents the rescaling activities of the governmental functions. It is in this 
sense that the planning process can be conceptualized as a process of state 
restructuring. The state restructuring activities may thus be understood from the 
interaction between multiple governments in planning the infrastructure projects. 
Taking the PRD intercity railway as a case study, the thesis attempts to understand the 
interaction among various governments during the planning process. 
Furthermore, understanding the role and interests of various governments is the key to 
understand the interaction behaviors among different actors. The role and interests of 
governments are directly related to the institutional arrangement and its transitional 
context in China. Thus, the institutional basis of planning regional railway and 
regional political economy in current China is imperative aspects for understanding 
the context of multiple jurisdictions' interaction. The changing power distribution in 
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China will be reviewed in Chapter 4, particularly the complex situation at the regional 
scale. Then, the institutional arrangement in planning regional infrastructure will be 
provided to make clear the institutional basis of cooperation between different 
jurisdictions. The background of planning intercity railway in the PRD region will 
also be introduced to demonstrate the necessity of new planning mechanisms in order 
to cope with the new round of state rescaling. 
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Chapter 4 
The State in Transition: A Need for Planning Coordination 
in Cross-boundary Railways 
In Chapter 3, it is clear that the roles and interests of various governments are of 
primary importance in understanding the interacting behaviors of actors in the 
planning process. In the case of China, the roles and interests of governments are 
directly related to the institutional arrangements and the context of state regulation, 
which has changed dramatically since the late 1970s. In this sense, China's post-
reform context and the institutional dimension of planning regional railways is 
necessary for understanding the background of multiple jurisdictions' interaction. 
This chapter provides a backcloth of various governments' coordination in planning 
intercity railways. It firstly examines the changing context since the economic reform 
in 1978, in which the restructuring of state power is unfolded with China's transition 
from a central-planned economy to a more market-oriented one. Special attention will 
be paid to the changing power distribution at the regional scale. Second, it intends to 
identify the institutional arrangement in planning regional railways and to see how 
different jurisdictions work together in terms of railway planning. An introduction of 
railway boom in China is followed to explain why choosing railways as an example. 
Third, the background of planning the PRD intercity railway is introduced to show the 
necessity of new planning mechanisms in order to cope with the new round of mass 
investment in railways. Based on these findings, several research propositions about 
the planning coordination of regional railways in China are put forward. 
4,1 Changing Political Economy 
China has started its economic reform since the late 1970s. The post-reform period 
has seen a significant transition in economic and political arena. Before the economic 
reform, China's development was characterized as a centrally planned economy with 
resource allocation controlled by the central government. The growth strategy was 
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state-led extensive industrialization. The production activities and infrastructure 
provision were organized and coordinated through the hierarchal system. Each 
sectoral department of the central government had its own plan to coordinate the 
sectoral development. In addition, infrastructure investment was highly centralized at 
the national level. State fiscal appropriation was the major source for infrastructure 
investment. From 1953 to 1978, almost 80% of investment on infrastructure came 
from the central government (China Statistical Bureau, 2002). The collection of all 
the taxes and profits were "remitted to the center and then transferred back to the 
province according to expenditure needs approved by center" (Su and Zhao 2006: 1). 
It was the central policy-makers to decide which project was invested and how to 
implement the plan, while the sub-national governments were subservient agents and 
took up the commands from the ministerial system. Such a central state-dominated 
system in fact guaranteed a smooth operation of infrastructure planning and 
implementation. The process involved was not a complex task, and was able to 
achieve through the ministerial system (Wu and Zhang 2010). On the whole, the 
sectoral system played an essential role in regional or trans-border infrastructure 
during the pre-reform period. However, the changing conditions since the economic 
reform made the planning coordination more complex. 
Since 1978, the concern of the central state has changed from the power struggles to 
economic development. Rather than blindly seeking rapid industrial growth as before, 
the primary goal of the new government is to upgrade the living standard of people 
and to reach economic growth. In the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-95), one 
significant goal set by the central state was 'to lead the people to achieve 
comparatively well-off level of living' {xiao kang sheng huo) by the end of 20【卜 
century. The reorientation of development mindset is of importance to the subsequent 
economic transition. To achieve the new development, it requires a more relaxed 
political environment as well as more productive and efficient mechanism for 
economic activities. 
The main target of the economic reform is to re-organize the centrally planned system 
and to introduce market economy. Thus the reform policies have seen a transition 
both on the capital regime of accumulation and the state institutional arrangement. 
Economically, the previous centrally planned system was replaced by a decentralized 
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and market-oriented system, which is commonly referred to as 'socialist market 
economy with Chinese characteristic，. The market force is introduced carefully by the 
central government, yet not all of the industrial sectors are open to the market. On the 
one hand, the state relaxes its control over the market by reducing its scope of 
planning (Lin 1997). One significant area is price reform. The commodities prices 
previously decided by the state are now allowed to fluctuate freely according to the 
market demand. It is believed that the market price can act as invisible hand 
(wuxingdeshou) to adjust the imbalance between production and consumption, and 
also to create incentives for enterprises. On the other hand, the state retains the 
production control over the key industries, such as coal mining, hydroelectric power, 
steel manufacturing and railways. In such industrial areas, it is the state-owned 
enterprises who take charge of production according to state policies. To make sure 
healthy development in these industries, the state-owned enterprises, like the China 
Railway Engineering Corporation, can always obtain capital and technical support 
from the central government. That central resource is biased to state-owned 
enterprises has caused the problem of monopoly in these industries. In the meanwhile, 
private enterprises are allowed to set up and engage into the commodity production. 
Such a transitional economy in China is recognized as the co-existence of planned and 
market economies (Nee 1989, Bian and Logan 1996). 
Furthermore, the transition from command system to market economy has brought 
out a relevant adjustment on the spatial strategies. In the pre-reform era, the national 
scale was taken as the primary scale for resource allocation. The central state only 
stressed heavy industry because of consideration on national defense and military 
power. Heavy industrial projects were always allocated to the remote interior region 
(Wu and Zhang 2010). This in turn made other regions difficult to prosper without 
central support. It thus resulted in inequalities between different regions. During the 
post-reform era, spatial policies have intensively targeted the cities at strategic scales 
for capital accumulation and regulation (Xu 2008). The central government conceives 
cities as the means to overcome the constraint of accumulation. This re-orientation of 
development towards cities is achieved through a series of policies, e.g. promoting the 
export-led industrialization^ improving the level of urbanization, relaxing the 
4 Export-led industrialization has been an economic policy usually adopted by the developing countries 
since World War II. It aims to stimulate Ihe domestic industries through exporting labor-intensive goods to 
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constraint for urban migration and attracting foreign investment and joint ventures. To 
sum up, state development strategies moved from state-led extensive industrialization 
to urban-based intensive urbanization' (Wu et al. 2007). 
Within this context, urban development has been achieved through several 
institutional reforms inside the state. There are two main targets of these reforms. On 
one hand, they aimed at creating local incentives and stimulating local growth. On the 
other hand, they attempted to transfer economic responsibilities from the central 
government to the lower levels of governments (Wu et al. 2007: 114). The central 
government relaxes the control over economic affairs, and leaves certain freedom for 
local governments. These have been achieved through decentralization. 
4.1.1 Changing Central-local Relationship 
Since the late 1970s, China have transferred some central economic responsibilities to 
local levels of governments, including provinces, prefectures, counties, townships, 
and villages (Qian 1999). One significant move is the fiscal reform which effectively 
started the decentralization of state power. This reform is to reduce the fiscal pressure 
of the central government by giving sub national governments more discretion to 
finance their own needs (Su and Zhao 2006). At the beginning of the reform, the 
central state mainly granted more jurisdictions and revenue to the lower level of 
governments in order to meet the demand of market-oriented economy. The central-
local fiscal contract, so called 'eating in separate kitchens' was first introduced in the 
1980s. The fiscal contract was proposed to distribute revenues and expenditures 
between the central and local governments. Under this fiscal arrangement, local 
governments were entitled to have space to make development decisions as long as 
the tax quota was met (Lin 1997). It thus stimulated local governments to develop 
local industries. Additionally, local governments were compelled to shoulder a larger 
share of responsibilities to develop urban infrastructure needed for supporting 
economic growth. As a result, the former centralized system for infrastructure 
development has gradually faded. The task to develop urban and regional 
infrastructure was scaled down to local governments. 
other countries. China's economic has seen a remarkable boom with its exported-led strategy. Now China is 
identified as the "World Factory" because of its powerful manufacturing industries. 
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The governments at all levels are now placing increasing importance on infrastructure, 
which is one major factor to promote the export-led industrialization. The other factor 
is the cheap labor force to develop industrialization (Liu, 2005). The rural reform in 
the late 1970s opened a pathway for rural labor to enter urban manufacturing sectors. 
With numerous supply of labor force, the infrastructure development became the key 
effort needed for export-led growth. As discussed, the decentralization of fiscal 
responsibilities was accompanied by a range of financial incentives (Qian 2000). 
Local governments were given the ability to make their own arrangement of 
expenditure within the surplus revenue. This has greatly stimulated local governments 
to develop urban infrastructure in order to promote territorial development. 
Because the fiscal reform redefines the fiscal relationship of various governments, 
funding infrastructure can be achieved through multiple sources in the post-reform era. 
A number of policies are also proposed to diversify funding sources for infrastructure 
development. Four main funding sources are identified, i.e. direct budget investment 
from fiscal resources, borrowing, special funds and market-based financing (Chen and 
Xu 2011:113). What is particularly worth noting is that local governments are playing 
increasingly important role in collecting capital for infrastructure. However, some 
difficulties have risen up from this new system. For example, local revenue from 
fiscal allocation is often unable to cover the infrastructure investment for ambitious 
urban development plans. Local governments thus have to seek other funding sources, 
most of which come from the extra-budget revenue and extra-system revenue, like 
arbitrary charges and fines (Wang and Li 2007). 
The land reform is also an integral part of decentralization. The central government 
transfers the land use rights of state-owned land to local governments. Municipalities 
are allowed to sell land use rights in land market (Wu 1995). Such disposal rights of 
land have given local governments opportunities to earn land income. There are two 
sources of land income. One is to impose taxes and surcharges on land appreciation, 
transaction, and development projects. The other is 'land sales' (Wu et al. 2007: 115). 
Although land income should be distributed between central and local governments, 
the latter is still able to obtain a much larger share by concealing the actual number as 
much as possible. In the 1990s, land revenue accounted for 30 to 70 per cent of total 
local revenue at the municipal level (Ho and Lin 2001: 15). Land income is used to 
improve urban infrastructure which in turn increases accessibility and opens up new 
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venues for capital accumulation in urban investment (Xu, Yeh and Wu 2009). This is 
commonly referred to as 'using land to breed land development' (Yeh, 2005). As 
such, infrastructure investment is no longer conceived as a burden for local 
governments, because it can bring more land income (Wu et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, the land reform also gives land use rights of state-owned land within 
certain limits to local governments. In 1990, the "Provisional Regulation on the 
Granting and Transferring of Land Use Rights over the State-Owned Land in Cities 
and Towns" was promulgated. It clarified the "local right of land allocation and 
supply" (Xu 2007:116). In addition, the right of regulating development was entitled 
to local governments through the City Planning Act in 1990. In this sense, local 
governments obtained both the ownership of urban land and the development rights of 
urban space through this land reform (Wu et al. 2007). 
The power to regulate land use is of great help for local governments to increase its 
importance in infrastructure planning and implementation. This is because the 
infrastructure projects, no matter national or local ones, are required to obtain land use 
approval from local land department. In addition, infrastructure plans have to be 
consistent with urban plans made by local governments. Local governments thus can 
have their opinions about infrastructure projects according to their territorial 
conditions. In fact, along with the scaling down of economic decision-making power, 
support from local governments is more crucial to the success of an infrastructure 
project (Wu et al. 2007). 
On the other hand, many authors observed that decentralized policies have cultivated 
strong localism (Wang and Hu 1994). Oi (1992, 1995) argued that decentralization 
allowed local state to play an increasingly important role in urban development. 
Walder (1995) contemplated that local governments started to involve in economic 
activities by establishing their own companies and were acting more like 'industrial 
firms'. The local state was also tabbed with the notion of 'entrepreneurial state' for 
their direct involvement in the profit-seeking and risk-seeking business (Duckett 
1998). In a sense, local state was a market player, using market instruments to achieve 
political purposes (Xu and Yeh 2005). The central government was being powerless 
and less relevant in urban development because of a series of reforms (Wong et al., 
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1995). Local governments shifted from passive agents of the centre to active 
promoters and managers of urban development (Xu and Yeh 2005) 
However, the rising status of local governments does not mean a total retreat of the 
central state from economic and political arena. In 1994, the central government 
launched another fiscal reform, so called 'Tax Sharing Reform' for two purposes. The 
first was to increase the center's share of revenue, and the second was to raise 
transparency of central-local revenue by changing from revenue-sharing contract 
negotiations to a tax and revenue assignment system (Su and Zhao 2006). Through 
the new tax reform, the central government achieved fiscal recentralization by 
attaining over half of the total revenue by 2002 (Wong 2000). Although the central 
government no longer directly regulates local economic development, it still 
maintains importance in regulating and coordinating the national economy (Lin 
1997). It is concluded that the success of China's transitional economy lies in 
preserving state institutions while introducing economic incentives (Wu et al. 2007: 
11). The hierarchical government organizations suggest the central government still 
maintains control in the institutional regulation. 
In this context, the change of the central-local relationship is more complex than one-
directional decentralization that generally accepted. Although local governments have 
been entitled various powers of local development, the central government still 
remains its status as the highest level of administrative regulation. In fact, these policy 
initiatives have resulted in a more delicate relationship between the central and local 
governments. For instance, the 1994 fiscal reform helped the central government 
counter budgetary decline trend. But it didn't change "the actual pattern of revenue 
distribution and spending responsibilities between the central and sub-national 
governments" (Zhang 1999:140). On the other hand, the central government "relied 
heavily on control over financial resources to ensure its influence over local 
governments" (Zhang 1999: 141). This suggests that the central government no longer 
confidently relies on local governments to collect revenue through the political 
command (Zhang 1999). Moreover, the phenomenon of local discretion leads to 
increasing tension between the central and local governments. Local governments 
have learnt how to circumvent central regulation and to go beyond legal and 
budgetary constraints to mobilize resources (Xu and Yeh 2005). In the meanwhile, the 
central government keeps adjusting its regulatory power to response to local 
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disobediences. Some scholar has made complain about the state structure, which 
creates difficulties for the center to differentiate between simple incompetence and 
willful disobedience by localities (Wedeman 2001). 
The changing force outside the state also has important influences on the relationships 
of governments, particularly those of horizontal governments. The open-door policy 
since 1978 has allowed foreign investors to participate in urban development. 
Because foreign investment is out of the control of state command system, the 
investment location follows the market mechanism in order to reach maximized 
profits. 
In order to generate more revenue, local governments are starting to cultivate the 
ability to attract foreign capital. The high mobility of foreign capital leads to 
increasing intercity competition (Wu et al. 2007). In fact, interaction between 
different municipal governments was intensifying, and their relationship became more 
complex than that before the economic reform (Luo 2005). This is more evident in the 
rapidly growing areas, like the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region, where cooperation 
and competition among local governments are prevalent. 
In the early years of post-reform period, inter-jurisdictional competition played a 
positive role in promoting territorial development, especially in terms of public 
infrastructure. During the 1990s, local governments began to adopt competitive 
strategies to attract more foreign capital to support their economic growth. Cities are 
developed as the optimal locations for investment in competition with each other. 
Local governments are keen in promoting various infrastructure projects in order to 
increase the competitiveness of cities. Such kind of competitiveness building is 
attributed to decentralization in fiscal control and land disposal. With delegated power 
on local finance and land disposal，local governments are becoming increasingly 
relied on property sector to stimulate local economy (Wu 1999，2002; Zhu 2004). 
Large infrastructure projects and property-led development are popular among cities, 
and are most welcomed by local governments to promote urban competitiveness (Wu 
et al. 2007). 
The local investment in infrastructure projects and other relevant physical assets (e.g. 
building, vehicles and machinery) are measured statistically in the "investment in 
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fixed assets^ ，，(see Figure 4.1). It illustrates the investment in fixed assets by 
Guangzhou government from 1952-2011. As the central city of the PRD, Guangzhou 
city has been a pioneer in seeking the innovative ways for territorial growth since the 
economic reform. The suddenly growth of investment in fixed assets in 1980 shows 
that Guangzhou government has attached more importance on the infrastructure 
projects within the territory than before. The rising amount of investing capital in the 
past two decades also suggests that the infrastructure project is still one major concern 
by Guangzhou government. 
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Figure 4.1: The total investment in fixed assets in Guangzhou city (1952-2005). 
Source: Guangzhou City Statistics Yearbook (1953-2006). 
Infrastructure projects, like highways and railways, are the main invested arena. Local 
governments regard new infrastructure projects as essential means to materialized 
their development strategies, and more significantly, to make their cities enjoy a 
better position in regional, national and even global competition. A number of large 
cities (e.g. Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenzhen) have adopted such competitive 
strategies. They all have well developed public infrastructure, efficient transportation 
connection, and large infrastructure projects, like industrial parks. 
5 Fixed assets are a term used to describe the tangible assets and property. They are no sold directly to the 
consumers, and used only in the production activities to create future economic benefit. These include items 
that will be use over one year period, such as houses, buildings, machinery and motor vehicles et al.,. 
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However, till the end of the 1990s, the problems of intercity competition have started 
to expose. The fierce intercity competition has resulted in various 'resource wars' and 
'production wars', which in turn led to trade barriers and market separations. 
Moreover, intensive competition has caused an oversupply of infrastructure, 
duplicated industries, and exacerbated competition in attracting investors at the 
expense of environment (Wu and Yeh 2005). Such kind of spatially fragmented 
phenomenon reflects China's administrative fragmentation, in which different 
jurisdictions act like rivals without any coordinated mechanism (Ng and Tang 1999). 
As such, the lack of an applicable intercity cooperation has been widely noted. Since 
2000, a number of endeavors, such as the Yangtze River Urban Economic 
Coordination Conference, have been undertaken to cultivate intercity cooperation, 
These newly formed organizations are "no longer only in response to internally-
triggered demands and imposed or mandated from the above, but external forces to 
optimize the process of globalization and market reform" (Xu 2008: 164). However, 
regional cooperation is out of state institutional system, and does not have statutory 
power to regulate municipal governments. 
To sum up, since the economic reform, the forces both inside and outside the state 
have created new conditions to change institution for regional infrastructure 
development. National development strategies were moving from state-led extensive 
industrialization to urban-based intensive urbanization. The transition of development 
was achieved through a series of institutional reforms inside the state. 
Decentralization has resulted in a complicated power distribution between the central 
and local governments. The economic decentralization combined with delegated 
regulatory power allowed local governments to play an indispensible role in urban 
development. Now local governments are showing increasing interest and passion in 
investing infrastructure projects for better territorial growth. In addition, along with 
decentralization of decision-making, support from local governments is becoming 
more crucial to the success of infrastructure projects (Wu et al. 2007). 
In the meanwhile, the growing importance of local state does not mean a total retreat 
of the center. The central government still maintains its essential power in regulating 
and coordinating the national economy. The relationship between the central and local 
governments is becoming more delicate during the post-reform era. Local 
governments start to engage in disobedience, and circumvent central regulation in 
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purpose. The central government attempts to regain its regulation power for better 
supervision of localities, but still find it difficult to differentiate between 
incompetence and disobedience by local governments (Wedeman 2001). 
On the other hand, the changing force outside the state also has important influences 
on the relationship between various governments, especially the intercity relationship. 
At the beginning, intercity competition has played positive roles to promote territorial 
development. Cities are developed as the ideal places for investment in competition 
with each other. Local governments strive to develop infrastructure projects in order 
to promote the competitiveness of their cities. The problems resulted from such 
intercity competition were not revealed till the end of the 1990s. The intensive 
competition between cities has caused the construction of redundant infrastructure 
and industries, even at the expense of environment (Wu and Zhang 2010). Now the 
attention has been paid to intercity cooperation. Although many regional 
organizations are formed, little progress has been made to forge regional cooperation. 
Under such circumstances, the institutional arrangement underlying regional 
infrastructure planning has become increasingly complex. The post-reform transition 
has been premised on new forms of partnership and interaction between different 
jurisdictions (national, provincial, and municipal governments) and market players. 
4.2 Institutional Structure in Planning Regional Railways 
Decentralization and market reform have provided a new political economic context 
for regional infrastructure planning. The central government relaxes control over 
economic affairs, and leaves certain room for local governments to develop economy. 
The consequence is the emergence of a new institutional structure within which the 
multiple levels of state and market forces interact with each other in regional 
infrastructure planning. Railways are one of the most important infrastructure projects 
in China. During the post-reform period, the institution for planning coordination of 
railway projects has also seen a transition from central monopoly to multiple state 
actors' partnership. 
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4.2.1 Railway Reform 
Railways in China are state-owned. They are provided and controlled by the Ministry 
of Railway (MOR). MOR is one of the functional sectors under the supervision of the 
State Council, the highest administration of state. Before the economic reform, MOR 
was tightly controlled and managed by the central government. All financial 
responsibilities for investment and operation were allocated to the central 
government, while MOR acted as the center's executive sector. MOR had to submit 
all railway income to the central government, which in turn distributed the funds for 
investment and operation. Under the pressure of restructuring economy, the central 
government originally introduced reforms to the railway system in the early 1980s. 
The new system, namely "economic contract responsibility system", decentralized 
more power to MOR in order to direct the railway operation in a more commercially-
oriented way (Luger 2008). The following reforms were mostly related to the 
financial responsibility between the center and MOR. In 1986, another decentralized 
system was deployed, in which MOR was responsible to manage the revenue, 
expenditure, and investment funds during the contract term. In the 1992 Railway Act, 
two primary roles of MOR were clearly defined — (1) to implement policy decisions 
by the central government; and (2) to manage and operate the national railway 
network as a state enterprise. In this context, MOR's scope of decision-making power 
and operation authority was significantly broadened. 
In the beginning of the reform, the delegated power of MOR did improve railway 
management and invested capability of new lines. However, new problems started to 
come out in the early 1990s, such as shortsighted behavior, rising construction costs, 
and insufficient investment in new lines. In the meanwhile, local governments were 
gaining more capacities as well as incentives for investment due to the fiscal reform. 
In this context, the central government look a further step, and relaxed ownership 
control to lower-level governments, such as provinces and municipal governments. 
The investment structure was changed through the introduction of joint-venture 
railways with participation of MOR, provinces and municipal governments. The 
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former exclusive investment body was gradually substituted by such joint-venture 
patter. In 1987, San-Mao (Sanshui-Maoming) Railway set precedence for the joint-
ventures pattern with participation of MOR and Guangdong Province. By 2004, up to 
26 joint-venture railways had been set up, covering 20 provinces and autonomous 
regions, with total length of 8,500 kilometers (Chen and Xu 2010). 
4.2.2 The Institutional Configuration of Railway Planning 
The power distribution in planning railways is a hierarchical one (see Figure 4.4). The 
higher-level government usually controls the power to legitimize the plans, and then 
delegates various plans of socio-economic development to lower-level governments, 
which are responsible to implement them. 
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Figure 4.2: The power distribution in planning railways. 
Source: Author. 
The administration of railway planning system includes the assignment of 
responsibilities based on plan formulation and plan implementation. At the central 
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level, many actors are involved in the planning formulation process. At the top of the 
institutional structure is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, 
formerly named as the National Planning Commission). NDRC is a management 
agency under the State Council, which owns the power to make the comprehensive 
decision-making as to which projects should receive the major support by the central 
government. Such decision-making is usually confirmed through various plans that 
approved by the NDRC. Accordingly, the NDRC is in charge of the formulation of 
long-term plans, annual plans and other socio-economic policies on the base of the 
sector plans by other ministries. Moreover, the NDRC owns the comprehensive power 
to authorize all the socio-economic plans, including railway plans and other 
infrastructure plans. Therefore, the NDRC usually jointly involves in the planning 
decision-making with relevant ministries. 
Actors working closely with the NDRC include the Ministry of Finance, the People's 
Bank of China, and other sectoral ministries. Although they are parallel agencies at 
the central level, the NDRC shows half a level higher than other ministries in 
practices. Because all major issues from ministries are supposed to go through NDRC 
first and then to the State Council (Levine 2009). One important actor is MOR, which 
is concerned with the railways' construction and management as mentioned above. Its 
responsibility is to draw up the national railway plans based on data collection, 
assessment of current condition, analysis of problems, and projected future demand. 
At the provincial and municipal level, the institutional structure is generally similar to 
the central level. It followed one principle that most of the central departments 
established corresponding bureaus at the sub-national level as to implement related 
functions. For example, at the provincial level, the party committee and the provinces 
stand at the top of decision-making body. They are followed by a group of functional 
departments (e.g. the Development and Reform commission, the Land Resource 
commission and other relevant infrastructure departments). These functional 
departments on one hand follow the instructions from the provinces, and on the other 
hand they have to implement sectoral policies from corresponding departments at 
higher levels. 
However, no agents under MOR are set up on the basis of provincial and city 
jurisdictions (Liu 2005). MOR organizes the territorial railway development by 
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establishing regional railway bureaus covering 18 provinces and regions. For 
example, the Guangzhou Railway Group (Guangtie) is the first railway enterprise in 
China. It follows MOR's instructions and reports to MOR, but it is responsible for 
own profits and losses as an independent economic entity. On the other hand, 
provinces usually set up their own railway corporations as provincial investment 
arms, which act as principal actors to finance, build, and mange provincial railways. 
One example is the Guangdong Railway Construction Investment Corporation 
{Shengtietou). 
In China, plans are often prepared in a technical and scientific approach. Figure 4.5 
illustrates the typical technical planning process of infrastructure project. This process 
usually involves a conceptual proposal, a feasibility study, detailed line planning, 
engineering design, and the final approval. At the early stage of plans, the pre-
feasibility study serves as base for determining the project's approval. More detailed 
development ideas are discussed and studied in the feasibility study phase. The 
principle of this phase is to make sure it meets with the needs of socio-economic 
development while satisfies the requirement of technical criteria (e.g. environment, 
engineer or land). The initial design is the most important, because both the detailed 
planning design and investment proposal are settled down in this phase. The line route 
and railway stations will be specified in the design. These technical details relate 
closely to both local conditions and development strategies of local governments. 
More interaction between the central and local governments is observed in this phase. 
For local governments, the phase is particularly crucial. Because it is the final chance 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Almost every procedure requires some form of review and authorization before 
moving to the next step for approval. Project approval is a crucial procedure in plan-
making process. The key of this approval is to ensure the infrastructure project is 
consistent with national development plans and policies (Liu 2005). The level of 
authority that holds final project authorization power is dependent on the size of 
investment. The projects with funding capital of over $7.3 million must be reviewed 
and approved by the NDRC, and the smaller projects are subject to the approval by 
Development and Reform Commissions of individual provinces. In general, it is the 
Project Management Contractors (PMC) who is responsible for the organization of 
all these procedures involved in the planning process. The PMC is usually the 
representatives of governments (Chen and Xu 2010). 
As for plan formulation, planning decisions are usually made during the socio-
economic and sector planning process at different levels of governments. The NDRC 
exerts an essential role in the final decision-making because it is in charge of 
authorizing national railway plans. Once the railway plan is approved by the NDRC, 
the railway project is listed as the national infrastructure projects. One benefit from 
the national status is to ensure the priority of plan implementation among a number 
of infrastructure plans. It is for the reason that many sub-national governments are 
striving to interact with the NDRC in order to promote their railway plans to the 
national level. 
The NDRC is so busy in coordinating different development plans from all the 
ministries. It gets the information from MOR and based largely on MOR's initiated 
planning projects. It is not compulsory for MOR to coordinate the planning proposals 
with the provincial governments, but the territorial governments (like provincial and 
municipal governments) are playing more active role in the planning formulation. 
Particular in the case of joint-venture investment, MOR may collect information or 
ideas of planning railway from the provincial and municipal governments. 
As for the plan implementation, MOR which submits the proposed plan has the main 
responsibility of seeing through planning implementation or revisions if necessary. It 
is the regional railway bureaus who are responsible for implementation agenda 
within the provincial territory. MOR holds the authority to direct and coordinate its 
activities. The provincial government accounts for the organization of railway 
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construction among the municipal governments that referred to the project. As for 
the municipal governments, their main task is to collect the land that is required for 
the line construction from the residents, and to compensate their loss. 
The partnership with local governments is one ofMOR's vital strategies in speeding 
up new railway construction. Planning cooperation with provincial governments and 
other entities for the construction of new lines has been underway. Since 2004, MOR 
has negotiated and signed strategic cooperation agreements with 31 provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous regions on the construction of new lines, with the 
number of total railway projects amounting to 158 (Zhang 2006). Both the central 
state and local governments have taken responsibility of flindraising. To ensure the 
controlling power in the operation of the joint-venture railways, MOC usually invests 
a bigger sum than local governments. 
The new cooperation pattern of investment has great influence on the increasing 
planning authority of lower-level governments. The joint-venture pattern of 
investment allows participation of multiple levels of governments. It allows lower 
levels of governments to share the responsibilities of railway construction. Though it 
means a loss of power from MOR, the joint investment has become more and more 
popular (Luger 2008). The great demand for new line construction has made a heavy 
burden for the central government as well as MOR. Worse still, some lines at certain 
regions are difficult to make profits, which in turn give little incentive for MOR to 
undertake the railway plans. As for provinces, they may have a different view in 
funding the railway line. The railway line construction is becoming increasingly 
important to the local economy, as they can provide smooth connection with the 
outside regions and promote the accessibility of cities. The increasing fiscal capacity 
helps provinces cover part of the investment so as to stimulate local economy. At the 
same time, the joint partnership suggests that planning design of railway network 
should be satisfied by all shareholders. In other words, local governments earn power 
in plan-making by undertaking certain share of investment funds. Thus, the joint 
investment has led to restructuring of the railway planning regime during the post-
reform period. 
Although railway plans gradually incorporates the views from the provinces and 
municipal governments, the decision-making power still remains in the hands of the 
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central government. The central government institutes an administrative system to 
examine and approve investment in accordance with its total size (DRC, 2002). All 
investment of state-owned railway planning decisions above a certain size is subject 
to approval by the central government. The governments at the provincial and 
municipal level are authorized the power to make decisions on investment projects 
which cost under $4.4 million, while the central government remains control of 
railway projects with funding more than that amount. Within this framework, MOR 
is able to become the biggest shareholder of lines. On the other hand, local 
governments now have enjoyed growing capacity to guide the local socio-economic 
development since the economic reform. Their support on investment or plan 
implementation is increasingly important for the railway projects. In this context, the 
central government may not restraint local levels and dominates the project planning 
as before. The core of planning process is to balance interests among different 
jurisdictions, and to reach a consensus plan that receives most governments' support 
(Liu, 2005). 
4.2.3 The Railway Projects Boom in China 
As discussed above, the economic reform since the late 1970s has allowed local 
governments to exert an increasing role in local industrialization and urbanization. 
Under the decentralized fiscal regime, local governments shared the investment 
responsibilities on infrastructure with the central government. Additionally, local 
authorities have attached increasing importance on the infrastructure provision since 
the 1990s. Cities are developed as the optimal locations for investment. Large 
infrastructure projects are regarded as the essentials means to materialized the 
development strategies, and furthermore, to enhance the urban competitiveness 
within a region. Infrastructure investment in China has increased significantly since 
1990, accounting from around 3 percent of GDP to 6 percent of that in 1998 (Li and 
Li Z. 2010). One major investment arena is the transport infrastructures. Specifically, 
the highways and railways are the top two sectors that received funding in the 
transport investment. Figure 4.2 showes investment in highways and railways from 
1993 to 2009 in China. 
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Figure 4.3: The investment of highways and railways in China from 1993 to 2009. 
Source: China Transportation Statistics Yearbook (1994-2010). 
In 1996, the investment in highways saw a marked growth by exceeding that of 
railways for the first time. In fact, local governments appeared to exert greater efforts 
in highways investment during the 1990s. Various kinds of financing methods were 
deployed in order to promote the highway construction. One famous policy was 
"building roads with loans and then repaying the loans through tolls" (Global Times 
2011). In 2005, the total length of highways in China was up to 41,000 kilometers, 
ranking the second highest in the world (Research in China, 2007). As for railways, 
it lost relative importance in transport investment during the 1990s, mainly losing 
share to the investment in highways (Li and Li H. 2010). The relatively lower share 
in railway investment resulted from many reasons. Taking a longer time to gain 
profits from investment on railway projects than on highways was one crucial reason. 
It thus gave less incentive for governments to invest in railway projects. The railway 
network in China is the world's smallest in terms of its population and area (The 
Economist 1992: 32 et seq.) The fact is railway journey is still the priority choice for 
long-distance passengers because of low household incomes and undeveloped road 
system in many parts of the country (Lugur 2008). 
However, the situation started to change from 2004. In the Tenth Five-Year Plan 
(2001-2005), MOR focused on capacity extensions by investing heavily in new 
railway constructions. The year 2004 was observed to be a turning point to railway 
development in China. Figure 4.5 (see below) showed the investment grow ratio of 
highways and railways in China from 1994 to 2009. An evident change on the 
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railways investment can be observed in 2004. The growth ratio of railway investment 
picked up from -14% in 2003 to 37% in 2004. Since then, the growth ratio of 
investment on railways has kept at a relatively high level, at around 50%. 
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Figure 4.4: The investment growth ratio of highways and railways in China from 1994 
to 2009. 
Source: China Transportation Statistics Yearbook (1994-2010). 
The railway investment now becomes an important investment regime. In 2007, 
China announced an ambitious investment proposal to stimulate economic growth 
against the backdrop of global economic recession. The funds, up to $586 billion, 
mainly went towards domestic infrastructure projects. The railway infrastructure was 
listed as the working priority of the central government. With the financial support, 
MOR began a series of ambitious railway plans nationwide. Mr. Liu, the previous 
minister of MOR, made new plans focusing on the new lines construction and speed 
acceleration in order to expand railways' capacity (Lugur 2008). 
The railway projects having boomed since 2004 is accompanied by the changing 
central-local relationship in China. As for the central government, MOR has 
positively engaged in developing the jointly invested partnership with local 
governments. Local governments have also made efforts to join in the national 
railway plans. Railways are no longer considered as signs of poor service, 
uncomfortable environment and slow transport by local governments. The newly 
finished Beijing-Tianjin high-speed railway has totally changed the impression of the 
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former image of railways. A new type of railways, with higher speed and service 
standard, has been promoted among local governments. In addition, after realizing 
the environmental problems brought by highways, local governments started to seek 
help from railways as a more environment-friendly transport. 
In fact, this modern transport has been regarded as one symbol of cities with strong 
competitive strength, which thus pushes local governments to promote the railway 
infrastructure construction. Railways are highly invested projects. It is difficult for 
local governments to undertake the whole amount of investment. Therefore, local 
governments positively seek support from the central government. Both the central 
and local governments are involved in the railway investment program. In the 
meanwhile, they also share the responsibilities in railway's planning and 
construction. In fact, most of the railway lines are designed to run through several 
connected cities, or even provinces. That means the line plans should be worked out 
between all jurisdictions along the line route. It is in this sense a new planning 
regime of railways is necessary between different jurisdictions (national, provincial 
and municipal) to cooperate with each other. 
As such, the railways booming in China calls for a new planning regime between 
various tiers of governments to work on the railways' plan-making process. A new 
partnership between governments at different scales would be formed in the planning 
process. Such new institutional configuration of railways may help obtain more 
insights into the new central-local relationship in China. 
4.3 Pearl River Delta: the Railway Planning Context 
Intercity railways are constructed to provide passengers express train services within 
a larger commuter system. There is no fixed definition of intercity railways, and 
different countries may have its own explanations on intercity railways. Generally, in 
the developing countries, the intercity railways mainly run through two large 
neighboring cities or metropolitan areas. While in the developed countries, especially 
in the European counties, the intercity railways provide international services. For 
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instance, the Eurostar and EuroCity are such intercity railways that connect nearly 50 
countries in the Europe continent (www. raileurope.co.uk). As for the USA, intercity 
railways are one part of the State's overall transportation system and runs through 
several regions of the state. 
The speed of intercity railways ranges from 50km/h to 200-350 km/h. In many cases, 
the common length of intercity railways' line is around 100-500km long. In many 
countries, the intercity railway is viewed as a priority to cope with the commuting 
demands of urban resident between two adjacent cities. Compared to the national 
railways, the intercity railways are equipped with higher construction and service 
standard (Huang 2010). In China, MOR has made clear the differences between the 
high-speed railways and intercity railways. The high-speed railways enable the speed 
above 300km/h while the intercity railways support the speed of 200-300 km/h. 
In the metropolitan regions like London, Paris, New York and Tokyo, the intercity 
railways play a pivotal role in promoting the economic development along the 
railway line. For instance, 70% of national population in Japan concentrates at three 
major metropolitan areas, which are characterized with high building density (Yuan 
2005). In the end of 19th century, the areas began to develop the intercity railway 
transport and now have formed a comprehensive railway transit network. The 
railway transit networks not only succeeded to solve the problems of traffic 
congestion. Nearly 90% of the commuters relied on this highly efficient transport 
way. Also, the development of industries along the railway line, like service industry, 
high-tech industry and real estate became more convenient. The boost of the 
industries in turn led to the development of the new town at the periphery of the 
urban building area. The intercity railways are claimed as a crucial regional 
infrastructure and play an indispensable role in the regional development. 
In China, Guangzhou-Shenzhen Intercity Railway was the first one that realized the 
"As-frequent-as buses" service with speed of 220 km/h in some sections. The 147-
kilometers railway made the connection between four cities in the PRD, including 
Guangzhou, Dongguan, Shenzhen and Hong Kong. There are totally 104 pairs of 
trains operated daily starting from Guangzhou to Shenzhen. Under the "public 
transport" mode, one pair of trains would be dispatched every 15 minutes on average. 
The direct journey from Guangzhou to Shenzhen costs only 52 minutes. Moreover, 
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the intercity railway transport has more competitive advantages than other commuter 
modes because of its larger passenger capacity and its higher dispatched frequency 
(Huang 2010). 
In terms of cities along the railway line, the efficient commuter service of the 
intercity railway increasingly facilitates the communication and the business 
transaction between the four cities. This in turn helps accelerate the economic and 
social integration of the PRD region to some degree. As indicated by the China 
media (CNRCN 2007), the Guangzhou-Shenzhen Railway as China's first intercity 
passenger line has witnessed the PRD's economic prosperity. 
As a new kind of regional infrastructure project, the construction of the intercity 
railways is increasingly emphasized by the central government. In 2005, the State 
Council approved in principle the intercity railway network planning in the mega city 
region, such as the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Bohai Sea area, the YRD region and the 
PRD region (see China Economic Times, 2005). The planning objectives for each 
region were ambitious. Up to 2008, the commuting time between Beijing and 
Tianjing would be cut to a half-hour; the interconnection among Hangzhou, 
Shanghai and Ningbo will cost one to two hours around the 2020; the 600 km of 
intercity rapid railway network will be constructed in the PRD region. Moreover, 
intercity railway construction in China is now becoming the favorable regional 
projects that are available to access to the funding support from the central 
government. In 2008, China announced a $586 billion stimulus plan to spur 
economic growth in the context of the global economic recession. The fund, 
equivalent to almost a fifth of China's $3.3 trillion gross domestic product in 2007, 
was used at the end of 2010 to stimulate domestic demand (Li and Wong 2008). A 
considerable part of the package was distributed to the railway construction. 
As for the PRD region, the construction of intercity railways is of great significance 
to the regional development. Since the economic reform, the PRD has become one of 
the regions with relatively most developed economy and the greatest development 
potential in China. As early as 1999, Guangdong province stated that the PRD should 
take the lead to realize socialist modernization basically in the year of 2010. 
Compared with railway coverage in other mega-city regions worldwide, the one in 
the PRD is of the least development. The PRD has a population of over 60 million 
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(Xinhua 2005), which is the considerably highest among compared regions, but the 
railway coverage is only one-eight of New York's. The fact is that in the past two 
decades Guangdong government focused on constructing an extensive network of 
highways. Until now, the density of highway network in the PRD has been up to 4.3 
km per square kilometer, which even stands above the average level in the developed 
countries (Lin 2010). 
Many researchers performed studies on the impact of this highway system to the 
regional development (Cao 2003, Han 2001, Zhang 1999). Their studies suggested 
that the highway system had great impact on the economic development and results 
in a more integrated and equitable regional development. However, with the 
increasing interconnection flows between the PRD cities, the highway network is 
now facing the problem of excessive vehicle burden. Compared to highways, 
intercity railways can carry larger number of people at lower prices. Therefore, 
intercity railways are planned to release the transport pressure resulted from the 
increasing interconnecting flows and also to optimize the intensive use of land. 
Besides, the economic achievements of the PRD have been well made after the rapid 
development. But some negative effects brought by the over-running development 
(e.g. environmental pollution, resource shortages, traffic congestion and other serious 
problems) have greatly restricted the sustainable development in the PRD region. 
The intercity railways, namely the green public transport, are more carbon-efficient 
than other modes of transport. In this case, intercity railways in the PRD are 
proposed to serve as the best and most effective mode of transport to speed up and 
integrate the PRD. They are also planned to transform the cluster of cities and towns 
of various sizes in the region into a larger functional urban region bound together by 
a dense network of mass transit railways. The Tokyo metropolitan region and 
Greater Paris are good examples in creating an effective and fast-moving metropolis. 
The intercity railway plan for the PRD of Guangdong province explicitly cited the 
example of Greater Paris as a target. 
From the perspective of strategic role, the PRD intercity railway is designed to 
eliminate inter-locality disparities in economy in order to balance the development of 
the PRD. The global financial crisis revealed the over-reliance on the export-oriented 
and foreign investment-dominated economies particularly in the eastern part of the 
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PRD region. Briefly, the PRD region exposed its regional economy to the changes of 
the overseas market too much. To sustain growth and diversify risk, the region is 
proposed by some experts to balance the importance of the domestic and overseas 
markets. Furthermore, to meet with the challenges of increasing competition in the 
two markets, the region should enhance the advantages of economies of 
agglomeration as well as the capacity of local innovation. As indicated by some 
researchers, this can only be achieved by integrating economies and communities of 
the entire PRD into a competitive network in terms of scale and diversity (Chan, 
2010). In this sense, an intensive regional network of railways is the essential 
foundation for such a strategy. Therefore, the intercity railways are designed to 
strengthen transport linkages not just between the developed cities, towns and areas 
of the eastern part of the PRD. Also, the less developed areas, such as Zhuhai, 
Zhongshan and Jiangmen, will be included in the network, 
What's more, the construction of intercity railways is considered to be an 
opportunity to increase investment in fixed assets and infrastructure. The 
infrastructure construction of the railway network generates huge demands for the 
iron and steel, cement and other related materials. The total investment of the 
intercity railways is estimated to reach around $463 billion, and the output value of 
industries like steels, cement and other building materials would be up to $15.4 
billion. As indicated by one of the officials from Provincial Development and 
Reform Commission (PDRC), the intercity railway construction is the "expansion of 
domestic demand and growth" works in a strategic choice facing with the 
international financial crisis. As an important constituent part of the infrastructure 
modernization, the construction planning of the network has stepped into daily 
schedule of both the central and local governments (www.china-up.com, 2004). 
4,4 General Propositions on Planning Coordination of Regional 
Railways in China 
As discussed above, the pre-reform planning institution followed a top-down model, 
whereas lower-level governments were required to obey high-level governments' 
instructions. However, a series of decentralized policies after economic reform 
opened new political spaces within which ideas of territorial governments who were 
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formerly marginalized could be incorporated into decision-making of plans. It is 
argued that the centrally dominated system gradually changed to a multi-level 
partnership in which the central state, provinces and municipalities work together to 
pursue economic and political goals (Lin 1997). Despite the cooperation regime 
between the central and local governments had been considerably improved in the 
reform era, it still embodied constraints that intensified the bargaining between 
various tiers of governments. 
Based on the theoretical review in Chapter 2 and the changing context of planning 
Chinese railways, several research propositions about the planning coordination of 
regional railways in China are raised. 
Proposition 1: The Increasing Need for Planning Coordination among Various 
Ties of Governments 
The power distribution of the multi-level governments' interaction turns out to be 
more complex than before. Pre-reform China saw a centrally dominated regime and 
its planning system followed a top-down model. The central government controlled 
of the whole plan-making process while local governments relied on the central 
command to implement the plans in their territories. Since the economic reform, the 
central government has decentralized certain controls of production activities, 
capital, land and the labor force, while granting regulatory powers (e.g. land 
management and urban planning) to local governments (Wu 2002). As local 
governments were granted greater decision-making power, regional infrastructure 
projects had to be planned based on an agreement of cities concerned. 
However, this institutional configuration of planning involves both collaboration and 
conflicts. On the one hand, the new power relationship involves collaboration. This 
is because the implementation and investment of infrastructure projects have to rely 
on multi-level governments' effort. Thus, the collaboration is necessary for regional 
infrastructure projects, and in the best interest of multiple governments (Lin, 1997). 
On the other hand, the planning system also meets with conflicts. Since a legitimate 
authority at regional level does not really exist, it means all levels of states are 
allowed to intervene in regional infrastructure planning. As for the PRD region, there 
is no regional government taking charge of planning coordination. Guangdong 
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province and its nine municipal governments are all involved in the affairs of the 
PRD region, and share the responsibilities of plan-making process. In the 
meanwhile, because the PRD intercity railway is one of the mega projects in the 
national plans, MOR is responsible for its planning issues and technical problems 
acting as a "big brother" in the railway industry. Different levels of governments 
may hold various interests and demands in plan-making process, and thus may result 
in conflicts when integrating their planning ideas. In addition, the widespread 
political fragmentation in the PRD region may bring lots of tensions to the 
interaction between cities. Thus, as to reach a coordinated plan, negotiated efforts 
must be made both at the horizontal level, which is called intercity, and the vertical 
level, which is named multiple levels of governments. 
Currently, the coordination has been identified as a major challenge in planning 
cross-bordered infrastructure in most countries. The new forms of public actions that 
we see emerging in most western countries are characterized by more complex 
systems of actors (Gaudin, 1993). The PRD, a polycentric region, has also seen the 
complexity of the governmental system and also the over-competed problems 
between the inter-jurisdictions. In this context, the efforts to coordinate among 
different agencies are necessary for the plan-making process. 
Proposition 2: Evolving Coordinating Mechanism in Planning 
Since the economic reform, the role of planning has shifted to a more policy-based 
one, on which various governments can achieve their interest on space (Ng and Tang 
2009). Different jurisdictions within both hierarchical structure and horizontal 
network are involved in the planning process in order to fulfill their spatial demands 
of future development. To plan infrastructure in Chinese regions, cooperation efforts 
should be made between different levels of governments. 
The fact was that the actors might try to change the existing way in which things 
were conducted, to deploy new ideas and policies for the development, or even 
substitute new approach with another (Healey 2004). The planning process may thus 
become the arena for the meditation of different interests, and the ideas of plans may 
be subjected to change by different governments for their own interests. It is in the 
sense that the pathway to reach agreements is not static but keeps an on-goingly 
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changing, evolving process. Many changes may happen at any time during plan-
making processes. 
Proposition 3: No Dominated Scale of State in Planning Railways 
Decentralization and market reform have provided a new political economic 
environment for railway planning in China. Local governments now enjoy growing 
freedom to guide local socio-economic development. Their supports on investment 
or plan implementation are increasingly important for the railway projects. In this 
context, the central government may not circumvent the local levels and dominate 
the planning ideas as it did in the pre-reform era. The institution for planning 
coordination of railway projects has seen a transition from central monopoly to 
multiple state actors' partnership. 
However, this does not mean the central state loses its control on railway planning. 
The argument of decentralization of statehood is subjected to some criticizes that 
they focus only upon one side of changing state institution (Xu and Yeh 2009). It 
was argued that their analyses neglected a counter-trend in which the central 
government recentralized and deterritorialised some key functions through the state 
regulatory regime (Xu et al. 2009: 60). Shen (2007: 314) proposed that, although 
there have been conflicts, intense interaction and negotiation between the central 
state and local states, the central states often assume a leading role in the final 
resolution of scalar reconfiguration. As such，the gradually decentralization of 
railways' planning system may be counteracted by the emerging state strategies 
through which a more centralized top-level control can be achieved (Xu et al. 2009). 
If this is the case, it can be drawn that there is no dominant scale of state in the plan-
making process of railways. The planning process is a reflection of the ongoing 
process of state rescaling. 




Planning the Pearl River Delta Intercity Railway: 
Institutional Form and the Planning Mechanisms 
5.7 Introduction 
This chapter uses the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter Three to examine 
the institutional arrangements and coordinating efforts in planning the PRD intercity 
railway. The whole plan-making process will be examined in chronological order. 
The main study focusing on each planning phase is the scalar relationship of central-
provincial-municipal governments in both technically planning and negotiation 
processes. Three main railway lines have been chosen to illustrate the coordination 
process among various tiers of governments. They are Guangzhou-Zhuhai Intercity 
Railway, Guangzhou-Foshan Intercity Railway and Guangzhou-Dongguan-Shenzhen 
Intercity Railway. 
5,2 Planning the PRD Intercity Railway: an Introduction of Three 
Planning Phases 
The whole planning process of the PRD intercity railway can be divided into three 
phases regarding to the planning focus and cooperation pattern (see Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1: The planning process of the PRD intercity railways 
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Source: Author sorted out from news on South Daily Newspaper. 
(1) Project Preparation Phrase一Cooperation between the Central government 
and Guangdong Province (2000-2005) 
In July 2000, Guangdong Province initiated the preliminary studies of the PRD 
intercity railway network. "PRD Intercity Rail transit network Plan" was endorsed in 
principle by Guangdong province and submitted to the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Railway (MOR) for review and 
authorization. Approval was given in 2003. MOR then incorporated the "PRD 
intercity railway network" into its "Mid-to-Long Term Railway Network Plan". In 
2005, the State Council approved the inter-city railway network plans for several 
mega city regions including the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Bohai Sea Rim, the Yangtze 
River Delta, and the PRD in principle. 
According to MOR's network plan, all towns and cities in the PRD will be covered 
in a railway transit network by 2020. The initial layout of the PRD intercity railway 
transit network was designed with two main lines and three radiating lines, which are 
Guangzhou-Shenzhen, Guangzhou-Zhuhai as two main lines; Guangzhou— 
Zhaoqing, Zhongshan (Xiaolan)-Jiangmen, Dongguan-Huizhou as three radiating 
lines; Shunde-Panyu-Dongguan, Zhongshan-Humen for two connecting lines. The 
total length of the system was about 600 kilometers. 
This initial PRD intercity railway plan obtained prior approval from the State 
Council. During this phase, the cooperative relationship between governments 
followed the typical pattern in planning national railways, which is so called 
"cooperation between central and provincial governments" {Shengbu hezuo). 
Guangdong Province and MOR contributed 50% investment each to set up the 
Guangdong Pearl River Delta Intercity Railway Co., Ltd., (GPIR). The joint 
company was mainly responsible for financing, construction, management, and loan 
repayment for the PRD intercity railway. Guangzhou-Zhuhai Intercity Railway was 
the first line that was carried out under this cooperation framework. 
{2) Plan-making Phase—Cooperation between Guangdong Province and 
municipal governments (December 2005- August 2010) 
There was no substantial progress on the further planning design for almost one year 
since the PRD intercity railway was approved in 2005 mainly because MOR had 
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shouldered funding difficulties. The funding promised to Guangdong was delayed 
afterwards. Therefore, the construction of the ambitious intercity railway network 
was far behind schedule. In fact, Guangdong province has developed a relatively 
strong financial capacity since the economic reform in the 1980s. It was not 
difficulty for the province and its municipalities to afford the construction funding 
themselves (interview no. l / . Especially, to build the first intercity railway network 
in China was listed as the primary task by Guangdong province. In this context, 
Guangdong province decided to take over the responsibility to undertake the plan-
making a step forward. Guangdong not only undertook the construction funding of 
the railway projects, but also initiated a cooperating pattern between the province 
and municipal governments to replace the previous MOR-led cooperation pattern. 
More details about the differences between two patterns will be discussed later. 
In July 2007, a forum was organized by the province to discuss the working 
procedure of intercity railway planning in the PRD. According to the minutes, the 
Provincial Development and Reform Commission (PDRC) was appointed by the 
province to conduct the plan-making work and to organize the other relevant 
departments to engage in the planning. In March 2008，PDRC made clear that its 
main responsibility was to coordinate the plan-making processes. The construction 
works would be mainly in the charge of the Guangdong Provincial Railway 
Construction Investment Group Co.,LTD^ (GPRI). This arrangement aimed to 
facilitate the coordination issues among municipal governments during the planning 
processes. In addition, the province emphasized that only GPRI could take charge of 
the PRD intercity railway network, and other organizations couldn't be allowed to 
share this responsibility. The meeting also drew the conclusion that the construction 
was in the charge of the Provincial State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC), while PDRC took charge of the planning 
coordination. 
6 In te rv iew wi th an official in Guangzhou, July 16 2010. More details see appendix 1 for a list of 
in te rv iew pa r tne r s . 
7 Guangdong Provincial Railway Construct ion Inves tmen t Group Co.,LTD w a s formally set up in 
March 1997 with t he approval of the Guangdong Provincial Government . It is a large en te rp r i se 
g roup directly u n d e r the Provincial Government , and is also the first co rpora t ion of profess ional 
es ta tes m a n a g e m e n t . It is au thor ized by the Provincial Government to ope ra te and manage the 
s t a t e -owned asse ts f inanced and managed by the Provincial Government a m o n g the rai lway 
compan ies wi th in Guangdong Province. It enjoys all legal pe r son ' s p rope r ty rights and exercises 
t he r ights and obligat ions in accordance to the f inancing share of projects . 
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The province designed another version of intercity railway network plan, and made a 
substantial expansion of the network to extend from earlier 600 km to 1890 km. 
According to the preliminary plan, the basic layout of this network was designed as 
"three rings with eight radiating lines" structure. Compared with the previous plan 
approved in 2005, 15 additional lines (on top of the existing five lines) were included 
in this new plan. All towns and cities in the PRD will be included in a railway transit 
system with a network density of 4.8 kilometers per 100 square kilometers by 2020. 
According to the new plan, the first railway lines to be built were Guangzhou -
Foshan, Guangzhou - Dongguan - Shenzhen, Dongguan - Huizhou, Foshan -
Zhaoqing (Yunfu). The estimated total investment reached $19 billion. One reason 
that Guangdong increased the lines of railway network, however, was argued that the 
province wanted to exclude MOR from the PRD intercity railway project completely 
o 
by increasing the funding in purpose (interview no. 3 ,4) . 
In March 2009, the province came to finalize the plan design, and approved "PRD 
intercity rail transport Plan (2008-2030) (Revision)". This round of planning revision 
witnessed a new era of intercity railway. The PRD intercity railway network plan is 
showed in Figure 5.2. There are totally three versions of the plan. 
\ ^ ^ 2009 Rail Nilnork IMunning 
\ 200N Rail NcfHork Pluiuitn^  
-^v 2005 Rail NrtHork Plamiiiiu 
V 广 \r Municipul boundary 
Pi-arl Rhi-r Dclu bounilir% 
0 w ‘ 
Figure 5.2: Pearl River Delta Intercity Rail Plans 2009, 2008 and 2005. 
8 In terview with two p l anne r s in Guangzhou, June 19, 2010. 
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(Source: Li, L. N. (2009), "The spatial communication pattern and its impact on the 
PRD intercity railway", Master thesis, Sun Yat-sen University.) 
The detailed layout of the intercity railway can be seen in Table 5.1: 
Table 5.1: Three rings and eight radiating lines" layout of the PRD intercity railway 
network. 
Source: Xinhua News http://www.gd.xinhuanet.eom/newscenter/2008-
07/07/content 13740536. htm. 
First Ring Guangzhou-Foshan Link 
Second Ring Guangzhou-Dongguan-Shenzhen; 
Zhongshan-Nansha-Humen; 
Guangzhou-Foshan-Jiangmen-Zhuhai; Foshan-Dongguan 
Third Ring Guangzhou-Dongguan-Shenzhen; Shenzhen-Zhuhai; 
Guangzhou-Foshan-Jiangmen-Zhuhai; Foshan-Dongguan 
Eight Guangzhou-Qingyuan; Dongguan-Huizhou; Shenzhen-
Radiation Huizhou; Zhuhai-Doumen; Jiangmen-Kaiping; Jiangmen-
Enping(Taishan); Zhaoqing-Nansha; Foshan-Zhaoqing (Yunfu) 
Over $57 billion will be invested for the entire project. Meanwhile, junctions for 
railway connections with West, East and Northeast Guangdong will be reserved. 
Guangzhou will serve as the hub for inter-city transport, with trains running in every 
direction when the PRD intercity railway network is completed,. Passengers in 
Guangzhou will be able to travel to any major city by railway within one hour. 
During this planning phrase, the major task was to coordinate different ideas and 
demands of cities along railway lines. In order to facilitate the negotiation processes, 
the provincial government set up the Southeast Corporation, Northwest Corporation 
under GPRI and SASAC. The Southeast Corporation undertook planning revision 
and implementation of the railways at the southeast of the PRD region, such as 
Guangzhou-Zhuhai railway and Guangzhou-Foshan-Zhaoqing railway, while the 
Northwest Corporation was responsible for the railways at the northwest of the 
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region, such as Guangzhou-Dongguan-Shenzhen railway and Dongguan-Huizhou 
railway. 
(3) The Transition Phrase-Cooperation between the Central and Provincial 
Governments (August 2010 to now) 
However, in August 2010, Guangdong Province signed with MOR that the planning 
and construction pattern of the PRD intercity railway network returned to the 
provincial and ministerial cooperation. One main reason that drove Guangdong to 
seek help from MOR was that Guangdong confronted with lots of technical problems 
on railway construction, like constructing standard of railway width, the information 
system that allocates the trains (more details will be stated in the followings). More 
significantly, met with difficulties in coordinating plans with its municipal 
governments (interview no. l l f . Without the assistance of MOR, it was difficult to 
move things forward. In fact, many municipal governments complained the 
inefficiency by the provincial government in the planning processes. Their opinions 
of the plans were always skipped by Guangdong province, which resulted in many 
problems in the construction of railway lines (interview no. 14, 15, 18, 19)1�. 
According to the minutes (interview no. 5), MOR would fully cooperate with 
Guangdong province in planning and building the PRD Intercity building railway 
network. The new planning projects would follow the unified plan based on two 
previous plans (2005 "long-term railway network plan" and 2009 revision of the 
"PRD Intercity Rail Transportation Network Planning (2005 - 2020) ). In addition, 
the construction pattern would follow the technical standards of constructions "by 
MOR. This new arrangement favored the dominance of MOR, because Guangdong 
wanted to speed up the construction of inter-city railway and it has to rely on the 
strong technical support from MOR, with nickname as the "Big brother of the 
railways". 
9 In te rv iew wi th a p l anne r in Shenzhen, March 15 2011. 
10 In te rv iew wi th two p l anne r s in Dongguan, June 2010 and two offcials in Zhongshan, July 
2010. 
11 The cons t ruc t ion s t a n d a r d of nat ional rai lway is unified by MOR. The s t a n d a r d width of 
rai lway t r ack is 1 4 3 5 m m . The opera t ion speed is des igned a r o u n d 2 0 0 k m / h , wi th maximum of 
2 5 0 k m / h . The m i n i m u m tu rn ing radius is 3500m. 
95 
The former PRD intercity railway Co., Ltd, set up as early as 2004, was renamed as 
Guangzhou-Zhuhai Intercity Co., Ltd (GZIC). in charge of the operation and 
management of Guangzhou-Zhuhai Intercity Railway. Whilst, a new PRD Intercity 
Railway Co., Ltd. was established in September 2010 with its registered capital 
funded by the Guangzhou Railway Group and GPRI at the ratio of 50% each. The 
ownership and management of the GZIC were naturally subjected to the new PRD 
Intercity Railway Co., Ltd. To smooth the transition of cooperation, Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Dongguan, and Huizhou were required to suspend three projects under 
construction from mid-August 2010 (interview no. 6)^'. 
5.3 The Planning Process of the PRD Intercity Railway: Interaction 
among Multiple Jurisdictions 
As discussed above, three distinct phases were evident in planning the PRD intercity 
railway regarding to the cooperation pattern among multiple jurisdictional 
governments. Two cooperation patterns were identified in the planning process -
"Cooperation between ministry and the province" (MOR-led pattern) and 
"Cooperation between the province and municipal governments" (province-led 
pattern). There was a considerable variation in planning administration and 
coordination between these two patterns. The major difference lay in the investment 
ratio. The decision-making power in planning is closely related to the investment 
ratio. Actor who contributed larger part of investment owned the final words on 
project plans. Under the MOR-led pattern, MOR dominated decision-making 
processes by contributing at least 50 per cent of the total stake. As for the province-
led pattern, the provincial government attempted to exclude MOR by increasing the 
investment in purpose. The funding responsibility is relocated between the provincial 
and municipal governments along railway lines. Likewise, the provincial government 
is the biggest shareholder and made the final-decision of railway plans. 
As such, the plan-making process of the PRD intercity railway will be mainly 
examined in these two patterns. For each phase, the core is to examine the scalar 
relationship of central-provincial-municipal governments in both technical planning 
process and negotiation process. Although the technical procedure in plan-making 
12 In te rv iew with two officials in Guangzhou, May 18 2009. 
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follows the same course, there are still many negotiations outside the formal 
planning system. 
Besides, different intercity railway lines are unique, and accordingly, many of the 
barriers in planning coordination are also unique to each railway line. Three main 
railway lines were chosen to illustrate the coordination process among various tiers 
of governments. They are Guangzhou-Zhuhai Intercity Railway, Guangzhou-Foshan 
Intercity Railway and Guangzhou-Dongguan-Shenzhen Intercity Railway. 
All the stories in these three lines were sorted out from the interviews in the PRD 
region from June 2009 to March 2011. However, the specific interaction between 
Guangdong and MOR would not be included in these three cases. Because it was not 
easy to access officials in the province and MOR. Despite officials from the province 
agreed to take interviews, the officials would not reveal any further information 
about the negotiation processes between Guangdong and MOR. 
5.3.1 Cooperation between Ministry and the Province (MOR-led pattern) 
In 2005, the State Council approved the first "PRD intercity railway transit network 
plan". This plan was then listed as a national project under MOR. Accordingly, MOR 
formed a cooperative relationship with the Guangdong province. They shared the 
responsibility of construction of the whole railway network. As for the funding 
capital, Guangdong and MOR owned nearly 50% each in the Guangdong Pearl River 
Delta Intercity Railway Co., Ltd.,. The corporation was mainly responsible for 
financing, construction, and loan repayment of the PRD intercity railway. 
Technical Planning Institution 
The institutional organization was a typical example of MOR-led pattern. Figure 5.3 
(see below) shows the planning institutional arrangement for the PRD intercity 
railway. As for the decision-making, it still followed the top-down model. At the top 
of the structure is MOR, which was in charge of the technical examination of the 
PRD intercity railway network plan. Based on MOR's opinions, the National 
Development and Reform Commission decided whether to approve the railway 
project. Thus, MOR to some extend was a crucial factor in determining railway 
plans. Any revision made by the provincial or municipal governments had to be 
informed to MOR. It was MOR who made the final decision of the revised plan. 
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Under MOR, there was a technical institution, namely Railway Appraisal Center 
with its main responsibility in assisting MOR in examining and approving railway 
plans based on technical standards and operational feasibility. 
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HSd^^^m 
‘ … j ” supervise 
. Guangdong Pearl River Delta 
叶ovinciai • Development and ~ • Intercity Rail Guangzhou-Zhuhai Intercity Rail 
Provinc ia l level G o v e r n m e n t Reform Commission Corpora t ion 
• J i 
1 r 
I 1 I n v e s t m e n t 〜 . . . 




Municipal level ^ ^ ^ ^ M g ^ S ^ H ^ ^ I ' ^ H j j l j j H I I I I j j ^ H 
u y I J 
‘ To coordinate the line ( 
: T o organized the To coordinate the planning with GPRI i To assist the site 
coordination with investment ratio with and to grant the sellection and to grant ； 
the provincial PDRC planning and the land approval 
government J | construction approval J ； 
Figure 5.3: The institutional arrangement in planning the PRD Intercity Rail. (Source: 
interview no. 
Although the province had the same administrative status as MOR, it was still under 
MOR's technical supervision in terms of railway development. MOR often has more 
authorities in final railway design. The main responsibility of the province was to 
organize lower level governments within its territory to engage in the plan-making 
process. It assigned PDRC to organize relevant departments as well as municipalities 
to reach a consensus on the railway plan. The PDRC was also responsible for 
organizing meetings and conferences for various parties to bargain for an investment 
agreement. The investment allocation between Guangdong and municipal 
governments concerned had to be decided on the specific plans. Thus the 
13 In terv iew wi th a p lanner in Guangzhou, June 19, 2010. 
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coordination on the investment share went hand in hand with the plan-making 
procedure. Another important actor at the provincial level was the PRD Intercity 
Railway Corporation (PIRC) ^^ a project corporation to build and operate the PRD 
intercity railway on behalf of MOR and Guangdong. The corporation is responsible 
for planning and managing all intercity lines. It also had to coordinate relevant 
governments on railway design. The PIRC played an essential role in bridging MOR 
and the province in the plan-making process. 
As a matter of fact, MOR and Guangdong respectively delegated some major 
officials from their railway agencies into the PIRC (interview no. 4)�5. To some 
extend, these officials were representing their "bosses" and would incorporate their 
own interests and ideas into railway plans. In the meanwhile, the PIRC served as a 
coordinator among different municipal planning agencies. It was the only formal 
pathway that municipal planning ideas could be transited to higher levels of 
governments (interview no. 1 
At the municipal level, it is the municipal governments who have the final decision-
making power of railway plans within its territory. As for the daily organization, a 
coordinating task force was established to organize coordination with the province. 
This task force was set up under the direct administrative supervision of its 
municipal government. It was empowered to organize coordination meetings for 
various municipal departments to reach a consensus. Under the direction of the task 
force, there were three main municipal departments involving in planning railway 
lines. One was the Development and Reform Bureau, who was in charge of 
coordinating investment allocation plan with PDRC. As for planning, it was the 
Planning Bureau to coordinate line planning with GPRI and to grant planning and 
construction permits. The Land Bureau was mainly to assist the site selection and to 
grant land use permit for railway development. 
14 The en t e rp r i s e i n d e p e n d e n t f rom the rai lway system is a favori te fo rm of coopera t ion in 
which multi-level g o v e r n m e n t s and pr ivate actors work toge ther to mobil ize f inancing for 
in f ra s t ruc tu re cons t ruc t ion . In addit ion, this company is the juridical p e r s o n tha t acts on behalf 
of t he g o v e r n m e n t to b o r r o w funds f rom banks and o ther sources, issue b o n d s w h e n allowed to 
do so, ra ise capital f r om Trus t s and o the r special pu rpose vehicles, en te r into joint ven tu res 
with pr iva te compan ies for in f ra s t ruc tu re development . 
15 Interview wi th an officials in Guangzhou, June 10, 2010. 
16 In terv iew with a d i rec tor in Guangzhou, July 15, 2009. 
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There were two major features of planning coordination, which had great influences 
on actual planning practices. One was that the functions of decision-making and 
planning coordination were separated to different administrative units. The planning 
coordination was taken over by functional departments while the final authorization 
power was in the charge of key leaders of territorial governments at the same level. 
This might lead to conflicts when railway plans were transferred from planning 
institution to actors of final decision-making. They might consider plan design from 
political perspective, rather than from technical dimension. Key leaders at high-level 
governments could also intervene in the decision-making. 
In particular, one government official's performance is evaluated by his or her 
economic achievement within the five-year term. In this context, they usually seek to 
finish some mega-projects during their political tenure. The time limitation may 
press certain pressure on railway construction, and eventually has an impact on plan 
design. 
The other feature was that the province played a relatively smaller role as compared 
with MOR. It has a higher administrative status than municipal governments. Thus 
planning ideas have to be reviewed by the provincial level. In reality, it is MOR who 
stands at the top of planning administration. The final decision-making of plan 
revisions is concentrated on MOR. So, powerful municipal governments may 
circumvent the provincial level and negotiate with MOR directly (such as Shenzhen) 
(interview no. 22)'^ For instance, there was a situation that the plans required by 
municipal governments were not accepted by the province. The top-down planning 
arrangement may leave the room for the lower level of government to go over his 
head towards a higher-level government directly. 
The planning procedure of the PRD intercity railway is illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
There were four phases that can be identified in the whole planning process. 
17 In te rv iew with a p l anne r in Shenzhen, March 15, 2011. 
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Figure 5.4: The procedure in planning the PRD intercity railway. 
(Sources: interviews no. 4, 5, 7) 
The first step is to undertake a prefeasibility study. This is to confirm the railway 
route and stations with cities concerned. The PIRC first entrusted a planning 
institution to create the prefeasibility study based on existing data and materials 
collected from local governments. Then the PIRC brought along the first draft of 
plans to each city along the railway line, and asked the city's ideas and feedbacks 
about the plans. The opportunity for the province and municipal governments to 
interact with each other was created through coordination meetings, which were 
organized by the PIRC to discuss various planning issues such as line alignment and 
design. Relevant sectors at the municipal level were invited to join these 
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coordination meetings, including the Planning Bureau, the Land Bureau and the 
Development and Reform Bureau. As mentioned before, the Planning Bureau takes 
charge of negotiating the railway planning with the PIRC, and makes sure that the 
lines within the city's territory accord with urban plans. As for the Land Bureau, its 
major task is to assist the PIRC in land acquisition for railway construction and 
compensating the loss of farmers who give up their land. The Development and 
Reform Bureau has to determine the investment allocation plan. At the coordinating 
meetings, different municipal bureaus will put forward their initial opinions on the 
18 
railway plan (interview no. 10) . The PIRC then makes some revisions on its plan 
based on local feedbacks, and turn back to each city for local opinions again. 
Accordingly, the plan will not be passed on to the province for approval until all 
relevant municipal agents accepts the revised railway plan. The PIRC will then hand 
out the plan to the provincial level when it thinks it has consulted all municipal 
governments concerned (interview no. 16)19. m o r will be in charge of the final 
approval of the revised plans after examination by the provincial level. If MOR has 
any alteration about the plan design, it can convene relevant local government 
officials to Beijing and discuss with them directly. 
After the prefeasibility study, a more detailed study, the Project Feasibility study, 
will be carried out. It lies its concern on delimiting the boundary of the line route and 
the site selection of railway stations. Similar to the former step, the PIPC would 
bring its draft plan design to relevant cities, and discussed technical issues with 
municipal agents. 
The final plan design will be confirmed at the third phase: initial line design. The 
specific railway line and its technical parameters will be finalized in this phase. As 
for municipal governments, it is the last chance to make any revision on the railway 
，0 暑 * _ • 
plans (interview no. 11, 12)一 . Thus, a large amount of negotiations and interactions 
can be found in this phase, which is seen as a real coordination process. In fact, two 
major issues which have been negotiated intensively are the line routes and the 
O 1 
location of stations (interview no. 1,2)— . A detailed story in this phase will be 
illustrated in the following case studies. After the initial line design is finished, the 
18 In terview with two p lanner s in Shunde and Foshan, June, 2010. 
19 In terview with one senior p lanner in Zhuhai, June 25, 2010. 
20 In terview with two p lanner s in Foshan, June 2010. 
21 Interview with two officials in Guangzhou, July 15, 2010. 
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next step is to seek official approval for railway projects. This includes applying for 
planning permit, construction permit, and land use permit for railway routes and 
stations. The PIRC has to apply for all these permits from municipal land bureau and 
planning bureau. Without these permits, railway construction is not allowed to start 
in principle. 
As showed in the planning procedure discussed above, the major form of planning 
coordination among various jurisdictional governments is the coordination meetings 
organized by the PIRC. However, there are mainly two problems in the coordination. 
One is that such coordination is controlled by higher-level governments. The 
coordination meetings are held only if the PIRC has any questions about the plans 
and it has to consult local governments. Cities may be difficult to send their 
feedbacks to the PIRC after these coordination meetings are over. 
The second problem is that there is no direct intercity interaction in the negotiation 
process. The PIRC conducts the coordination meetings with different municipal 
governments separately. If conflicts arise between two adjacent cities, they would 
hand over the problem to the PIRC and the province to resolve these conflicts. 
Usually, no formal meeting is arranged for interaction between these two cities. This 
may cause a problem because the higher-level government has its vested interests 
and therefore may be not neutral enough to solve these conflicts. It may tend to favor 
the city with higher administrative status, like Guangzhou (interview no. 11)^'. In 
this sense, any technical conflicts between two jurisdictions in planning process may 
finally evolve into serious political issues between different levels of governments. 
Although the formal procedure of planning approval for each railway line follows the 
same course, the reality is that there are many coordinations going on between 
different jurisdictions outside the formal system (interview no. 19). Furthermore, as 
discussed above, there is no legal regulation for planning coordination between 
different jurisdictions. For example, the administrative relationship between the 
province and municipal governments seems fuzzy in the planning arrangement. 
Although the provincial level has the power to determine the plan revisions from 
municipal governments, MOR, as a major partner, holds the final saying on plan 
design. This restricts the freedom of the province to some extend. 
In terview with two p lanners in Foshan, June 21, 2010. 
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On the other hand, the relationship between MOR and municipal governments can be 
closer and more flexible in planning coordination. Because the decision-making is 
dominated by MOR, it may be more effective for municipal governments to 
negotiate with MOR directly. As for inter-city relationship, it becomes delicate in 
such coordination process. Conflicts between two municipal governments have to be 
resolved by the province rather than by face-to-face negotiation. As such, the 
technical issues in planning may become political issues. 
In this context, more observations are needed to get deeper insights into the 
coordination process and to review the bargaining politics between and among 
different governments. 
Negotiation Process: Case Study of Guangzhou-Zhuhai Intercity Railway 
Guangzhou-Zhuhai (Guangzhu) Intercity Railway is a dedicated passenger railway 
linking South Station in Panyu, Guangzhou, and Zhuhai Airport in Zhuhai, through 
Shunde, Zhongshan and Jiangmen. Guangzhu Intercity Railway is the first intercity 
railway project which commenced construction. Its construction started in early 
2005, and will open to operation in January 2011. Guangzhu Intercity Railway has 
one main line and two extension lines. The main line connects Guangzhou and 
Zhuhai through Shunde and Zhongshan. It has 117 kilometers long, and allows trains 
to run at a maximum speed of 200 km/h. There are two kinds of passenger services 
on the main line,, i.e. 46-minute non-stop trip and 76-minute all-stop trip. Currently, 
only 13 stations out of total 27 are put into service. 
As early as 2004, the preliminary feasibility study of Guangzhu Intercity Railway 
was finished. MOR and Zhuhai reached an agreement on line alignment, technical 
standards of railway track and its speed, and plan design (CRIonline.com 2005). 
Different jurisdictions had various considerations and interests in this railway line. 
MOR, who was the biggest investor, cared about the cost and benefits of the project. 
In other words, MOR intended to maximize its profit and minimize the cost. Its 
major consideration was the volume of passenger flow. Therefore, MOR would like 
to direct the line route to pass through urban areas such as urban center with high 
population density to capture passenger flow. 
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As for the province, its major concern was to provide a more efficient transport 
system and to facilitate intercity travel. The Guangzhu Intercity Railway was greatly 
valued, because Guangdong regarded this mode of regional transportation as means 
to promote the PRD's competitiveness. Guangdong's primary goal was to complete 
the construction by 2010 because the Guangzhou Asian Games was held in 2010. 
Cities considered the railway plan from a more complex and more comprehensive 
perspective than the province and MOR. Railway planning was not merely about the 
physical matters of location and land use, but to a wider concern related to urban 
strategic development. 
As for Zhuhai city, the intercity railway provided a good opportunity to link more 
closely with the provincial capital, Guangzhou, and to integrate with the whole PRD 
transport network system. By promoting its accessibility, Zhuhai aimed at restoring 
its status as one of the three economic centers in the PRD. In fact, Zhuhai was listed 
as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) as early as the 1980s. A series of policies were 
deployed to stimulate economic growth there. During the first decade of the 
economic reform, Zhuhai was one of the most developed cities in the PRD region. 
However, the slow industrial growth in the past decade failed to match up with its 
status as a regional economic center. As shown in Figure 5.4, the output from large-
scale industries' in Zhuhai from 1999 to 2009 was lower than its nearby city, 
Zhongshan, not to mentione other two central cities, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. 
Inappropriate industrial strategies should be responsible for Zhuhai,s lagging behind 
its nearby cities (Greater Pearl River Delta Business Council 2006). 
23 Large-scale industry includes all state owned enterprieses and private industrial companies with 
annua丨 sale revenues of around $7.8 million or over. 
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Figure 5.5: The output from large-scale industries in five cities from 1999 to 2009. 
(Source: China City Statistics Yearbook 2000-2010) 
It was argued that the transportation connection was a crucial factor in determining 
the degree of integration (Cao et al. 2005, Greater Pearl River Delta Business 
Council 2006). Since the level of integration in turn affects the economic 
development, the transportation link is important to cities' development. China 
Academy of Urban Planning and Design (2004) conducted a study on the transport 
linkage among the PRD cities. Cities at the western side presented relatively weak 
connection compared to the eastern cities in the PRD (Xu and Yeh 2010). In this 
context, railway transport is a good alternative for Zhuhai to build stronger tie with 
Guangzhou and with other PRD cities. Guangzhu Intercity Railway was then listed 
as one key city project in 2005 (interview no. 17)'^. 
At the very beginning, this project was positioned as a mass rapid transit between 
major cities in the western part of the PRD. MOR proposed that the route passed 
through urban centers of Zhuhai, and terminated in Gongbei, which is a border 
crossing point to Macau. One problem was that the proposed line was built on an 
elevated track that is high above the ground, running through the urban central 
district. Such elevated railway would bring a series of negative effects to the urban 
environment and the cityscape. City planners in Zhuhai did not agree with the plan 
design and proposed to build an underground railway track. MOR rejected their 
24 Interview with one official in Zhongshan, July 30, 2010. 
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proposal because the construction cost for an underground railway line was much 
higher. In the end, MOR argued that if an underground line was built, Zhuhai would 
cover additional cost itself. 
Finally, Zhuhai accepted the elevated railway plan. For one reason, Zhuhai did not 
have sufficient budget for the additional cost. For the other reason, the city's main 
consideration was to stimulate its economic growth in the urban area by directing the 
intercity railway through urban centers. According to the previous agreement 
between MOR and Zhuhai, the intercity railway was mainly to connect cities in the 
^ c 
western side of the PRD. Thus, railway track and its operation speed" were designed 
with a technical standard similar to that of metro railways running in an urban era. Its 
relatively low operation speed allowed the train to stop at a shorter distance than the 
railway with high speed standard. This suggested the train might bring large 
passenger flow from other cities to the CBD of Zhuhai. Therefore, the economic 
benefits brought by the plan could overwhelm the negative impacts on urban 
environment and cityscape. MOR and Zhuhai then reached an agreement on the 
location of the railway track and its stations in the city. 
However, MOR kept on changing the technical standards of railway track and its 
speed of Guangzhu Intercity Railway. MOR decided to incorporate this line into the 
national railway system. The function of the railway was thus changed to serve long-
distance travel instead of intercity travel within the PRD. This meant a train might 
start from Beijing to Zhuhai directly. The technical standards of railway track and 
speed were also changed in accordance with the standard of national railway. The 
latter was equipped with higher operation speed, which meant less stops would be 
made in one trip. In this case, there was little chance for the long-distance train to 
stop at each station located in the city center. 
Zhuhai strongly disagreed with this change, and required to revise the railway plan 
accordingly. MOR rejected the request and claimed that the railway route and station 
location could not be revised any more once it was approved officially. Zhuhai then 
tried to negotiate with MOR through Guangdong province. However, Guangdong 
governor cared about when the construction could start, and did not want to spend 
25 丁he width of track is a little shorter than that of national railway track (interview no. 3). It usually 
has a high capacity and frequency. The average of operating speed is around 70 km/h, and the 
maximum can reach 120 km/h (interview no. 16). 
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extra time in revising the plan. Zhuhai failed to make any change on the railway 
route and stations. The Guangzhu Intercity Railway was thus constructed mainly 
based on the initial plan. 
The case in Zhongshan is quite similar to that in Zhuhai. The major conflict between 
MOR and Zhongshan was the line alignment. As for MOR, the main concern in 
planning railway line was to maximize passenger flow. Sanxiang, a district in the 
southwest of Zhongshan, was the ideal place for MOR. This town is famous for its 
export-oriented processing industries. These labor-intensive industries helped the 
town attract a large number of migrant workers. In 2010, the total population in 
Sanxiang was up to 200,197，ranking the fifth in Zhongshan. In the initial plan, MOR 
directed the railway route through Sanxiang to Zhuhai because of its relatively large 
population. 
However, Zhongshan had a different consideration about the benefits that the 
Guangzhu Railway could bring along. The municipal government concerned more 
about the city's development, and railway project is a key planning and political tool 
to achieve urban development strategies. Guangzhu Intercity Railway was regarded 
as a good opportunity to stimulate the development of new area. The city believed 
that the railway which connected two central cities in the PRD could bring along 
many passengers, and more importantly, lots of investment opportunities and new 
economic dynamics to newly developed urban area. 
Zhongshan had positioned the southeast part as a high-tech development area in its 
1 ith Urban Plan. In this case, they made the request to direct the railway towards 
southeast. In the beginning, the municipal government told its ideas to the provincial 
level, which would then report to MOR. But it did not work out. MOR rejected the 
proposed plan mainly for two reasons. First, the new plan would add additional 
length of 10 kilimeters and thus substantially increase the construction cost. Second, 
the newly developed area could not bring as many passengers as Sanxiang. 
Even though Zhongshan kept on promoting its plan to higher level of governments, 
MOR strongly insisted on the initial plan. Then the city turned to a railway planning 
design institution for help. This institution is a technical agent subordinated to MOR, 
and usually undertakes railway planning projects from MOR. For each project, it 
would suggest several planning proposals to MOR, which would then make final 
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decisions. In fact, MOR's decision makers rely heavily on the information and data 
from this technical institution because it is difficult for them to access all details 
about local situations. Zhongshan thus attempted to convince MOR by appealing the 
MOR's planning design institution for reporting the city's ideas. Furthermore, the 
mayor of Zhongshan even went directly to Beijing and talked to MOR face to face. 
In the process of negotiation with MOR, Zhongshan made two points clear. First, 
there was no railway pathway in the city's southwestern region. If the railway went 
through that area, a large built up district had to be removed, and the cost of 
resettlement and land compensation would be substantially high; Second, local 
farmers were strongly against MOR's plan. If they were forced to give up their land, 
they might organize protests and thus undermined social harmony (interview no. 
19)26. 
Consequently, MOR agreed to change the line route to the southeast area, and 
approved the plan design proposed by Zhongshan. It took almost two months for the 
city to negotiate with MOR. Yet they felt confident about the negotiation during that 
period. They believed that the central government would eventually consider local 
requests (interview no. 18)'^. MOR could not carry out the project without local 
support. For instance, it is extremely difficult for MOR to acquire the land for 
railway projects without local governments' supports. 
Nowadays in China, land acquisition became increasingly difficult and complex 
because of ambiguity of land ownership (Ho, 2010). If local farmers do not agree on 
the land acquisition, any railway construction cannot be legally permitted by NDRC. 
Therefore, MOR relies on local governments to persuade farmers to give up their 
land. However, some local governments have adopted illegal strategies to force local 
farmers to leave their land. The farmers are often not happy about this, and fight 
back with strong protests. The oppositions by the farmers have become more and 
more prominent, and have been a hot topic reported by mass media. This is particular 
evident in Guangdong. The central government is quite sensitive with such 
gathering, and worries that it may involve into large-scale protests which are out of 
control by local governments. In this context, the central government often directly 
26 In terv iew with one senior official in Zhongshan, July 30, 2010. 
In terv iew with a p lanner in Zhongshan, July 2 2 , 2010. 
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intervenes in regulating land issues which undermine the benefits of farmers. Now 
MOR would try to avoid the conflicts with local farmers (interview no. 19). It is in 
this context that MOR would rather change its line route than taking the risk of 
arousing mass protests. 
As for the intercity negotiation, Zhongshan also developed some strategies. For 
instance, Zhongshan did not agree with the alignment of a branch line to Jiangmen. 
The city then went to discuss with this problem with Jiangmen first, instead of 
reporting it to the province. The two cities developed an informal dialogue on the 
railway plan. After a consensus was reached between them, they argued with the 
provincial government in a consistent tone (interview no. 19). Since an agreement 
had been reached between two cities, the province finally allowed their changes on 
the railway plan. 
5.3.2 The Cooperation between the Province and Municipal Governments 
As early as 2005, the PRD intercity railway network obtained prior approval from 
the central government. The initial plan included four main railway lines. They were 
Guangzhou-Shenzhen Line, Guangzhou-Zhuhai Line, Guangzhou-Zhaoqing Line, 
and Dongguan-Huizhou Line. The whole network was supposed to cover all towns 
and cities in the PRD region by 2020. Yet up to 2007, only the Guangzhou-Zhuhai 
Line started planning and construction under MOR's leadership. The other three 
lines, though on MOR's list of project calendar, had no substantial progress. 
Guangdong was not happy about the slow progress and decided to make a big 
change. The province determined to bypass MOR to build the PRD intercity railways 
on its own. In 2007, Guangdong organized a meeting to discuss the planning issues 
of the PRD intercity railway. The meeting was an essential start of plan-making work 
under the province-led pattern. 
As for the investment, Guangdong has developed a considerable financing capacity 
in the reform era. The province was able to settle funding construction issues on its 
own, and thus decided not to rely on MOR any more. It would work out an 
investment allocation plan with relevant PRD cities. The planning duties were thus 
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distributed among relevant organizations at the provincial and municipal levels. 
These changes of investment partners and planning regime meant that a new 
partnership had to be developed to plan the PRD intercity railways. Different from 
the previous MOR-led pattern, this new model was initiated to guide and coordinate 
railway planning between Guangdong province and its municipal governments. 
Under this model, there were two main levels of governments involved in the 
planning coordination. They were Guangdong province and its municipal 
governments. MOR was no longer the final decision-maker. All decisions on either 
the investment ratio or railway planning were in the charge of Guangdong province. 
In addition, major conflicts were resolved through the interactions between 
Guangdong province and municipal governments. Without intervenes from MOR, it 
opened a large room for Guangdong province and municipal governments to bargain 
with each other. In most of the cases, the negotiating issues were not set out in 
advance, but relied on the specific situation. Once conflicts occurred, Guangdong 
province and its municipal governments would come to negotiate and reach an 
agreement of plans. Being more flexible and informal are the characteristics for 
interaction among jurisdictions within the province in the context of the new 
collaboration pattern, which is close line with actual local conditions. 
Technical Planning Process 
The institutional organization of the railway planning is mainly made up of two 
levels of governments. Figure 5.6 (see below) illustrates such arrangement. 
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Figure 5.6: The institutional arrangement under province-led pattern in planning the 
PRD Intercity Rail (December 2005- August 2010) 
(Source: interview no. 4, 
The lead of decision-making was the province, which was also in charge of planning 
preparation in Guangdong. PDRC was appointed to take the lead in railway planning. 
Its major duty was to conduct plan-making processes by organizing other relevant 
departments (e.g. Transportation Commission, Land and Resource Commission, and 
SASAC). PDRC was also in charge of railway plan approval on behalf of the 
province. However, it is still the province which made the final decisions. The 
province reviewed all plan designs before submitting to NDRC. The planning 
coordination and railway construction were undertaken by the GPRI (Shengtietou). 
Its major task is to coordinate various ideas and demands of cities along railway 
lines. To facilitate the negotiation process, PDRC set up the Southeast Corporation 
and the Northwest Corporation, which were mainly invested by GPRI and SASAC. 
Similar with PIRC under the MOR-led pattern, these two corporations are project 
developers to plan and construct the PRD intercity railway on behalf of the investors, 
including the provincial and the relevant municipalities along the railway line. They 
serve important roles in connecting the province and municipal governments in 
negotiation processes, just like two mediators who deliver information between two 
levels of governments and among different municipalities. They are responsible for 
28 In terv iew wi th two officials in Guangzhou, in June 2010. 
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commissioning qualified planning institutions to design initial railway plans, and 
then bring these plans to relevant cities for discussion. Usually, these draft plans 
have incorporated planning ideas at the provincial level before being submitted to 
municipalities for discussion. Individual cities have to rely on these two corporations 
to deliver their feedbacks to the province. The institutional arrangement at municipal 
level is almost the same with that at the provincial level. The municipal government 
has the final decision-making power of railway plans. The functional departments at 
the municipal level undertake corresponding responsibilities of those at the higher 
level, yet at a smaller scale of jurisdiction. For instance, the Land and Resource 
Bureau are responsible for assisting in site selection for railway stations and for 
granting land use permit. Yet the responsibilities of the Development and Reform 
Bureau and the Planning Bureau at the municipal level are a little different from 
those at the provincial level. One coordinating group is set up under the direction of 
the municipal government. It is empowered to organize the municipal departments to 
engage in planning processes，and also to coordinate their ideas of the plans. The role 
of the Development and Reform Bureau is thus reduced to take care of the 
investment allocation plan with PDRC and to issue documents of cooperation 
framework. As for the Planning Bureau, its main task is to coordinate railway 
planning with GPRI and to grant planning permits and building constructing permits 
prior to any construction. The Planning Bureau plays a key role in the planning 
process because it deals with all information from both Guangdong province and the 
municipal governments. Besides，it has to negotiate with GPRI on behalf of the 
municipal governments. 
The railway planning procedure under the province-led pattern is showed in Figure 
5.7 (see below). The technical procedure in the plan-making process can be divided 
into four parts, which show high similarity with the process under the MOR-led 
pattern. 
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Source: Summarized by the Author from the interview notes (interview no. 11,13)" 
Different from the MOR-led pattern, the project developer has changed to GPRI， 
which is taking care of planning coordination between the province and 
municipalities. As mentioned above, two corporations under GPRI are responsible 
for different railway lines. The working procedure in each phase follows the same 
flow. The project developer first entrusts a planning institution to design a railway 
plan. It then brings along the first draft to cities along the line for discussion. 
Usually, many coordination meetings have to be organized in each city by the project 
developer to discuss details of the railway plan with the municipal government and 
29 In terview with p lanners in Foshan and Dongguan, June 2010. 
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its relevant functional departments. During these meetings, the project developer will 
give briefings on the draft plan and the line's technical parameters. These functional 
departments will then consider whether the draft plan can be implemented at the city 
level, and more importantly, whether this plan meets their expectations. 
If no agreement is reached on the first draft, PIRC will make revisions of the plan 
according to feedbacks from cities along the railway line. In fact, not all the requests 
of the cities will be taken into account in the revised plan by PIRC. Each city has its 
own interests and ideas, which may conflict with other cities' interests and needs. 
PIRC would prioritize one city over another by its preferences. Since the revised plan 
is unable to satisfy all cities, a further round of negotiation is needed between PIPC 
and relevant cities. Again, PIRC organizes coordination meetings with different 
municipal governments and talked about new planning revisions. As for municipal 
governments, they will take the chance to express their ideas on these revisions, and 
also make clear their demands if the new plan fails to reach their expectations. In 
most cases, PIRC will convince various municipal departments of accepting its 
planning design, instead of accepting all suggestions from municipal governments. It 
is in this context that negotiations are undertaken. These negotiations depending on 
specified problems in each city vary from case to case. More details about 
interactions between Guangdong province and municipal governments will be 
illustrated in next section. When a consensus on the planning design is reached， 
PIRC would frame the coordination ideas in official documents. A city's planning 
bureau is required to issue a document back to show the planning design has been 
approved. Different from MOR-led pattern, all agreements on the plan design have to 
be documented officially. The formal form of planning agreement is designed to 
ensure each city's commitments and also to smooth the implementing process of the 
railway plan. Unlike the western city regions, the cooperation framework is not 
common in regional infrastructure planning in China. The responsibilities of 
municipal governments in plan implement are supervised by the strong higher-level 
governments. Therefore, documented framework is not used in the regional 
cooperation as frequently as the western regions'. In this sense, the documented 
framework of PRD railways indicates that, without MOR's intervention, Guangdong 
province has not enough confidence in administratively controlling over the 
municipalities. 
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As showed above, Guangdong province has predominantly put forward a new 
collaboration pattern to conduct intercity railway plan-making process. The 
partnership is mainly composed of two levels of governments-Guangdong province 
and municipal governments. The planning administration and mechanism under 
province-led pattern are a little different from those under MOR-led pattern. There 
are only two levels of governments mainly involved in the planning process. It thus 
can avoid the ambiguous relationship between the province and the municipal 
governments as presented in MOR-led pattern. The new collaboration pattern no 
longer stresses the vertical administration. The final decision-making step is thus less 
affected by the higher level of governments. More attention can be focused on the 
coordination process of the railway plans. 
As for the municipal governments, there are various pathways to transfer their 
feedback upwards. Under the new planning pattern, the decision-making power is 
controlled by Guangdong province. The municipalities have to convince its higher-
level leader if they want to incorporate their ideas into railway plans successfully. It 
is not a difficult task for the municipalities. As a matter of fact, they have developed 
various formal or informal connections with their superiors in the daily 
operation^°(interview no. 18, 19). Moreover, Guangdong province is more familiar 
with the local economic-social conditions, which facilitates the negotiation on 
railway plans. As such, the municipal governments enjoy more chances to fully 
express their opinions and feedbacks to the province. However, it does not mean all 
problems are solved by the municipal governments themselves. Their higher level of 
government serves indispensable role in the planning coordination. The new pattern 
has followed the rule in the former pattern. No direct interaction platform between 
cities is provided in the planning coordination process. The conflicts between two 
adjacent cities have to be informed to the provincial level and let the province help 
solve the issues. As discussed before, this may cause a problem that the province 
may be biased to one city for political reasons (interview no. 11, 12, 22)31. 
As for Guangdong province, more concerns will be put on the investment ratio and 
the collaboration framework in the planning process. Since the whole intercity 
30 In terv iews with two officials in Zhongshan, July 30 2010. As indicated by them, the formal 
connec t ions mean official linkages with certain provincial depar tmen t s , while the informal 
connec t ions re fe r to the individual re la t ionship with provincial officials. 
31 In te rv iew wi th two p lanners in Foshan, June 2010 and one p lanner in Shenzhen, March 2011. 
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railway project is a huge financial burden, the province positively seeks to share the 
investment responsibilities with the municipal governments. In order to increase their 
incentives, Guangdong province ties the investment ratio with the railway route and 
station directly. The more stations a city asks to build, the higher share of investment 
it has to undertake. Similarly, more funds have to be committed if the city designs a 
longer railway line within its territory. This may result in a problem that cities with 
larger financial ability would own the priority in planning the railway with their 
preference. While poorer cities have to obey Guangdong province even if they do not 
satisfy with the plan design. 
On the other hand, the province attempts to develop a cooperation framework with 
municipal governments. The framework is proposed to legitimate the planning 
collaboration and interactions between Guangdong province and municipal 
governments in the future. Without the strong power as MOR, Guangdong province 
considers that the official framework can help them to regulate local governments' 
actions, as well as to ensure a smooth process of the cooperation. 
Furthermore, it is the first time for Guangdong to conduct the cross-border railway 
projects within the region. All rules and experience must be accumulated from the 
very beginning. It takes a lot of time and energy for it to coordinate with the 
municipalities. The goal, however, is to complete the intercity railway network as 
soon as possible. The time-consuming negotiation turns out to be a headache for the 
province. It is in this context that the provincial government is eager to form the 
cooperating agreement with the municipal governments. Once they reach agreements 
on the framework, the planning activities of the coming railway projects will follow 
the same instructions in the framework. It is also expected to shorten the negotiation 
time between jurisdictions. 
Actually, however, the coordination process is far more complicated. The problems 
and its solutions vary from case to case. It is quiet difficult to use one framework to 
summarize all cases on interactions between d i f ferent jurisdictions. The following 
section shows how d i f ferent jurisdictions interacted with the province in the planning 
process. Two railway lines (Guangzhou-Foshan railway and Guangzhou-Dongguan-
Shenzhen railway) are used as examples to illustrate their interactions in the planning 
process. 
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Negotiation Process: Case Study of Guangzhou-Foshan Intercity Railway and 
Guangzh o u-DongguanSh enzh en Intercity Railway 
Guangzhou-Fosl ian Intercity Railway 
As one important part of the PRD intercity railway network, Guangzhou-Foshan 
Intercity Railway line {Guangfo Line) connects two major cities namely Guangzhou 
and Foshan in the region. The railway extends around 33km, 18.5km in Guangzhou 
and 14.5 km in Foshan respectively. There are 21 underground stations along the 
railway line. Its construction started from 2007 and is expected to finish in 2012. The 
entire Guangfo Line is divided into two sections. One is from Kuiqilu Station to 
Xilang Station in Foshan, which was opened to public in September 2010. The other 
is from Xilang Station to Lijiao Station, which will run into operation at the end of 
2012. Similar to Guangzhu railway line, two service modes will be applied into the 
daily operation — non-stop and all-stop services. The Guangfo line is the first 
intercity subway that put into operation in China. During the 2010 Asian Games, the 
line made it convenient to travel from Foshan to Guangzhou. 
When planning Guangfo line, the province's starting points were quiet a bit different 
from those of municipal governments. The purpose of the provincial government was 
to connect cities closely. The train was designed to run at around 200 km/hour speed. 
The technical conditions for the railway were required to be straight line and long 
distance. As for Foshan government, the intercity railway was used to solve the 
traffic congestion and to drive the development of key urban area strategically. When 
designing the railway route, the Foshan government followed two principles, 
directing the railway through urban center with dense population, and directing the 
railway to the new developed urban center. The different goals in planning railway 
made the direction of railway line become the biggest problem between the two 
levels of governments. 
The province proposed to direct a straight line through the urban center. In order to 
cut costs, it preferred an elevated railway. Foshan strongly objected this proposed 
plan. The city argued that an elevated railway line would separate their flourish 
business area into two isolated parts. This may lead to a big trouble for the daily 
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communication within the urban center area. Foshan government refused to construct 
the railway line underground. 
In addition, Foshan government has recently designed another urban center named 
Dongping New Town at its southeast. They positioned the new town as the future 
CBD of Foshan. Thus, the Foshan government requested the railway route to pass 
through this region with one station located there. It was believed that the new 
railway could bring along a lot of people. Their potential demands can effectively 
stimulate the new center's economic growth. 
However, GPRI rejected Foshan，s requirements because it would make the previous 
line curve to the south. To stick to its plan project, Foshan government had several 
coordination meetings with the province. The city's mayor paid several visits to the 
province and explained his ideas on the railway plan. After several rounds of 
negotiation with the province. Foshan made the first move, and agreed to increase 
the investment for the extra payment of underground construction. Yet on the other 
hand, Foshan claimed that there was no land use quota for the railway line according 
to its land use plan. 
Finally, the province compromised to Foshan's request. The new railway line was 
adjusted and agreed to pass through the new town area. 
However, not every request made by Foshan can be accepted by the province. In 
fact, the Foshan government was confronted with another dilemma. When designing 
the PRD intercity railway network, Guangzhou was positioned as the transportation 
hub. All major railway lines were design to start from Guangzhou to northwest, 
southwest and southeast areas. Because Foshan lies closely to the southwest of 
Guangzhou, railway lines from Guangzhou to the southwest cities may inevitably to 
cross the territory of Foshan. As most of the railway lines will be constructed above 
the ground, the railway transportation will certainly bring about a number of negative 
impacts on Foshan city. For instance, the railway through the downtown would result 
in a huge loss of existing built environment. Furthermore, the urban center with 
dense population would be seriously separated by these ground constructions. This 
might lead to a huge trouble for comminuting between different functional areas in 
the urban center. 
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As for Guangzhou, however, the railway directing to the southwest was of great 
benefits to its status as a regional hub center. The route via Foshan could connect the 
southwest cities at the shortest distance. In this sense, whether to build railways via 
Foshan has involved two cities' interests: Foshan and its neighbor, Guangzhou. As 
two cities were not authorized to solve their conflicts face to face, this problem was 
thus handed over to the province. 
The province insisted on the original plan by emphasizing its significance to 
Guangzhou and other southwest cities. Although Foshan government argued with the 
province from time to time, no change was made on railway route at the southwest of 
the region. One official in Foshan complained that the two cities status in the 
province was totally different (interview no. 1 G u a n g z h o u , as the provincial 
capital, was attached more attention by the province, which often distributed 
resources to Guangzhou, and concerned less on Foshan. The officials in Foshan also 
indicated that they were not surprised at the result, as the provincial government 
would make the decision according to its political preference instead of the technical 
consideration (interview no. 12). 
Guangzhou-Doiigguan-Shenzhen Intercity Railway 
Guangzhou-Dongguan-Shenzhen {Sui-Guan-Shen) Intercity Railway is a dedicated 
passenger railway connecting XinTang Station in Guangzhou, via Machong to 
Dongguan, and through Humen to Shenzhen. It is 86.62 kilometers in length, and 
with a total investment of $30.5 million. There are 16 stations along the railway line. 
The construction work started from December 2008, and was expected to finish at 
the end of 2011. When it puts into operation, it will take 60 minutes to travel from 
Guangzhou to Shenzhen with the speed of around 140 kilometers/hour. There will be 
one train every three minutes. 
A large part of the railway line had to pass through Dongguan from the northwest 
part to the southeast part. Hence, the location of the railway route became a big 
concern in the planning process. One major conflict was that the intercity railway 
line by Southeast Corporation overlapped with urban subway line planned by 
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Dongguan. In July 2008, the province proposed a new version of the PRD intercity 
railway network. It was found that the railway route from Machong to Houjie was 
nearly consistent with the direction of R1 subway plan of Dongguan (interview no. 
13)33. Even the stations in both plans were located at the same place. In fact，the 
overlapped area is the urban district of Dongguan. Both of them aimed to attract 
passengers as many as possible. The developed urban center is the ideal place to 
locate the station. Dialectically, the intercity railway passing through the urban 
center would bring about a number of problems to urban transportation, as well as 
the urban landscape. Dongguan government opposed the plan design and had a 
debate with both GRPI and PDRC. In the meanwhile, Dongguan government also 
refused to approve the land use right for construction projects of the intercity railway 
(interview no. 15). Without local government's approval, Guangdong province could 
not implement the previous plan at last. In response, the province left the Dongguan 
subway plan unapproved, and thus delayed its subway construction as well. A year 
later, Dongguan government made some revisions on the urban subway plan and 
reached a compromise with PDRC. After a further negotiation, the original intercity 
railway was also modified a little. It changed to passed through the southwest of the 
urban district. 
In Dongguan, there were many other disagreements on the planning design. However, 
the province acccpted the revision by Dongguan to speed up the planning process of 
the railway (interview no. 14). When the provincial governors came to Dongguan, he 
said that the speed is most important. As long as Dongguan could promise a pathway 
for the intercity railway, all requests proposed by Dongguan would be accepted by 
the province. According to the plan, every town in Dongguan was designed to locate 
at least one station. 
33 Interview with one senior p l anne r in Dongguan, June 24, 2010. 
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5.4 The Scalar Changes of Central-provincial-local State: State 
Rescaling Process 
As showed above, different jurisdictions took various interests from the railway plan 
basing on their own development. It can be generally summarized in Table 5.2. At 
the central level, MOR mainly considered the economic efficiency that the intercity 
railway could bring in the future. MOR attempted to minimize the constructing cost 
and maximize profits by capturing as many as local passengers. Hence, MOR would 
raise two requirements in the planning process. The first is to design straight lines 
and fewer stations, which can reduce construction cost effectively. The second is to 
direct railway line through the urban area with dense population. 
At the provincial level, Guangdong also kept socio-economic targets in constructing 
the regional railway network as a top priority. Compared with MOR, time schedule 
was the major concern of the provincial government. Guangdong's goal was to 
construct an efficient transport system and to facilitate intercity travel. This modem 
railway network was regarded as a valuable infrastructure to allow the PRD step 
forward in the competition with other regions in China. Guangdong believed that, the 
less time it takes to complete the construction, the sooner it becomes a competitive 
region in China. In the planning process, the provincial government also asked for 
straight line and fewer stations as for economic efficiency, but sometimes it may 
compromise to cities in order to speed up the planning procedure. 
At the municipal level, cities considered the railway plans from a more complex and 
more comprehensive perspective than MOR and the provincial governments. They 
regarded the regional railway as a good opportunity to spur local development, and 
related the railway plans to urban development strategies. The planners of cities 
usually requested railway line to cross the newly developed area according to their 
urban plans. Also, they would ask for more stations built along the railway line. In 
this sense, the major conflicts in the planning process were the line alignment and the 
location of stations. 
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Table 5.2: Interests of different governments in planning the PRD intercity railway. 
Actors Major Interests Planning concerns Conflicts 
Economic efficiency; Straight line; fewer 
MOR passenger flow; less stations 
cost 
— ； Line 
Regional Straight line; fewer alignment; 
Guangdong province competitiveness; time . o n s ; less location 
g g P schedule; economic coordinating time of stations 
efficiency 
Municipal Urban development; Long line; more 
governments socio-economic growth stations 
In the meanwhile, they also possessed different degrees of power in planning 
coordination. This led to some tension of the relationship between different 
governments. Such tension thus resulted in various conflicts in the planning process. 
Without definite regulations for planning coordination, the interactions between 
jurisdictions become flexible as well as complicated. 
The planning coordination mechanism is not fixed, but loose and flexible. Once 
conflict happens, relevant government agencies would come to negotiate a 
resolution, and make revision on the planning design based on their agreements. 
Issues which cannot be resolved at lower levels rely on the next higher level. The 
first round of coordination was undertaken by PDRC. If no agreement is reached by 
PDRC, the governor, the highest leader at the provincial level, will come forward to 
intervene in the coordination. The final decision is reached through meetings 
between the provincial governor and mayors. While in some cases, it is the 
provincial governor who makes decisions by his own. Such coordinating manner is 
not uncommon in China. 
Although central government releases some power to local governments, they will 
retain the decision-making authority from localities when they need to intervene into 
the local issues. This process can be called a scaling-up process, through which the 
planning power is recentralized by higher level of government. The table below has 
classified the cases mentioned before into two trends of scalar changes, as well as 
four kinds of relationship. As showed in Table 5.3, the upward trend of planning 
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power has emerged in the interaction between MOR and the provincial government. 
This is a scaling-up process, through which MOR takes back its authority to control 
the planning process from the provincial government. This suggests that the higher 
level of government is still able to reassert its power in the final decision-making 
process. The lower-level governments have to subordinate their higher-level 
governments at certain situation. 
Table 5.3: Four kinds of interaction in the planning coordination 
Province and MOR and Intercity MOR and Province 
Municipality Municipality 
Scaling None None None Monopolized 
up relevant technique; 
Dominated 
schedule planning 
Scaling e.g. Foshan e.g. Zhongshan e.g. Zhongshan Invested railway 
down Coordination Turned to design & Jiangmen network on its own 
meeting with institution; Two cities made 
the province; Talked to MOR informal 
Increase face to face dialogue, and 
investment; talked to the 
not approve province with the 
the land use forming 
quota agreement. 
It is observed that there is a desire to resolve conflicts at the possibly lowest level. 
The problem is, however, that deadlocks among entities at lower levels resulted in 
the delay of planning procedure. The time-consuming negotiations among the 
squabbling subordinates can be a headache to the higher level of governments. 
Currently in China, the official leaders believe that the less time it takes to construct 
the railway, the earlier the region gains development than others, and the more 
profits it can bring to local economic growth. In this context, the higher levels remain 
overwhelmed at this stagnant situation by competing subordinates. 
However, this does not mean that lower level of governments can not change the 
planning decisions and involve their ideas into it. On one hand, they maintain 
frequently formal and informal dialogues among themselves, and come out a 
resolution through political negotiations. Such coordination processes have been 
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thoroughly studied well in the political arena，namely the bargaining process. 
Bargaining is one of the characteristics in China's political system. Usually, the 
leaders would utilize the political or economic resources to bargain with each other. 
Before the economic reform, a large part of bargaining happened between the 
different sectors at the central level (Lieberthal 1992). Since the economic reform, an 
increase in bargaining has emerged between the different levels of governments. The 
shift is accompanied by the decentralized reform of state power in the past two 
decades. The changing power distribution between central and local governments is 
left with many problems unsolved. Some of the duties and powers are not separated 
strictly between different levels of governments. This leads to fuzzy relationship 
between governments. As showed in the case of Zhongshan, lower-level 
governments may seek another pathway to argue with higher-level governments. 
On the other hand, the lower levels of governments adopted strategies to delay the 
construction, such as, not to approve the land use quota, or to report the problems of 
land acquisition caused by farmers. The success of such strategies is largely 
benefitted from the economic reform in the 1980s. Before the reform, plan 
implementation was not attached much attention from governments. The core is to 
control various kinds of resources, like funding capital, land resources, and labor. 
Along with decentralized reform, local governments are granted with a bunch of 
planning authorities and certain rights of urban land use. They have become essential 
actors in plan implementation. On the other hand, the fierce competition between 
cities makes the plan implementation a big concern for local governments and the 
province. As such, in order to implement the plan, the central and the province need 
support from local governments (Ng and Tang 1999). The dependence on local 
authorities makes the central government comprise to local demands in some cases. 
As illustrated in Table 5.2，lower-level governments have developed various 
strategies to convince higher-level governments, and obtained power in the plan-
making process. The downward trend of planning power is called a scaling-down 
process. 
To sum up, the coordinating mechanism is not fixed but ad hoc during the planning 
process. It is developed on a case-by-case basis. There is no regular route in planning 
coordination. Once conflicts appear, relevant actors would come together to resolve 
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problems. Coordination meetings are important instruments for them to voice their 
ideas and interests. In addition, both the formal and informal dialogue between 
various jurisdictional departments serve key role in solving problems in reality. On 
the other hand, no scale of government dominates the power in decision-making. All 
agreements are reached based on the bargaining between various jurisdictions in both 
scaling-up and scaling-down processes. Briefly, the planning coordination process is 
not a singular directed activity, but achieved through both upward and downward 
trends of state re-organization. 
Furthermore, the planning processes for regional infrastructure and politics involved 
are a reflection of the ongoing process of state rescaling. The administrative form 
and configuration in planning railway are formed in relation to the trends and counter 
trends of state reorganization process. 
Although the PRD intercity railway plan was approved by the State Council in early 
2005, further planning design was delayed for almost one year because MOR, who 
should be responsible of more than half of the construction cost, met with funding 
difficulties while, a number of railway projects were underway nationwide. In the 
railway arena, it is always MOR that provides more than half of the investment, and 
takes charge of management after its construction. Though local governments are 
allowed to join in the investment, the proportion is too small that they can only exert 
limited functions in the railway management. MOR shouldering heavy financing 
burden thus left little funding support on the PRD intercity railway project. 
Meanwhile, the province was ambitious to dominate in the organization of railways 
within the territory. Consequently, it took over the responsibility to carry the 
planning work a step forward, and initiate a province-led pattern instead of previous 
MOR-led pattern. 
There are two main reasons that drive the province to seek the help from MOR, and 
go back to the cooperation pattern between MOR and the province. One is that MOR 
has monopolized technique in railway management as well as construction. To run 
different trains within the network requires a workable network center for 
coordination. Such high-tech network is controlled closely by MOR. In addition, 
MOR has also dominated schedule planning of national railways. It has the authority 
to decide whether the train can run through the country. In other words, by excluding 
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MOR's participation, train may be not allowed to run out of the PRD region railway 
network. 
The other reason may be more urgent and important. The provincial government has 
been confronting with lots of coordination problems with the municipal governments 
just likes a story in a big family. Parents always have the headache when distributing 
the candies among a bunch of children. As showed before, during the coordination 
process, the technical planning problems would turn out to be political issues. This 
bargaining process costs the province lots of time and energy. It is in this context that 
the province needs higher-level government to take care of planning coordination 
among various jurisdictions. Although MOR is on the same level with Guangdong 
province in China's political system, it is still able to exert more effective functions 
on the municipal levels. This is because the MOR has a closer relationship with the 
central governments. Besides, it belongs to the functional department at the central 
level and is less relative with the interest of territorial governments. Thus, the 
domination of MOR has advantages to avoid the sensitive issues of competitive 
interests among different jurisdictions at least extent. MOR attempts to coordinate 
the planning design within the technical scope to push forward the planning process 
more quickly. 
The regions in China are now witnessing a re-organization of state regulatory scale, 
because certain functions of state are being scaled up and scaled down towards 
different institutional levels. Accordingly, the planning process of regional 
infrastructure is not a single directed activity, but achieved through both upward and 
downward movements of state power. The newly emergent planning institutions at 
the regional scale highlight the essential role of regions as an arena for the trends and 
counter trends of state re-organization. Furthermore, the power reshuffling between 
the central and provincial governments has showed that, the rescaling of planning 
authority intensifies the bargaining among different governments while the 




This study aims at analyzing how different jurisdictions interacted with each other in 
regional railway planning in China. The research questions raised in previous chapter 
focuses on the complex relationships between different jurisdictions in the planning 
process. More specific attention is spent on the institutional arrangement that 
relevant governments have set up, their roles in the planning process, and the way 
they coordinated plans to achieve their demands on regional infrastructure. Although 
the cooperation regime between central and local governments has been considerably 
improved since the reform era，it still embodied constraints that intensify the 
bargaining between various tiers of governments. This in turn led to a change of state 
power among different geopolitical scales (Ren 2008). In this study, the theoretical 
basis of state re-organization adopts the state rescaling theory, which provides an 
alternative way to examine the changing roles of states. Instead of treating the 
regional institution as a pre-given form, its core lies in evaluating the dialectical 
ways in which regions were produced by interaction between different jurisdictional 
governments. The Pearl River Delta (PRD) intercity railway is used as a case study. 
What concerned most is the ways in which multiple actors conducted the planning 
coordination. 
This final chapter summarizes the changes on the planning system of Chinese 
railways, and also the coordinating mechanism of railway plans in the PRD region. 
Afterwards, I will sum up the changing scalar relationships among multiple 
jurisdictional governments, and try to relate it with the state scaling theory. 
6,1 Major Findings 
1. Changes on the Railway Planning System 
During the pre-reform period, infrastructure plans depending on the official power 
structure followed a top-down model. The lower-level governments were 
subordinated to the higher level of governments and local governments were 
required to obey the central government. 
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With economic reform, a series of decentralized policies created a new political era 
within which ideas of territorial governments who were formerly marginalized could 
be incorporated into decision-making of plans. The centrally-dominated system 
gradually changed to a multi-level partnership where the central government, 
provincial governments and municipal governments joint together to form a 
partnership to maximize their economic interests (Lin 1997). As local governments 
gained greater decision-making power, region-wide infrastructure projects would be 
planned based on the agreement of cities where the infrastructure was located. 
The power distribution of the multi-level governments' interaction turns out to be 
more complex than before. The new power relationship involved both conflicts and 
cooperation (Lin, 1997, p. 60). On the one hand, the lack of rules made room for 
bargaining, negotiation and mutual accommodation among multi-level governments 
as there was no definite regulation for the operation mechanism of interaction. The 
bargaining process carried complicated tensions between the central and local 
governments. On the other hand, the new power relationship also involved 
collaboration as the investment and implementation of infrastructure plans relied on 
the joint efforts of multi-level governments. What's more, the horizontal partnership 
was becoming more and more important. While local governments were granted with 
greater decision-making power, regional infrastructure projects had to be planned 
based on an agreement between cities. There was no formal mechanism to forge 
horizontal interaction. 
It was in this context that coordination among multiple jurisdictions was necessary to 
plan railways in regions. Particularly, the coordinating process not only includes 
vertical negotiation among the multi-level governments, but also a horizontal and 
competitive relationship between municipal governments. 
2. Planning Coordination of Regional Railways 
The coordinating mechanism in planning was not fixed but loose and flexible. The 
newly emergent planning institutions were based on coordination, partnerships and 
various responses from governments. Once conflict occurred, the relevant agencies 
of governments would come to negotiate for a resolution. If issues couldn't be 
resolved at lower levels, they would be kicked up to the next higher level. Such a 
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coordinating manner was called a superior-decided system, which was not 
uncommon in China. 
Although the central government released some power to local governments, they 
would still retain decision-making authority when they needed to intervene into local 
issues. This process could be called a scaling-up process, through which planning 
power was recentralized by higher-level governments. As shown in the planning 
process of the PRD intercity railway, the upward trends of planning power were 
observed in central-provincial-local interactions. It revealed that the higher-level 
governments were still able to reassert their power in final decision-making. Lower-
level governments have to subordinate their supervisors in certain situations. 
One reason for scaling up was that time-consuming negotiations among the 
squabbling subordinates could be a big problem to higher-level governments. This 
was because political leaders in China believed that the less time it took to construct 
the railway, the faster the region became competitive against other regions, and more 
help to local economic growth. In this context, the higher levels remained 
overwhelmed by competing subordinates at this stagnant situation. 
However, this did not mean that lower levels of governments cannot change the 
planning decisions and involved their ideas into it. On one hand, they maintained 
frequent formal and informal dialogues among themselves, and uncovered 
resolutions through political negotiations. This coordination processes had been 
thoroughly studied in the political arena, and named the bargaining processes. 
Bargaining was one of the characteristics of China's political system. Usually, 
leaders would utilize political or economic resources to bargain with each other. 
Before the economic reform, a large part of bargaining happened between different 
sectors at the central level (Lieberthal and David 1992). Since the economic reform, 
an increase in bargaining emerged between different levels of governments. The shift 
was accompanied by the decentralized reform of state power in the past two decades. 
The changing power distribution between central and local governments left many 
problems unsolved. Some duties and powers were not separated strictly between 
different levels of governments. This led to fuzzy relationship between governments. 
As showed in the case of Zhongshan, lower-level governments might seek another 
path to argue with higher-level governments. 
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On the other hand, lower levels of governments adopted strategies to delay railway 
construction. The success of such strategies largely benefited from the economic 
reform in the 1980s. Before the reform, plan implementation did not attract much 
attention from governments. The core was to control various kinds of resources like 
funding capital, land resources, and labor. Along with decentralized reform, local 
governments were granted with planning authorities and certain rights of urban land 
use. They become essential actors in plan implementation. In addition, the fierce 
competition between cities made plan implementation a big concern in local and 
provincial governments. As such, in order to implement the plan, central and 
provincial governments needed support from local governments (Ng and Tang 
1999). It was in this context that dependence on local authorities made the central 
government comprise to municipal demands in some cases. As showed in the case of 
the PRD intercity railway, lower-level governments developed various strategies to 
convince higher-level governments, and obtained power in the plan-making process. 
The downward trend of planning power was called scaling-down process. 
In summary, the coordinating mechanism is not fixed, but rather, ad hoc during the 
planning process. The planning mechanisms varied case by case in planning the PRD 
inter-city railway. There is no regular route in planning coordination. Once conflicts 
appear, relevant actors come together to solve the problems. Coordinating meeting is 
an important instrument for different governments to voice their ideas and interests. 
Moreover, in reality, both the formal and informal negotiations between different 
jurisdictions serve key role in solving problems. 
On the other hand, no scale of government dominates the power in decision-making. 
All agreements are reached based on the bargaining between different jurisdictions in 
both scaling-up and scaling-down processes. Briefly, the planning coordination 
process is not a singular directed activity, but achieved through both upward and 
downward trends of state re-organization. 
3. Scalar Changes between Central and Local governments: State Rescaling 
Process 
The planning process for regional infrastructure and the politics involved are a 
reflection of the ongoing process of state rescaling. The administrative form and 
configuration in planning railways are formed in relation to the trends and counter-
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trends of the state re-organization process. In the case of the PRD intercity railway, 
the planning cooperation pattern has seen both scaling-down and scaling-up 
processes, which changed from MOR-led pattern to province-led one and then was 
back to MOR-led pattern. 
The reason for scaling down is about the funding problems of MOR. Although the 
PRD intercity railway plan was approved by the State Council in early 2005, further 
planning design was delayed for almost one year because the Ministry of Railway 
(MOR), who should be responsible of more than half of the construction cost, met 
with funding difficulties when a number of railway projects were underway 
nationwide. In the railway arena, it is always MOR that provides more than half of 
the investment, and takes charge of management after its construction. Though local 
governments are allowed to join in the investment, the proportion is too small that 
they can only exert limited functions in the railway management. MOR shouldering 
heavy financing burden thus left little funding support on the PRD intercity railway 
project. Meanwhile, the province was ambitious to dominate in the organization of 
railways within the territory. Consequently, it took over the responsibility to carry 
the planning work a step forward, and initiated a province-led pattern instead of the 
previous MOR-led pattern. 
As for the scaling up, there were two main reasons that drove the province to seek 
the help from MOR, and to turn back to the cooperation pattern between MOR and 
Guangdong province. One was that MOR monopolized the technique in railway 
management as well as construction. It also dominated schedule planning for 
national railways. It had the authority to decide whether the train could run through 
the national network. In other words, by excluding MOR's participation，the train is 
possibly not allowed to operate outside of the PRD region railway network. 
The other reason might be more urgent and important. The province confronted lots 
of coordination problems with municipal governments just like a story in a big 
family. Parents always have the headache when distributing candies among a bunch 
of children. As showed before, during the coordination process, technical planning 
problems would turn out to be the political issues. This bargaining process cost the 
province lots of time and energy. It was in this context the province needed a higher-
level government to take care of planning coordination among different jurisdictions. 
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Although MOR is on the same level with provincial governments in China's political 
system, it is still able to exert more effective functions on the municipal levels. This 
is because MOR has a closer relationship with the central government. Besides, it 
belongs to the functional department at the central level and suffers less interests' 
conflict with territorial governments. Thus, the domination of MOR allows the 
advantage to avoid sensitive issues of competitive interests among different 
jurisdictions at a less extent. MOR attempts to coordinate the planning design within 
the technical scope to push forward the planning process more quickly. 
The regions in China are now witnessing re-organization of states' regulatory scale, 
because certain functions of states are being scaled up and scaled down towards 
different institutional levels. Accordingly, the planning process of regional 
infrastructure is not a single directed activity, but achieved through both upward and 
downward movements of state power (Wu and Zhang 2010). The newly emergent 
planning institutions at the regional scale highlight the essential role of the regions in 
an arena for the trends and counter-trends of state re-organization. Furthermore, the 
power reshuffling between the central and provincial governments has showed that 
the rescaling of planning authority intensifies the bargaining among different 
governments while the increasingly intensive bargaining leads to another round of 
rescaling activities. 
6.2 Suggestions for Further Studies 
This study conducted an examination of state interaction on the regional issues using 
the PRD intercity railway as a case study. Specific focus was placed on the changes 
of planning legislation, institutional arrangement and coordinating mechanism 
relevant to infrastructure planning, and also to explore the relationship between 
multiple jurisdictional governments and the emerging institutions of planning in the 
PRD region of China. The study may be extended in several directions in the future 
research. 
First, a deep analysis of the driving forces in planning coordination will be essential 
for further understanding of state re-organization, and thus needed in future studies. 
In this study, it only revealed the trends and counter trends of state re-organization in 
forming the planning institution in China. In particular, a further study should be 
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conducted to conduct a systematic interpretation of governments' motivation and 
interests behind the phenomenon. In fact, the coordination between different 
jurisdictions is affected by many factors, including economic interests, development 
strategies and political interests. How these factors affect partnership formation and 
which factor is considered most important by governments? What are the different 
points of different jurisdictions in making decisions? All these inquiries will need to 
be answered in future studies. 
Second, the case of the PRD intercity railway is still underway and will need more 
tracking investigations in future. A renewed cooperation pattern of intercity railway 
plan is formed in the PRD region. How will MOR take up planning issues from the 
provinces? How will MOR deal with cooperation relationships with the strong 
municipal government in the PRD region? Is it different from the cooperation 
patterns in other regions? A comparison of the state relationship between different 
regions in China will also be needed in order to obtain a possibly comprehensive 
picture of state re-organization at the regional scale. 
Third，the spatial impact brought by such a regional railway is worthy of studying. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the politics and planning of city-regions were the 
mediums through which governments use to materialize state spatial strategies. Final 
railway plans represent different interests, and the spatial pattern that results from 
such a railway plan is thus essential for us to understand the planning effect. This 
will be quite useful for institutional agents as they can testify whether their planning 
strategies will be able to achieve their goals of spatial development in reality. 
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